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After the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas, applicants to Baltimore’s public housing projects were legally allowed to apply for 
residence in whichever projects they preferred, regardless of race. When it came to implementing 
this desegregation policy, however, the reality was not so simple. By ignoring the legacy of 
segregation and ongoing systemic racism and focusing on removing official barriers to “choice,” 
housing officials and local leadership did little to actually alleviate segregation among public 
housing residents. In the city’s three main arenas of conflict—planning, policy, and politics—
leaders embraced the rhetoric of “freedom of choice,” which allowed them to eschew more 
substantive steps toward desegregation by blaming continued segregation on individual agency. 
This dissertation examines the ways in which city planning, public policy, and local 
politics intersected in the fight over segregation in Baltimore’s public housing during the 
twentieth century. The critical period from the early 1940s to the early 1970s established patterns 
of residential segregation that the city follows to this day. This dissertation relies upon close 
readings of sources to get at the underlying implications and obfuscations by Baltimore policy 
makers and public officials, and to highlight the places where the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” 
was embraced by the public. This close-reading approach questions the underlying assumptions 
and unspoken motivations policymakers had related to “choice”—What does choice mean? 
When is choice meaningful, and when is it not? Ultimately, the espousal of “choice” in public 
housing was more a way for city officials to avoid responsibility for meaningful desegregation 
than honest attempt to support individual agency and decision-making .  These changing uses of 
“individual choice” in Baltimore created a path that other cities would follow in the more well-
known neoliberal policies after 1970. Rather than chronicling the important ways that tenants 
worked within and challenged the limitations of the public housing systems, this dissertation 
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On the morning of August 20, 1995 a crowd gathered in the streets of downtown 
Baltimore. Thirty thousand people formed an eight-block-long parade and party, complete with 
band performances and vendors selling commemorative t-shirts and souvenirs. At noon, a hush 
fell over the crowd, after which the countdown began. As the chant hit zero, a series of 
explosions could be heard, and felt. In just twenty seconds, the six high-rise towers of the 
Lafayette Courts housing projects crumbled into dust and rubble.1 
This moment, decades in the making, bookended the rise and fall of public housing in 
Baltimore. Planners initially envisioned Lafayette Courts as one of Le Corbusier’s “towers in a 
park,” meant to replace overcrowded slums with clean, comfortable, affordable provisions for 
the city’s working poor. Built in the mid-1950s as Baltimore’s first high-rise public housing, 
Lafayette was also the first of Baltimore’s public housing to open as a desegregated project.2 The 
first residents in the project “were begging to get into this place,” former resident and custodian 
Joe Lamma remembered.3 By 1995, however, the towers were plagued by constant maintenance 
issues, crime, and categorical disinvestment by the city and the citizenry of Baltimore.  
Still, reactions to the demolition were mixed. Former residents of the housing project 
returned from as far away as Oakland, California to bear witness to the implosion. One resident, 
Carolyn Lamma, said, “I’m just glad I was here in person. That was history.” While the husband 
of another former resident insisted, “It’s a good thing. A lot of people who lived over there are 
                                                 
1 JoAnna Daemmrich, “Lafayette Courts Ends in 20 Seconds of Explosions, Cheers, Tears,” Baltimore Sun, August 
20, 1995; Charles Cohen, “Destroying a Housing Project, to Save it,” New York Times, August 21, 1995. 
2  Lafayette opened in 1956 as a desegregated project, a significant change by city officials following the 1954 
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board declared “separate but equal” to be inherently unconstitutional.  
3 Cohen, “Destroying a Housing Project, to Save it”.  
2 
good people who deserve a better chance,” a woman could be heard wailing as the towers fell, 
“They killed my building!” After plunging the ceremonial detonator, Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke 
told one reporter, “We all had a tear in one eye and a big grin on our faces at the same time.” 
Former resident Penny Dunlop summed it up similarly, saying, “I don’t know if I should take a 
picture or cry.”4  
Lafayette Courts was just the first of Baltimore’s public housing high-rises to come 
down. Less than a year later, 15,000 onlookers gathered for another “festive atmosphere” to see 
the five towers of Lexington Terrace fall.5 Murphy Homes, with its four 14-story high rise 
towers and its grim moniker “Murder Homes,” followed in 1999.6 Baltimore’s demolitions in the 
late twentieth century were part of a wider trend as public housing authorities across the country, 
supported by federal HOPE VI funds, divested from their large-scale public housing 
developments. As Baltimore Housing Authority spokesman Zack Germroth explained, “It made 
no sense to repair them from a sociological, physical or maintenance standpoint.”7 Some units 
were replaced with new public housing in mixed-income projects, the rest with Section 8 
Housing Choice vouchers. The last of Baltimore’s low-income high-rises came down with the 
2001 demolition of Flag House Courts.8  
The rise and fall of public housing is a popular topic for urban historians. The story has 
been told for cities from Chicago to Los Angeles, New York to San Francisco. While the story in 
Baltimore may not, at first glance, seem unique, the city has become known for its public 
                                                 
4 Daemmrich, “Lafayette Courts Ends in 20 Seconds of Explosions, Cheers, Tears;” Cohen, “Destroying a Housing 
Project, to Save it.” 
5 “Baltimore to Demolish More Public Housing Units,” The Washington Post, September 30, 1995. 
6 Dylan Waugh and Megan Miller, “Murphy Homes Gone, Not Forgotten,” Capital News Service Maryland, 
December 19, 2008. 
7 Sharon Cohen, “Demolition of Dangerous, Decaying Public Housing Begins,” LA Times, May 26, 1996. 
8 Jewish Museum of Maryland, “Flag House Courts and Albemarle Square,” Explore Baltimore Heritage, accessed 
June 3, 2018, https://explore.baltimoreheritage.org/items/show/374. 
3 
housing and related issues of poverty, drugs, corruption, and crime since the critically-acclaimed 
HBO series, The Wire, debuted in 2002. More recently, the tragic death of Freddie Gray and the 
resulting uprising in the city’s streets have brought Baltimore’s housing problems back to the 
public mainstream. Though its official motto is “The Greatest City in America,” Baltimore, 
Maryland is more likely to be colloquially referred to by the pejorative, “Bodymore, 
Murderland.”9  
Yet the projects have been home to thousands of Baltimore residents since 1940, when 
Poe Homes (named for one of the city’s most famous residents, Edgar Allen Poe) opened in 
West Baltimore. Poe Homes, and the twelve housing projects that followed, were divided into 
“Negro” and “White” projects. After 1954, when the Housing Authority of Baltimore City 
(HABC) officially desegregated the projects in response to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, applicants to public housing were legally 
allowed to apply for residence in whichever projects they preferred, regardless of race.  
When it came to implementing this desegregation policy, however, the reality was not so 
simple. By ignoring the legacy of segregation and ongoing systemic racism, the liberal focus on 
removing official barriers to “choice” did little to actually alleviate segregation among public 
housing residents. Even as federal officials mandated a new policy aimed at ending continued 
segregation, allowing local control provided Baltimore officials and residents ample opportunity 
to maintain several all-white projects—primarily in the interest of maintaining any white 
residents on their public housing rolls. These three arenas of conflict—planning, policy, and 
politics—coalesced around the rhetoric of “freedom of choice,” a key phrase and concept 
                                                 
9 For some of the many variations, see Frances Stead Sellers, “Life and death in Bulletmore, Murderland,” The 
Guardian, January 17, 2008; Richard Byrne, “Bodymore, Murdaland,” The American Prospect, October 22, 2006; 
Dewayne Wickham, “In ‘Bodymore, Murderland,’ Snitching Could Save Lives” USA Today, June 8, 2015. 
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running through the history of Baltimore’s public housing in all its iterations. From the initial 
emphasis on individual liberty as a solution to segregation during the post-World War II period, 
to the neoliberal shift to Section 8 “Housing Choice” vouchers in the 1970s, this phrase “freedom 
of choice” returns again and again in the context of local attempts to subvert changing federal 
policy and in Baltimore official’s attempts to answer the fundamental questions of where public 
housing should be built and who should live there. 
This dissertation examines the ways that city planning, public policy, and local politics 
intersected in decisions about Baltimore public housing in the twentieth century. The critical 
period from the early 1940s to the early 1970s established the patterns of residential segregation 
that the City of Baltimore follows to this day. The choice to end before the development of the 
Section 8 voucher program is a deliberate one; while the neoliberal shift to supporting “choice” 
through voucher programs now dominates low-income housing policy across the country, the 
lack of national regulations protecting voucher recipients means that landlords can refuse to 
participate, resulting in voucher use trends that mirror the very same segregation patterns 
discussed here. By focusing on the periods during which public housing projects were physically 
constructed in Baltimore’s communities, this project unpacks liberal assumptions of what 
“freedom of choice” meant in theory and how it operated in public policy. 
This dissertation relies upon close readings of sources to get at the underlying 
implications and obfuscations by policy makers and public officials, and to highlight the places 
where the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” was embraced by the public. It draws heavily from 
official memos and minutes from the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Authority, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, and the Citizens Planning and Housing Agency. 
Other official records came from the Baltimore City Archives. Newspaper accounts are drawn 
5 
from two Baltimore papers of record: the Baltimore Sun, a mainstream daily press, and the 
Baltimore Afro-American, one of the most influential black weekly newspapers in the country.  
This close-reading approach questions the underlying assumptions and unspoken 
motivations policymakers had related to “choice.” What does choice mean? When is choice 
meaningful, and when is it not? Moreover, was the espousal of “choice” in public housing a way 
for city officials to avoid responsibility for meaningful desegregation, or an honest attempt to 
support individual agency and decision-making? Even if the latter is the case, how did the system 
of structural racism in the city prevent public housing residents from having the ability to choose, 
despite having the right to do so? And, in the case of Baltimore in particular, what do officials do 
when there are not enough white people left in public housing to meaningfully integrate projects?  
In this dissertation, I make four overarching arguments about Baltimore’s public housing 
program. First, the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” allowed Baltimore housing officials to 
eschew responsibility for affirmatively desegregating public housing and correcting the resulting 
segregation patterns in the city. Second, deliberate choices made by local and federal agencies 
created a situation that exacerbated white abandonment of public housing throughout the city and 
resulted in severely limited options for low-income black residents. Third, when the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) attempted to advance policy 
solutions to continued public housing segregation, local officials found ways to subvert these 
policies and maintain the status quo of de facto segregation in Baltimore’s housing projects. 
Finally, those local civil servants who did embrace the idea of deconcentrating public housing in 
the mid- to late-1960s were stymied by elected officials who refused to advance fair housing 
policies.  
6 
This focus on the changing policy through the rhetoric of “freedom of choice” is an 
intervention into the historical literature of public housing because it shifts from the current 
“bottom-up,” tenant-focused view of resident agency to questioning the ways that decision-
makers justified their top-down policies as promoting that choice.10 Rather than chronicling the 
important ways that tenants worked within and challenged the limitations of the public housing 
systems, this dissertation examines the ways that those systems were constructed and construed 
by city planners and policy makers. Baltimore is unique in that it exist in a borderland—not quite 
a southern city like Richmond or Atlanta, nor an industrial northern city like Philadelphia or 
Pittsburgh. Its border positioning has left it out of much of the historiography because it does not 
quite fit in either paradigm. What is instructive about Baltimore in this case, though, are the ways 
that the language of choice as a way to avoid desegregation were first being hammered out. 
While most cities which resisted housing desegregation after Brown v. Board in 1954, and the 
Fair Housing Act in 1968 did so in direct refusal, Baltimore officials and policymakers were 
experimenting with new ways to comply with the mandated legalities of desegregation while 
avoiding integration and the fraught political realities that would entail. Though most public 
housing authorities would eventually turn to the language of choice, and the emphasis on 
                                                 
10 Among such resident-centered work is Roberta Gold, When Tenants Claimed the City: The Struggle for 
Citizenship in New York Housing (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014); Gerald D. Suttles, Social 
Order of the Slum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Lee Rainwater, Behind Ghetto Walls (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1970); Lawrence Vale, Reclaiming Public Housing: A Half Century of Struggle in Three Public 
Neighborhoods (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, American Project: 
The Rise and Fall of a Modern Ghetto (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Talja Blokland, “'You 
Got to Remember you Live in Public Housing'” Housing, Theory, and Society 25 (2008): 31-36; and Amy L. 
Howard, More than Shelter: Activism and Community in San Francisco Public Housing (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2014). Books focusing specifically on women in public housing include Roberta M. Feldman and 
Susan Stall, The Dignity of Resistance: Women Residents' Activism in Chicago Public Housing (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) and Rhonda Y. Williams, The Politics of Public Housing: Black Women's 
Struggles Against Urban Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
         Also of note is the “American Public Housing at 75: Policy, Planning, and the Public Good” Special Issue 
of the Journal of the American Planning Association 78, no. 4 (2012) focusing on public housing, and featuring 
articles by such noted historians as Joseph Heathcott, Lawrence Vale, Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Amy Howard, 
Edward Goetz, and Leigh Graham. 
7 
individual decision making would be codified nation-wide with the turn to “housing choice” 
vouchers, it is in this time and this place in Baltimore that this emphasis on choice began.  
Throughout this dissertation, my examination of Baltimore public housing policy hinges 
on the axis of choice and agency versus structural racism and systems of constraint. This 
approach advances historical conversations on the interplay of urban poverty and political 
systems, drawing from foundational scholars such as Douglas Massey, Nancy Denton, Michael 
B. Katz, and Lawrence Mead.11 It also builds on the work of historians who look to structural 
explanations of urban poverty and inequality, specifically targeting the American economic 
system and racial discrimination as inextricably intertwined.12 Much like scholars of the history 
of race and politics, like Kevin Kruse and Matthew Lassiter, I find the roots of modern urban 
society in the racial politics of cities, especially those following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the resultant backlash of suburbanization.13 Finally, as in the recent works by Nathan D.B. 
                                                 
11 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on 
Poverty to the War on Welfare (New York: Pantheon, 1989); Lawrence Mead, The New Politics of Poverty (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992). 
         See also Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1968); Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, eds., The Moynihan Report and the Politics of 
Controversy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967); George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty(New York: Basic Books, 
1981); Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984); 
Myron Magnet, The Nightmare and the Dream: The Sixties Legacy to the Underclass (New York: William Morrow, 
1993); Ken Auletta, The Underclass (New York: Random House, 1982); Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social 
Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993); and James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against 
Poverty, 1900-1994 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).  
12 The two strands are characterized by William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the 
Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) on the one side and Gary Orfield, 
“Ghettoization and Its Alternatives” in The New Urban Reality, ed. Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1985), 161-95, and Massey and Denton, American Apartheid on the other. 
13 Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Kevin Kruse and Thomas Segrue, eds., The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006); and Matthew D. Lassiter (The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). Important earlier works with a political-based focus include 
Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American 
Politics (New York: Norton, 1991); Jim Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in 
New York City (New York: Norton, 1990); and Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn 
Against Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). 
8 
Connolly and Richard Rothstein investigating the role of policy in creating the modern United 
States’ housing system, I locate the origins of Baltimore’s ongoing struggles with population 
decline, race relations, and citizen distrust of lawmakers in the housing decisions made 
throughout the mid-twentieth century.14 
I frame these topics through examinations of urban inequality and public housing in 
twentieth-century Baltimore. Much recent scholarship on public housing history identifies a 
structural pattern of policy decisions that conflate poverty with race and urban renewal with slum 
clearance.15 Rather than focusing on the narrative of public housing’s decline, my work looks to 
the—at times unintentional—patterns put into place beginning with the city’s very first 
discussions of where to locate public housing projects, through later struggles to change these 
patterns after they were engrained in the fabric of the city.16 As the location of one’s home has 
reverberating effects on education, employment, political representation, and health outcomes, 
                                                 
14 Nathan D.B. Connolly, A World More Concrete: Real Estate and the Remaking of Jim Crow South Florida 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014); Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How 
Our Government Segregated America (New York: Liveright Publishing Group, 2017). 
15 Much recent work in public housing studies have focused attention public housing decline and the resultant 
demolition through the HOPE VI program of the 1990s. At the forefront of this new movement are historians 
Lawrence Vale, Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) and Edward G. Goetz, New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice, 
and Public Housing Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013). Additional work from the policy history 
field includes Alexander Polikoff, Waiting for Gautreaux: A Story of Segregation, Housing, and the Black Ghetto 
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2006); Mary Pattillo, Back on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in 
the City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007); and Edward G. Goetz, “Better Neighborhoods, Better 
Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI,” Cityspace 12, no. 1 (2010), 5-31; James Hanlon, 
“Beyond HOPE VI: Demolition/Disposition and the uncertain future of public housing in the U.S.,” Journal of 
Housing and the Built Environment 27 (2012), 373-388. 
16 Historians of public housing who have sought to understand the ultimate successes and failures of public housing 
as a result of initial design include Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing that Worked: New York in the Twentieth 
Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) and D. Bradford Hunt, Blueprint for Disaster: The 
Unraveling of Chicago Public Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). Others taking a policy-
centered view are John Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in 
Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Lawrence Vale, From the Puritans to the 
Projects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Charlotte Brooks, Alien Neighbors, Foreign 
Friends: Asian Americans, Housing and the Transformation of Urban California (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009). 
9 
these residential segregation patterns affected generations of Baltimoreans well beyond the walls 
of the public housing projects.17 The institutionalization of urban housing discrimination is the 
result of seemingly non-racial economic decisions by public institutions and private companies, 
reinforced through a lack of government intervention.18 While “disparate impact” studies often 
elide blame, throughout this dissertation, I point to the direct lines between supposedly “racially 
neutral” policies of choice and resultant racial discrimination. In Baltimore, as elsewhere across 
the country, residential segregation was enforced not by government decree, but by individuals 
abandoning “block-busted” neighborhoods for the suburbs, pressuring elected officials to stop 
“encroachment,” and loudly proclaiming racially coded complaints about declining property 
values.19 
Although this dissertation does not chronicle the widespread change from public housing 
projects to voucher programs, it does set the stage for the systems and policies that culminated in 
demolition and subsidized housing vouchers through programs including Section 8, under 
HUD’s HOPE VI program. The neoliberal shift toward a belief that free markets were better 
                                                 
17 The literature on these topics is voluminous, but of particular note for their importance to framing this dissertation 
are two works examining school desegregation: Howell S. Baum, Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and 
the Limits of Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010) and Ansley Erickson, Making the Unequal 
Metropolis: School Desegregation and its Limits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
18 In The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2005), Thomas Segrue chronicles how decisions made regarding industrial plant location, deindustrialization, 
and automation, when combined with a historic discrimination in housing and employment, made it possible for 
businesses to actively discriminate against their black labor force without specifically targeting laborers by race. 
Beryl Satter’s work, Family Properties: Race, Real Estate, and the Exploitation of Black Urban America (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 2009) examines how the refusal by banks to insure mortgages in black neighborhoods 
resulted in racially-biased credit policies that resulted in financial discrimination and perpetuated residential 
segregation without any need for laws to enforce it. 
19 Historical works on residential segregation are numerous, but of particular note are Massey and Denton, American 
Apartheid; Ronald H. Bayor, Race and the Shaping of Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996); Preston H. Smith, Racial Democracy and the Black Metropolis: Housing Policy in Postwar 
Chicago (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, Negroes in 
Cities: Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965); Camille 
Zubrinsky Charles, “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation,” Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003), 167-
207;  and a number of recent books on white flight including Kruse, White Flight; Lassiter, The Silent Majority; and 
Eric Avila, Popular Culture in the Age of White Flight: Fear and Fantasy in Suburban Los Angeles (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004). 
10 
equipped to handle social needs (despite known market failures in affordable housing) has led to 
what urban planners Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore termed “geographically uneven, socially 
regressive, and politically volatile trajectories of institutional/spatial change.”20 As with the 
uncritical acceptance of “freedom of choice” as a meaningful framework for the liberalist 
policies of the 1950s, so-called “housing choice” vouchers rose to prominence in the 1980s and 
persist today as the primary form of affordable housing subsidies for low-income families.21 As 
Baltimore was forced to confront the arbitrary jurisdictional divisions between city and county 
during the 1990s and early 2000s with the Federal District Court case of Thompson v. HUD, the 
focus on neoliberalism has led historians to reevaluate the utility of an urban/suburban divide in 
the study of American metropolises.22 Those public housing projects that do remain in the city 
are now built in the style of the city’s quintessential rowhouses. As Mayor Schmoke proclaimed 
when the towers of Lexington Terrace came down in 1996: “What we have done is torn down 
what essentially have become warehouses of poverty, and what we’re creating is town houses of 
choice.”23  
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In chapter one, I discuss the development of subsidized housing for war workers during 
World War II. Though first planned as low-income housing, changes to federal funding and 
wartime rationing meant that the only housing construction authorized in any city was to house 
war industry workers. In Baltimore, despite desperate housing shortages for black migrants 
coming to work in shipyards and other defense industries, city lawmakers insisted that no such 
shortage existed. When officials did unveil plans for a black war worker housing project near a 
white area of town, the outcry was strong and immediate. Protests against the Herring Run site 
were successful in preventing construction of the proposed public housing project there; instead, 
the units were built in Cherry Hill, close to the municipal incinerator. I argue that the effects of 
this unsuccessful attempt to locate public housing outside of all-black neighborhoods 
reverberated throughout the rest of the city’s public housing decisions in the twentieth century. 
Having learned the vehemence of white public distaste for black public housing, elected officials 
never again championed its creation.24  
Chapter two delves into the liberal rhetoric of “freedom of choice” in public policy. 
Following the 1954 Supreme Court case Brown v. the Board of Education, Baltimore officials 
desegregated both public schools and public housing projects through the same method—
removal of de jure segregation. The liberal concept of “free choice,” with its emphasis on 
individual action and refusal to acknowledge systemic or community influence on decision-
making was key for elected officials and policy makers. Baltimore was one of the first southern 
cities to desegregate its schools and public housing, and did so with relatively little strife. I argue 
that this lack of conflict is due not to the success of desegregation through “freedom of choice,” 
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but rather the inability of said choice to have any meaningful effect against a system of such 
deeply rooted segregation.  
In chapter three, I discuss the realities of Baltimore’s public housing program after the 
city decided to “eliminate the factor of race” in public housing admission. Whether by declaring 
segregated projects desegregated or opening new projects on a desegregated basis, Baltimore’s 
public housing officials grappled with clear racial divides. Even those projects that did briefly 
meet the threshold of “integrated” quickly changed over to all-black occupancy. More than a 
decade after the city’s “freedom of choice” plan was implemented, public housing remained 
effectively segregated; although the overwhelming majority of public housing residents in the 
city were black, three housing projects maintained all-white occupancy. When HUD demanded 
affirmative steps to desegregate these three projects, local officials again turned to the rhetoric of 
“choice” to explain resistance by both white and black residents. I argue that this insistence on 
maintaining the “freedom of choice” policy was rooted in a desire to elide responsibility for 
dismantling the very system of residential segregation the HABC had helped create.  
Chapter four further explores the conflict between federal officials and the HABC over 
the emphasis on individual choice in public housing desegregation. In the late 1960s, HUD 
revised their tenant selection policies and required public housing authorities across the country 
to implement a new “first come––first served” program. HUD’s goal was to centralize public 
housing waiting lists in an attempt to end situations like Baltimore’s, where housing authorities 
were able to maintain all-white projects. I contend that after an unsuccessful attempt to argue that 
these projects were, in fact, desegregated, Baltimore officials were able to use the language of 
choice and emphasis on individual preferences to once again subvert the new HUD requirements 
to the point of irrelevance.  
13 
Chapter five shifts from a focus on tenant selection to one on site selection. In the late 
1960s, HUD began efforts to deconcentrate public housing from low-income minority 
neighborhoods and experimented with new forms of public housing construction, forming the 
precursors to modern housing voucher programs. In Baltimore, officials struggled with decisions 
over how to deconcentrate public housing in a city that was rapidly losing white and middle-
class residents. While the city’s public housing civil servants generally accepted HUD’s site 
selection guidelines and put forward requests to build housing in non-minority neighborhoods, 
elected officials, remembering the lessons learned decades earlier at Herring Run, refused 
permissions necessary to build new public housing outside of areas that were already majority 
black. I argue that, by 1970, the combination of white flight from the city, an ever-larger 
majority of black residents in public housing, and these site selection decisions created a 
situation in which integration of Baltimore’s public housing projects had become impossible.  
The policy rhetoric of “freedom of choice” continued even as the high-rise housing 
projects came down. As with the original slum clearance efforts that gave rise to large-scale 
public housing, proponents of HUD’s HOPE VI plan often touted its benefits as giving low-
income residents more choices about where to live––thus the moniker, “Housing Choice 
Vouchers.” Despite releasing residents from the problems of pre-built public housing projects, 
the neoliberal shift to vouchers is unable to further meaningful choice because of the reliance on 
a private housing market that still operates within a society replete with systemic racism. Even as 
the housing projects have come down, the decisions made by public housing officials and 
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2 CHAPTER ONE: HERRING RUN 
 
Following years of debate, in 1937 Congress passed the first piece of federal legislation 
to develop government-subsidized housing projects for low-income families. In the debate 
surrounding the Housing Act of 1937, the key point of contention was whether the new housing 
should be built on vacant land, thus increasing the available housing stock of cities, or be built on 
cleared land, which would improve the quality of housing in blighted neighborhoods without 
adding to the overall quantity of housing. Advocates for building on vacant land argued that the 
creation of housing run as a public utility would lead to long-term “communitarian” values 
among the working class.25 These modern housing reformers were more concerned with creating 
European-style, avant-garde projects for the working classes than improving living conditions for 
the urban poor. On the other side, progressive activists argued that elimination of slum 
conditions was paramount not only for the individuals who lived in the blighted neighborhoods, 
but for cities and society at large. Joined by the real estate lobby, which was concerned about 
market competition from government subsidized construction, slum clearance advocates 
prevailed. The 1937 Housing Act passed with an “equivalent elimination” provision, 
guaranteeing that public housing would not lead to any substantial increases in the total housing 
stock available.26 
Housing availability was a particularly pressing issue in cities like Baltimore, where the 
Great Depression led to a sharp decline in home building. In 1934, only 119 new houses were 
constructed in Baltimore; for black residents, who depended on the secondhand housing market 
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26 Hunt, 29. 
16 
to open up new housing in the segregated city, this underproduction had cascading effects.27 As 
the Great Migration brought a huge influx of African Americans from the rural South to the 
industrial cities of the North, overcrowding of black neighborhoods in Baltimore became dire. 
From 1940 to 1942, 33,000 new black residents moved to the city, primarily to work in the 
burgeoning war industries, without any increase in the number of available housing units.28  
Baltimore’s low-income housing projects, which under the terms of the 1937 Housing 
Act focused on replacing rather than expanding housing stock, did nothing to alleviate the 
problem. Despite African Americans making up an overwhelming majority of slum residents, the 
regulations put in place by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City designated 45% of these 
new public housing units for white people.29 The racially discriminatory patterns continued in 
Baltimore even after the federal government passed the Lanham Act in 1940, which was 
designed to expedite the creation of war worker housing through local housing authorities. 
Municipal housing authorities signed on to participate in part because wartime housing projects 
were able to circumvent material rationing and complete building projects that would otherwise 
have been forced to sit partially finished until the end of the war. By 1943, the city had built or 
designated seven housing projects for white war workers, but not a single project was designated 
for black workers.30 All of these issues would crystalize in the fight over a proposed black 
housing development in an area known as Herring Run. 
By the time the United States entered World War II, the City of Baltimore had already 
seen an influx of thousands of poor white and black rural Southerners. Hemmed in by strict 
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residential segregation and unable to expand outward, the population density of black 
neighborhoods skyrocketed. Despite the dire housing shortage for black residents, city leaders 
did everything they could to avoid opening additional areas to black residency. In 1941, Mayor 
Howard W. Jackson testified before a congressional panel that there was no housing shortage for 
blacks in Baltimore. His statement directly contradicted that of Dr. Abel Wolman, Chairman of 
the State Planning Commission, who testified that the city needed at least 9,000 housing units for 
lower-income workers. Mayor Jackson and other politicians wished to reject federal funding 
because they feared black workers would remain in the rent-free housing after the war ended, 
destabilizing the city and placing an extra burden on public relief rolls. Congressman Harry 
Streett Baldwin also claimed that “in-migrant colored laborers,” as opposed to “worthwhile 
Baltimore citizens,” were lazy and unreliable. “That’s the kind we’re going to get,” he 
proclaimed, “because there’s no other kind left to come. And what earthly good are these people 
to the war industries?”31 Instead of building housing for these workers, Baldwin proposed they 
should be put in trailer camps “so they can be easily moved out after the war is over.”32  
The federal government was not persuaded by these protestations by city leaders, 
especially after a 1942 spot-check of one city block found 590 workers sharing 121 rooms, with 
only 53 bathtubs between them.33 On February 26, 1943, the National Housing Agency 
authorized the construction of 2,000 new housing units for black war-workers.34 Once again, the 
idea of using vacant land to increase the city’s housing stock was in play. Though activist groups 
including the Citizens Planning and Housing Association insisted that the only solution to the 
“Negro housing situation” was to designate additional land for black housing development, real 
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estate men denied the need, claiming that the market was the final arbiter.35 One agent claimed 
the existence of vacant homes near Baltimore war plants reflected a lack of demand, despite the 
homeowners’ refusal to sell those homes to black buyers.36 In response to this disagreement, 
Maryland Governor Herbert O’Conor created a Commission on Problems Affecting the Negro 
Population. In their 1943 report, the Commission argued that vacant land “in and adjacent to the 
City of Baltimore must be made available for Negro housing to take care of the present 
overcrowded situation and for future development.” In the meantime, the report suggested, 
dormitories and temporary barracks could be set up inside large buildings and public parks, and 
residents not employed in the war industry should be encouraged to move further away from 
defense plants to make space for war workers.37    
Under the terms of the Lanham Act, the decision of where to place temporary housing for 
war workers (white or black) was under the purview of the Federal Public Housing Authority 
(FPHA), but it was the traditional practice of the FPHA to consult with local governments for 
their input. The first seven housing sites for white war workers went ahead without much 
dispute. When the FPHA began exploring locations for black war workers, however, they were 
met with immediate resistance. The first proposed site, a vacant tract along Eastern Avenue, was 
quickly abandoned after overwhelming protest by white residents in the neighboring areas. In 
response, the FPHA chose Herring Run, an industrial area in the eastern portion of the city near 
several defense plants, but away from the “semi-suburban developments” of East Baltimore.38  
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Though the Lanham Act was only authorized to fund temporary emergency housing 
during the war, the federal authority recommended that “sites selected...should have in mind 
future permanent buildings,” especially in cities like Baltimore where chronic housing shortages 
predated the influx of war workers. Statements like these did housing advocates no favors; from 
the outset, public statements issued by the housing authority and disseminated by the press 
stoked white fears about the creation of permanent black housing near their neighborhoods.39 It 
seemed to many that whatever site picked to house black war workers would eventually become 
a permanent black enclave. In April 1943, the Baltimore Sun quoted John D. Steele, chairman of 
the City Plan Commission, who said that Herring Run, “lends itself to the purpose that we are 
thinking of as the beginning of a permanent colored-area development along modern lines to 
accommodate those in whatever financial strata.”40 To those fearful of “negro encroachment,” 
then, a black housing development at Herring Run would allow the strictly delimited black 
neighborhoods of Baltimore to spread into their backyards. Lutheran minister Luke Schmucker 
declared that if a black housing project was placed at Herring Run, white war workers would be 
set upon “in the streets, in the cars and buses, in the stores and movies, and even in the 
schools.”41  
Encouraged by success in blocking the plans for black war worker housing at an Eastern 
Avenue site, an organization later known as the Northeast Civic Groups held a series of meetings 
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to discuss challenging the proposed plans for Herring Run.42 Their president, speaking on behalf 
of the Belair Road Improvement Association and “at least twenty-five” other groups, stated he 
feared the new housing “would depreciate the value of present properties in the vicinity,” which 
referred to those owned by whites.43 Similarly, Reverend T. Vincent Fitzgerald, the pastor of St. 
Anthony’s Catholic Church, claimed that if the Herring Run development went forward, it would 
jeopardize a $1,000,000 investment in the parish. If black housing were to be allowed at Herring 
Run, he claimed, “I can’t pay it off.”44  
In a meeting before the Housing Authority of Baltimore City45 (HABC) Chairman 
Cleveland Bealmear, local residents claimed the plans for black housing at Herring Run would 
“destroy property values.”46 Chairman Bealmear was no stranger to Mayor Jackson, and the two 
had worked together in the past on a business-friendly agenda. In the 1930s, Jackson had 
appointed Bealmear to the Baltimore Emergency Relief Commission (BERC). The BERC, 
though ostensibly tasked with coordinating relief activities for Baltimoreans during the Great 
Depression, was investigated by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration in 1933 and 1934 
for mismanaging relief programs in efforts to reduce the number of people “on the dole.”47  
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After James Edmunds resigned as chair of the HABC to pursue defense housing 
contracts, Bealmear took on the leadership role. His appointment was clear evidence of the 
Jackson administration’s distaste for public housing. As a realtor and former chairman of the 
Real Estate Board’s Home Builders’ Division, Bealmear had lobbied against public housing in 
the city, fearing it would “compete with private industry and private capital now invested in 
housing.” Like many others in his field, Bealmear believed that public housing was “not 
only...unfair competition, but a means of establishing what we believe will develop into a 
permanent dole system for a large number of citizens.” Though Bealmear disliked public housing 
in general, he especially objected to vacant land project development, denying any claims of 
market failure and espousing instead that “private enterprise...if let alone by the government 
would provide all housing in Baltimore for which there was effective demand.”48 Despite 
Bealmear’s distrust of federal intervention in housing, under his leadership, the HABC calculated 
that 22,700 households in the city lived on incomes so low that they could only afford rental 
payments at or below $33 a month––the point at which housing was no longer profitable to the 
private market.49  
The HABC continued to disavow any input into the process in public meetings, including 
one in which Bealmear once again emphasized that “The Baltimore Housing Authority has no 
power to choose the site.” Furthermore, he claimed that when the HABC had refused to approve 
the proposal of the original Eastern Avenue site, “Federal officials paid no attention to them and 
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only hesitated in their program when objectors staged a mass protest meeting.” With this 
statement, Bealmear moved from distancing himself and his agency from any decision-making 
power to actively encouraging white residents to once again resist the site placement in hopes 
that they could do what Bealmear’s agency could not. Adding fuel to the fire, Bealmear told the 
meeting, “‘there is no doubt in my mind’ that whatever site the Government selects will be used 
as a permanent settlement,” a statement he surely knew would reignite white opposition to the 
plans.50  
Neighborhood objectors were listening. They quickly planned demonstrations and filed a 
formal protest with the City Plan Commission, one of the groups responsible for suggesting 
Herring Run. In addition, the president of the Belair Road Improvement Association led a 
delegation to the mayor’s office, demanding the Herring Run site be withdrawn from 
consideration. Mayor Jackson felt the effects of the increased pressure; when asked to comment, 
he claimed that increased housing for black residents was not needed at all, despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Just weeks before the mayoral election, Jackson gave 
very different statements to the mainstream press and to the black weekly newspaper. To the 
Baltimore Sun, Jackson said, “We have a problem in regard to the housing of our permanent 
Negro population. I agree that this problem must be solved. But it has not been proved, in my 
opinion, that there is a need at the Martin plant or the Bethlehem Steel Company that would 
warrant the building of this temporary Negro war workers’ housing.”51 On the other hand, in the 
Baltimore Afro-American, Mayor Jackson was quoted as saying, “there should be prompt 
construction of the homes, regardless of protests if the Federal Housing Authority feels that there 
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is immediate need for them.”52 Though difficult to rectify these two positions, Jackson appeared 
to be attempting to thread the needle of supporting the clear need for more housing for black 
Baltimoreans, while objecting to the spread of black neighborhoods through the creation of black 
war worker housing.  
In mid-April of 1943, Baltimore’s housing officials submitted several sites for 
consideration by the FPHA. Although the FPHA continued to insist that the chosen site would be 
in the northeastern section of the city near manufacturing centers, the HABC submitted several 
sites in the southwestern portion of the city, nearer to the existing black neighborhoods.53 
Herring Run was also included on the list, due to insistence by the City Plan Commission. Even 
so, HABC Chairman Bealmear insisted that his agency did not support the site and that the 
HABC was “only lending its services as a matter of courtesy” to the FPHA by sending the 
suggestions.54  
Protesters were not convinced, and in part due to the negative response surrounding 
Herring Run, Federal Housing Authority officials announced on April 26 that instead of building 
temporary housing, the agency would now fund permanent housing for black war workers.55 
While the FHA had authority under the Lanham Act to choose the location for temporary 
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housing, this change to permanent housing placed the location decision in the hands of the 
Baltimore government––specifically, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City. Encouraged by 
control moving to local hands, protest group leaders stated they “had been given assurances” that 
“all plans for the erection of Negro housing” in the Herring Run area had been abandoned. The 
HABC denied such a definitive statement, saying that although Herring Run had not been 
abandoned, “exhaustive studies are being made of other areas.”56  
While this decision moved the focus of protest away from federal officials, it renewed 
objections to the creation of permanent housing for black Baltimoreans and revived fears of 
black residents “invading” white neighborhoods. Fifteen years earlier, attorney J.K. Barbour 
claimed that “all of East Baltimore has been invaded,” and in 1943, protesters against the 
Herring Run site again used the term to stoke fears about potential black residents.57 Northeast 
Civic Groups attorney John Gontrum referred to the Great Migration as “the second time we 
have had an invasion. The first was in 1814; and now they want to bring in another foreign 
invasion of Southern laborers.”58 Others in the Northeast Civic Groups referred to Herring Run 
as an “unwarranted intrusion,” including Reverend Fitzgerald of St. Anthony’s Catholic Church, 
who claimed “I, personally, have no animosity towards colored people,” while objecting to 
allowing black workers living ten blocks away from his church. Another said, “I believe that 
colored people should have a decent place to live, but not in with us.”59 Northeast Civic Groups’ 
president, H.E. Thursby, went on the record saying, “We have nothing against colored people, 
but we are unalterably opposed to and vigorously protest construction of the project” in their 
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neighborhood.60 The group likewise spoke to white solidarity across the class divide, telling city 
officials, “if they do this to us they can invade Roland Park where some of you gentlemen live. If 
our rights are overridden, no rights of any one in Baltimore City or county will be protected.”61 
With their newfound power to decide on the housing site, local authorities spent months in a 
deadlock with the HABC refusing to approve Herring Run while the City Plan Commission 
insisted upon it.  
In the midst of this controversy, Baltimore held a mayoral election. During the campaign, 
candidate Theodore McKeldin said of the incumbent, “the Mayor has not taken any part in the 
discussion of the Negro housing project. The Mayor ought to make the initiative of that.”62 
Following his win, McKeldin addressed the “crying need” for additional black housing in his 
inaugural address, a topic on which “Mr. McKeldin spoke with deep conviction,” according to 
the Baltimore Sun.63 In his first week as mayor, McKeldin convened an interracial commission to 
study the problem and submit a recommendation.64 In theory, the interracial commission would 
visit possible housing sites and meet with the HABC, the City Plan Commission, and 
representatives of the FPHA to come to a solution. In July, however, McKeldin announced that 
despite their best efforts, the interracial commission had been unable to come to an agreement on 
a single site that had the approval of all the involved agencies. Three of the groups –– the  
interracial commission, the City Plan Commission, and the Citizens Planning and Housing 
Association –– all agreed that Herring Run should be the recommended site put forward to the 
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FPHA for new black housing.65 The HABC still disagreed, and it was their choice that mattered 
most.  
McKeldin made attempts to convince Chairman Bealmear and the other members of the 
HABC to select Herring Run by appealing to the poor physical condition of the site. Although 
the land technically abutted Herring Run Park, few Baltimoreans would even recognize it as 
such, because it was far away from the developed portions of the park on what the Baltimore Sun 
referred to as "waste land." Moreover, the Sun writer argued, the land was not part of the 
"pleasant semi-suburban developments" near Belair road and instead ran near a massive set of 
power lines.66 Because of these limitations, McKeldin said, Herring Run would be the least 
likely of the available sites to draw significant protest. McKeldin also appealed to the HABC’s 
fiscal sense, pointing out that if the city failed to agree on a site, it risked losing significant 
federal financial support to solve its ongoing housing crisis.67  
With Mayor McKeldin on board for Herring Run, it seemed that final approvals were 
forthcoming and construction could finally begin on the much-needed housing project. Oliver 
Winston, FPHA Regional Director, went so far as to say that with the interracial commission, 
City Plan Commission, and FPHA “in complete accord” on Herring Run, “there is absolutely no 
reason to think that we cannot approve the site,” and “acceptance of it is a foregone 
conclusion.”68 Winston spoke too soon. The HABC persisted in its rejection of Herring Run, 
with Chairman Bealmear insisting that if the FPHA chose the site over their objections, they 
would ask the Board of Estimates “to approve the proposal without our making a 
recommendation on it,” effectively absolving the HABC from responsibility for opening up 
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black housing in East Baltimore. Winston shot back, “Should the HABC come forward, even at 
this late date, with an appropriate site...which represents as sound principles as the Herring Run 
site, the FPHA will give it full consideration.” Instead, the HABC continued to recommend sites 
only in Southwest Baltimore, knowing full well that the FPHA wanted war housing built near the 
factories in the east. By making these recommendations, the HABC claimed to be working to 
increase the housing stock of the city, while also signaling to white Baltimoreans that they were 
fighting against federal authority to keep black people out of white neighborhoods.69  
Neighborhood protests increased. In the intervening months, the Northeast Civic Groups 
had grown to encompass 75 organizations.70 “The people out here don’t want it, and they are not 
going to have it, even if we have to march 20,000 strong on the City Hall to prevent it,” the 
group’s chairman insisted.71 And march they did. On July 13, a group of 750 gathered downtown 
at the Baltimore War Memorial to confront McKeldin; a week later, another group of 800 
marched.72 Both times the mayor attempted to limit the appearance of his own involvement in 
the actual decision-making process. The first time he told the group, “If I had selected this site I 
would have had the courage to stand up here and say so.”73 To the second group, he insisted, “I 
tried to get the various bodies to agree on one site but that was utterly impossible. So I appointed 
an interracial commission….That is all I have done.” Neither side was appeased –– white 
protests continued, while the Afro-American accused McKeldin of “passing the buck” by 
refusing to take a definitive stand for or against the project.74 The mayor continued to claim 
neutrality, saying that it was not his “prerogative” to choose the site. “All I have done...is to 
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submit recommendations to them from the two commissions,” he insisted. “Actually, I have 
never even seen the Herring Run Park site.”75  
Despite his attempts to walk the thin line of supporting the decision on Herring Run 
without supporting the site itself, McKeldin found himself in political hot water. Seeing that their 
protests had not been enough to halt the proposal, the Northeastern Civic Groups hired three 
lawyers to wage a legal fight.76 Simultaneously, the City Plan Commission fell under fire by the 
Baltimore City Council, particularly council vice president James F. Arthur, who asked members 
of the commission if they were being “pressed” by federal authorities “who seem anxious to 
encroach on the rights of our people.” He furthermore accused the commission of malfeasance, 
claiming that the commissioners were violating a resolution that they should only consider sites 
approved by the HABC. Since HABC Chairman Bealmear refused to back Herring Run, Arthur 
claimed the commission had no right to consider the site.77 Following this scrutiny, the City Plan 
Commission held two days of hearings with groups in favor of and against Herring Run. At the 
end of them, the commission passed a new resolution affirming its recommendation of Herring 
Run as “the most logical spot within the city limits” and “a site ideal for its purpose.”78  
Undeterred, the lawyers employed by the Northeast Civic Groups went to work on Mayor 
McKeldin directly. Backed by the city solicitor, the attorneys argued that neither of the 
commissions had standing to approve housing sites on behalf of the city, and that the 
“recommendation would have to come from the municipal corporation as a whole acting through 
the City Council.”79 While the mayor acquiesced to the rights of the City Council to make a 
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recommendation, he reminded them that, due to the War Powers Act, the federal government had 
supreme authority over the city in developing war worker housing. In response, the City Council 
immediately set to work drafting a city ordinance to prohibit the federal government from 
constructing war housing in Baltimore without prior approval from the city.80  
Alongside the City Council, several politicians joined the fray, including Democratic U.S. 
Senator Millard Tydings, and Congressmen H. Streett Baldwin and Thomas J. D’Alesandro, Jr. 
Baldwin went on the record saying that the Herring Run proposal “was part of a socialist 
experiment being carried on all over the country,”81 and later referred to it as “a vast 
development, entailing the expenditure of many millions of dollars as a social experiment.”82 
D’Alesandro, seeing a great political opportunity, also joined in.83 He attacked McKeldin’s 
handling of the recommendation process, saying that the mayor never attended any HABC 
meetings or allowed the members to explain their reasons for refusing Herring Run. He further 
sought to force McKeldin to declare his position for the record, saying, “There is just one 
question I would like to ask Mayor McKeldin, Mr. Mayor are you or are you not in favor of the 
Herring Run site?”84  
McKeldin was unable to answer, as he had left for a two-week vacation to Maine shortly 
after calling the City Council into session. In his absence, the council passed their new 
ordinance. Under the new ordinance, the federal government was required to first apply to the 
mayor for permission build on a site, who had to then submit to the City Council and the Board 
of Estimates for approval.85 Supporters claimed that the provisions of the ordinance “were in line 
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with the theories of local self-government,” and a matter of protecting the city’s interests.86 With 
McKeldin away, it fell to the head of the City Council to sign the ordinance. Even with the 
ordinance in place, FPHA leadership maintained that, due to the War Powers Act, the federal 
government had the right to build worker housing with or without local approval.87  
Even with McKeldin gone and the City Council asserting their authority, Representative 
D’Alesandro did not let up his pressure on the mayor. He released a letter to the Baltimore Sun in 
which he again called upon McKeldin to give a definitive answer on whether or not he approved 
of the Herring Run site. As D’Alesandro pointed out, McKeldin’s approval of the 
recommendation by the City Plan Commission and the interracial commission had been taken as 
tacit approval of the site itself. D’Alesandro wrote, “Washington has interpreted your action in 
forwarding these recommendations as an approval by you, as the Mayor of Baltimore, of this 
particular site,” and thus approval by the “duly constituted authorities” of the city.88 
Perhaps because of that implied approval, or because they were tired of the months of 
political dealings with the city officials, FPHA representatives continued to move forward with 
plans for Herring Run. On July 30, FPHA Commissioner Herbert Emmerich announced that not 
only had the federal agency officially selected the Herring Run site, but that the work would 
begin “as rapidly as possible” because of the immediate need for worker housing as part of the 
war effort. He reminded the City Council that there was no requirement in federal law to seek 
city approval before building war housing, and “as a matter of fact, there is an express provision 
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in the Lanham Act that these projects may be constructed without regard to any municipal laws, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations.”89    
Having failed to stop Herring Run through city ordinance, City Council members and the 
Northeastern Civic Groups’ lawyers continued to threaten legal action, pledging to take their 
fight “to the Supreme Court if necessary.”90 City Councilman James F. Arthur, taking over duties 
as acting mayor, called Herring Run, “a large expensive and elaborate permanent housing site for 
Negroes in Baltimore in the nature of a socialistic experiment.”91 He claimed, “the issue raised is 
one of States’ rights and local self-government vs. arbitrary Federal bureaucracy,” elevating the 
matter from a disagreement over a single plan to erect housing to a matter of the federal 
government forcing integration onto local bodies despite their protests, a reframing of integration 
efforts that would continue to echo into the 1950s and 1960s.  
Still on his vacation in Maine, McKeldin continued to “pass the buck” as he dodged 
requests to go on the record as approving Herring Run. In a phone call to the Sun, he stated the 
FPHA “obviously has the right to select the site. I don’t see any way to stop it.” “At this 
distance,” he said, “it seems to me I have done all I can possibly do….Now it is up to the Federal 
Government to build the houses.”92 The City Solicitor, F. Murray Benson, disagreed. In his view, 
since, as Mayor McKeldin insisted, he had “simply forwarded the findings” by the commissions 
on to the FPHA, that was not enough to constitute city approval. In this case, Benson argued, 
such authority belonged only to the HABC, which had repeatedly and consistently refused the 
Herring Run location. In Benson’s opinion, the FPHA was acting “illegally and improperly, and 
under the guise of the war emergency, to accomplish the avowed purpose of permanently 
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altering the traditional plan for the development of Baltimore city.”93 Benson’s phrasing is 
important –– in addition to accusing the agency of using World War II as an excuse to expand 
federal powers, he was directly linking this expansion of powers to forced integration, rights for 
black residents, and civil rights writ large. 
Pressure came down from Congress on the FPHA as well, when Senator Tydings and 
Representatives Baldwin and D’Alesandro convened a meeting in Washington. D’Alesandro 
warned that any effort by the FPHA to move forward with the Herring Run site “may bring a 
Congressional investigation.” Baldwin threatened the FPHA’s funding, saying “if Congress 
knew the money (for the site) was to be used for this kind of project you would not have gotten 
it, and you would not get any more,” again raising the specter of federal meddling in racial 
affairs. The other congressmen also echoed these claims of federal encroachment on state and 
local governance. Said D’Alesandro, “This country is a democracy and the people speak through 
their chosen representatives. As such, I respectfully recommend that you reconsider your 
decision.” Senator Tydings pointed out, “opposition is ten times greater than ever to the selection 
of the site,” and told Commissioner Emmerich, “I can’t see the reason for building these houses 
when the whole city is protesting….I don’t say these protests are fair or not, but I do say the 
protestants are within their rights to oppose this site.”94 In this framing, Tydings endorsed the 
rights of individuals to protest because of their racist views, without endorsing their viewpoint 
himself. 
The FPHA’s choice to change the plans from temporary to permanent housing, and thus 
try to avoid protest by passing the responsibility of site selection to the city, was proving to be a 
mistake. Finding their position tenuous, FPHA officials recognized the need for definitive 
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approval by some elected city official to proceed with the construction of Herring Run. As such, 
Commissioner Emmerich called upon Mayor McKeldin, now returned from Maine, to give an 
official statement for or against “using the Herring Run Park site for a Negro housing 
development.”95 Though McKeldin had been able to skirt the issue for months, the FPHA was 
now bringing pressure directly to bear on him. The FPHA had heard from multiple elected 
officials against the site, while McKeldin still refused to speak on the project. As Regional 
Director Winston explained, “If there are any such proponents, they have kept quiet; they haven’t 
come to us; all we get is the opposition group.”96 Writing to McKeldin, Commission Emmerich 
told him, “We had every reason...to conclude that you joined in these recommendations and 
spoke for the city,” but now found it necessary that the mayor answer “definitively and 
promptly” whether he approved of the development at Herring Run.97  
When McKeldin again responded that the choice was not his responsibility, the FPHA 
continued to press for a clear yes or no answer, “whether or not the city government approves the 
selection.” If McKeldin did not give his official approval on behalf of the city, the federal agents 
emphasized, the plans to build permanent housing at Herring Run would be scrapped.98 Instead 
of building permanent housing, thereby helping to relieve dire housing shortages for black 
residents and creating a housing site that would become the property of the HABC after the war, 
the FPHA would go back to their original plans of building temporary housing instead. The city 
would thus lose out on millions of dollars of federally subsidized construction that could 
otherwise be used to alleviate the city’s housing problems.  
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Mayor McKeldin had nowhere left to hide, no buck to pass along, and had to officially 
take a stand. Faced with the opposition of an entirely Democratic City Council, the Republican 
mayor caved.99  Still avoiding saying whether he personally favored the Herring Run site, the 
Mayor instead backed the right of Baltimore City Council to choose the housing site as covered 
by their city ordinance. He said, “As Mayor it is my duty to respect the ordinance. I have been 
fully informed as to the sentiments of the individual Councilmen and they have not and will not 
select Herring Run.” His choice made, McKeldin declared “Herring Run is as dead as the 
dodo.”100 The Afro-American placed the blame for losing the site clearly on McKeldin’s 
shoulders, as did the NAACP of Baltimore, which issued a letter accusing him of damaging the 
war effort by causing the city to lose “this gravely needed project.” “We discover that your 
interest in housing for colored people is limited by expedience,” they wrote, and failing to 
support Herring Run “caused a lot of us who had great faith in you...to experience grave 
disappointment.”101 Having lost the black community’s support, McKeldin also lost his 1947 re-
election bid –– to Representative D’Alesandro. 
True to their word, the FPHA announced that, lacking city approval for permanent 
housing at Herring Run, “there is only one course open to us, build temporary housing on sites 
we will choose.” Due to the urgent need for black war worker housing in Baltimore, the FPHA 
endeavored to build “as quickly as possible.”102 As temporary projects built under the Lanham 
Act, the housing on site would be torn down within two years of the war’s end. Following this 
announcement, the editors of the Baltimore Sun ran an impassioned argument against the 
decision, charging that “the great long-range need” was to “find an area offering the Negro 
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population of Baltimore an opportunity to escape from the enclaves in which their homes are 
now confined” by opening up new areas to black residents. Temporary housing, they feared, 
would not go far enough.103   
While it was the usual policy of the Federal Government to lease property upon which 
temporary war housing was built, in this case, the FPHA brought legal condemnation 
proceedings to acquire the land for Herring Run out of fear that landowners would refuse to 
cooperate. In addition to asserting the rights of the Federal Government to take possession of any 
necessary location to build war worker housing, FPHA officials explained that Herring Run was 
selected “after full consideration of all factors involved,” and “the advisory opinions received 
during the many and lengthy consultations...with local public officials and with various citizens 
groups.” As soon as the condemnation proceedings were filed with the courts, the City Council 
directed the city solicitor to contest the suit. In his statement to the press, Councilman Arthur 
again framed the case as a matter of federal authorities forcing their will on matters of local 
governance, saying, “The Federal Government has abandoned its traditional position of 
recognizing the rights of the subdivisions of the sovereign States and has decided to work its will 
in a most autocratic and dictatorial manner.” He further accused the FPHA themselves of 
damaging the war effort, producing “resentment and lack of confidence in the short-sighted and 
incompetent men...during this tragic war,” and damaging the “peace and good order of Baltimore 
city...beyond calculation.”104  
Northeastern Civic Groups’ attorneys and the city solicitor again joined forces to fight 
against and stall the condemnation proceedings. Solicitor Benson filed a motion with the court to 
deny the land use to the FPHA. Among the complaints listed were that the location of Herring 
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Run did not “conform in location and design to local planning and tradition” in accordance with 
federal statute; that taking Herring Run through condemnation did not follow the new city 
ordinance requiring approval by the city council and the mayor; that officials feared even though 
the FPHA was now claiming they would erect only temporary housing, “the city believes that the 
Government intends to erect permanent housing on the land;” and finally, that the condemnation 
was illegal because compensation had not yet been deposited with the courts.105 In an ironic twist 
for a segregated city, the citizen protesters filed motion on the basis that, “a Negro war housing 
project constructed on a site surrounded by an area wholly occupied by persons of the white race 
constitutes the establishment of a racially segregated area in violation of the Constitutions of the 
United States and the State of Maryland,” and further, “since the land will be used for homes for 
Negroes who are neither citizens nor residents of Maryland, the project also will exclude the 
petitioners.”106 While exclusion of black people was a right defended by the courts, exclusion of 
these middle-class white men from black war-worker housing was, in their minds, indefensible. 
Instead of moving forward with either the condemnations or the motions to dismiss, 
Judge William C. Coleman repeatedly postponed the hearings.107 When the first postponement 
failed to result in an agreement between the parties, Coleman issued a rebuke to the FPHA that 
there had been “a good deal of fanning of air and wasting of time” by the federal government 
because they had not followed proper procedures for site approval in the very beginning. While 
he acknowledged the government’s rights to seize property under the War Powers Act, he stated 
that he hoped the agency “preferred to work something out” rather than proceeding “by force of 
sheer power.” “What good does it do to build houses if you are going to have disagreements and 
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uprisings?” he asked. His advice was to “attempt to satisfy the greatest number of people” –– 
with the clear subtext that this referred only to the “greatest number” of white people.108    
Following the second postponement, understanding that Coleman was not going to allow 
the condemnations to proceed, FPHA Commissioner Emmerich agreed to “confer personally” 
with representatives of the HABC and “discuss seriously all alternatives” to the Herring Run 
site.109 Despite having insisted for months that housing for black war workers needed to be 
located near the defense industry in eastern Baltimore, at this point, the FPHA finally relented to 
local political pressure and agreed to consider new sites in other areas of the city. When no 
alternatives had been presented two weeks later, FPHA Regional Director Winston warned, 
“Unless [the HABC] can produce an alternate site in the immediate future,” the FPHA would 
push forward with condemnation proceedings to take not only Herring Run, but also a second 
nearby site for another black housing project.110  
In response, city officials quickly cobbled together a plan. Instead of one large, 1,400-
unit development at Herring Run, the HABC proposed four different sites with 200-600 units 
each. Rather than being in the eastern portion of the city near the defense plants, all four sites 
were located in the black areas of South and Southeastern Baltimore. In fact, two of them did not 
even fall within the city limits, but required Baltimore County approval instead.111 All four of the 
locations had been suggested to the FPHA before, but were each rejected as “inadequate and 
inferior” to Herring Run.112 Despite these issues, and weary from months of delays, the FPHA 
approved of the plan with the provision that one site, Cherry Hill, be built as a permanent black 
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housing development and transferred to the HABC for low-income housing after the war was 
over. Referring back to the mess of the past seven months, Commission Emmerich declared that 
there was now “complete agreement” by the FPHA, the HABC, the Mayor, the City of 
Baltimore, and Baltimore County. In sum, said Mayor McKeldin, “the problem is settled.”113   
The largest of the replacement sites chosen was Cherry Hill. Like Herring Run, the 
location for Cherry Hill was in a generally unprofitable location and condition, on a peninsula on 
the Patapsco River. What the site did have, as white protesters were no doubt aware, was a B&O 
Railroad right-of-way cutting it off from the rest of the city. In describing the site, former police 
magistrate Charles H. Heintzeman called it “a damnable selection.” He explained that the area 
was polluted with railroad engines “puffing smoke and cinders on an upgrade to the 
manufacturing plants in Curtis Bay,” and the site was “bounded on the north by Spring Gardens 
with tugboats belching forth their cinders and soot.” Even worse than the smoke from trains and 
tugboats, though, the Cherry Hill site was located near the municipal incinerator. Heintzeman 
described, “On sultry days the odor and fumes from this plant are very objectionable and when 
the atmosphere is heavy and the wind is blowing from the southeast, it covers this location, 
making it unfit for any housing.”114  
While not garnering white protest, the selection of Cherry Hill was not without 
complaint. City Councilwoman Ella Bailey, who represented the South Baltimore district in 
which Cherry Hill was situated, objected to the choice of her district for the new location. She 
said, “I heartily favor anything that may be done to improve the housing conditions of the 
Baltimore Negroes, but I am, on the other hand, unalterably opposed to any attempt to house in-
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migrant Negroes at Cherry Hill.”115 Though class division would soon become a dividing line in 
arguments over where to place black public housing projects, in this case, it was the migrant 
status of black workers that caused objection. If the site was not to house Baltimoreans, 
Councilwoman Bailey insisted, it should be developed into a water-front park for the benefit of 
South Baltimore residents.116 The Urban League of Baltimore also expressed reservations about 
Cherry Hill, primarily the limited ability to expand the area, which they feared would cause it to 
deteriorate into “another blighted area” as it became overwhelmed and overcrowded by the 
continued black housing shortage.117 Even so, FPHA Commissioner Emmerich expressed hopes 
that Cherry Hill would become a “new permanent and well-rounded neighborhood for Negro 
families” in Baltimore.118 Despite these objections, the selection of Cherry Hill passed without 
much fanfare.119  
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Figure 2.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1940 120 
 
Simultaneous to the approval of the sites, the FPHA dropped the condemnation suit for 
Herring Run. The other sites chosen were rife with problems as well. Urban League executive 
secretary J. Harvey Kerns criticized the choice of the Holabird Avenue site because of “a 
polluted stream” to the west, its “low and flat” geographical plain, and “that it is in a heavy 
industrial area with no nearby community facilities.” Likewise, the Turner Station site was of 
poor quality, which he described as “low land...infested with mosquitoes due to standing water 
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on its fringes,” and “hemmed in by the municipal airport on one side and a large body of water 
on the other... two miles from the nearest shopping district.”121 Nevertheless, plans continued 
unopposed and the HABC quickly acquired rights to the land and began construction.122 The 
white working class of eastern Baltimore had successfully fended off the “invasion” of black 
residents, and city officials continued to follow the pattern of concentrating public housing 
projects in majority-black areas of Baltimore for the rest of the century, as later chapters discuss.  
The argument over Herring Run was more than simple resistance to housing black 
residents near white neighborhoods –– it was the opening salvo in an ongoing war over who 
public housing should serve, whose rights and priorities should be emphasized, and how much 
influence local government should have over projects funded by federal dollars. In this period, 
appointed civil servants in the Housing Authority of Baltimore generally aligned in their views 
with elected representatives and could thus join forces against “unwarranted intrusion” by the 
federal government into city planning decisions. In later years, with changes in HABC 
leadership, the divide shifted and deepened, and this coalition of Baltimore civil servants and city 
leaders dissolved at exactly that moment the federal government began insisting on stronger 
policy control over local decisions –– an issue that the following chapters explore.  
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3 CHAPTER TWO: DESEGREGATION IN THEORY 
 
As World War II drew to a close, questions about the legality and ethics of segregation 
entered the white American public consciousness as never before. Before President Harry S. 
Truman desegregated the Armed Forces with Executive Order 9981 in 1948, black troops 
overseas and on the homefront used their position as defenders of American freedom to press for 
equal rights, a precursor to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s now 
acknowledged by historians as part of a longer tradition of black political struggle.123 In this 
same period, the wartime shortages that had slowed home building lifted and the Baltimore 
Housing Authority (HABC) began making plans to change its war worker stock back to low-
income housing. By 1954, the HABC operated thirteen low-income housing projects along 
segregated lines –– seven designated for white residents, and six for black.124 As the city 
wrestled with questions of segregation following the 1954 Brown v. Board Supreme Court 
decision, the issues raised in desegregating public schools and public housing fell along nearly 
identical lines. Although schools had attracted more newspaper coverage leading up to Brown, 
when public housing became part of the civil rights agenda, white Baltimoreans raised similar 
concerns and authorities sought to put similar policies into place to eschew federal directives. 
In Brown in Baltimore: School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism, Historian 
Howell S. Baum argued that the “freedom of choice” desegregation policy implemented by the 
Baltimore City School Board following Brown v. Board was an understandable extension of a 
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national emphasis on the tenets of liberalism. Baum’s interpretation of liberal thought as 
expressed in the individual choice model of desegregation closely mirrors the desegregation of 
Baltimore’s housing projects. Placing the two desegregation policies in the framework of 
liberalism offers additional context for understanding the broader paradigms of individualism 
and choice that directly influenced the effectiveness of Baltimore’s housing desegregation 
policy. By applying Baum’s framework of liberalism to the public housing desegregation policy 
and giving particular attention to the language of “choice,” this chapter argues that the HABC 
not only created a policy that could speak to the language of desegregation without having to 
actually address the reality of segregation, but that it did so because of a focus not on the 
aggregate outcomes of the system of segregation, but instead on providing individual opportunity 
to choose otherwise. Because of their fundamental rooting in individualism and its entrancement 
by the chimera of “choice,” the desegregation plans never had any real ability to reckon with 
enduring, systemic inequality in housing or in schools.   
Despite having the nation’s largest antebellum free black population, the city of 
Baltimore did not provide schools for black children until 1867, when the state’s post-
Reconstruction constitutional convention acquiesced to provide public schools for black 
students.125 Despite a rapidly growing black student population, the city school system refused to 
replace or update the overcrowded and dilapidated buildings. Over the next few decades, 
crowding became so endemic that, from 1905-1920, most black children attended school only 
part-time, splitting the day in two shifts. The school system built ten new buildings for black 
students and handed down an additional twelve that were deemed no longer “suitable” for white 
students by 1933, enabling all students to attend classes full-time. Even so, overcrowding and 
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poor conditions continued to plague Baltimore’s black-designated schools. In the late 1930s, the 
Baltimore NAACP began concerted efforts to improve conditions in black schools while 
simultaneously filing legal suits to challenge segregation.126 
While the topic of school desegregation had thus been circulating in white newspapers 
for years by the post-World War II era, the idea of desegregating public housing came as a 
surprise to those who relied on the Baltimore Sun for their news. The Baltimore Afro-American, 
in contrast, reported heavily on housing segregation challenges throughout the 1940s and into the 
1950s. This coverage included a 1941 article about limited integration in Philadelphia housing 
projects, statements by First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to the Washington Housing Association 
that she was “opposed to any new planning to set up any segregation on any grounds whatsoever 
since this is a barrier to teaching people to live side by side with one another as Americans,” and 
the approval by the Boston city council of a resolution banning discrimination in public housing. 
In addition to coverage of successfully integrated public housing programs like those in Queens, 
New York, the Afro-American followed legal challenges to public housing segregation in 
Detroit; Newark; Atlantic City; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Toledo; Elizabeth, New Jersey; San 
Francisco; and Washington, DC.127  
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In contrast, for those who read only the mainstream Baltimore Sun, coverage of public 
housing segregation was extremely limited. In December 1949, the Sun recounted that the 
federal Public Housing Administration refused a loan to the city of Charlotte, North Carolina to 
fund the creation of a black-only housing project. The reason for the refusal was not the funding 
of a segregated project, but that the Charlotte plan did not include a “separate but equal” whites-
only project as well and thus constituted discrimination against whites. According to the account, 
“Federal officials insisted that if the Charlotte Housing Authority wanted any Federal money, it 
would have to treat whites and Negroes equally.”128 Even in this instance, where the event was 
detailed in both papers, the nature of the coverage distinctly diverged. In the Afro-American’s 
article, the focus was on the announcement by the Charlotte Housing Authority that their 
allocated funds would create integrated housing projects, a distinction left out by the Sun.129 For 
the Sun’s audience, it was automatically assumed that local distribution of federal housing funds 
would be “separate but equal”; in contrast, the Afro-American chose to highlight an instance of 
local decision-making leading to integrated housing. The next instance of coverage related to 
public housing segregation in the Sun would not come until five years later, when the question of 
desegregation was at the forefront of the national consciousness. 
 In the summer of 1954, the Commissioners of the Housing Authority of Baltimore City 
(HABC) received a memo from their General Council, Eugene M. Feinblatt, that dramatically 
altered their approach to public housing.130 Just months before, the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down segregation in public schools in the Brown v. Board of Education decision, but the memo 
centered on an even more relevant court case from the previous year, Banks v. San Francisco 
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Housing Authority, which essentially banned discrimination in public housing.131 Although the 
ruling did not directly affect them, the HABC decided to reexamine their own policy of 
segregation in the city’s housing projects in light of the legal precedent set by Banks. As 
Feinblatt made clear in his memo, “Even if it be assumed that segregated projects are in and of 
themselves legal, the present policy applicable to the admission and assignment...is certainly 
discriminatory and illegal.”132  
 The HABC immediately began discussions to craft a new policy. In a staff meeting, 
Director of Management Ellis Ash noted that “the national trend” was moving toward 
desegregation, and that, as an agency “subsist[ing] to a great extent on federal assistance,” the 
HABC would eventually be forced to do the same. In light of that reality, Ash recommended the 
HABC “take the action without being forced to do it,” so they could better control the 
development of a new policy and manage its implementation.133 Through this anticipatory 
strategy, the HABC hoped to be able to decide for themselves what desegregation would look 
like in Baltimore’s public housing, rather than being forced into a vision designated by the 
federal government or the court system. 
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Figure 3.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1950 134 
 
 In discussing the new desegregation policy, HABC officials held starkly divided 
opinions. Despite raising initial concerns, General Counsel Eugene Feinblatt stood on the side of 
maintaining segregated housing projects. In his memo following the Banks decision, Feinblatt 
accused the California court of overstepping its boundaries and exercising judicial activism. 
Feinblatt further disagreed with assertions that the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the Banks 
case signified an approval of the ruling, claiming that “despite its general acceptance, this view is 
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not justified by either law or precedent.” It should come as no surprise, then, that Feinblatt also 
did not believe the Brown decision applied to the realm of housing accommodations either. 
Instead, he claimed that there was “no rule of law” that prohibited public housing segregation, 
and that there would be none, “unless it can be found as a factual matter” that segregation was 
“so detrimental to the occupants of public housing” as to constitute a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution. This distinction of “so detrimental” was an undefined bar, 
but indicated an implicit acceptance of some level of harm caused by segregated housing, but not 
one that rose to the level of psychological damage done by school segregation. In sum, Feinblatt 
believed that the ruling of “separate but equal” from Plessy v. Ferguson remained generally valid 
except in the specific places laid out in the Brown decision.135  
 While projecting confidence in his interpretation of legal precedent, Feinblatt also noted 
that, despite his objections, the general trend of the Supreme Court would likely be to continue 
limiting the legality of segregation.136 As such, he came to the conclusion that maintaining 
segregation in public housing –– no matter its legality, in his view –– would become increasingly 
difficult. As in the discussions surrounding school segregation, maintaining substantially equal 
offerings to satisfy the legal requirements of Plessy would prove prohibitively expensive.137 Like 
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the housing authority commissioners, Feinblatt recommended that the HABC, “as a practical 
matter,” begin “to embark...on a policy of limited integration.” In doing this, he suggested that 
the commission make more housing units available to black residents, and alter the admission 
policy, “so that applicants will be considered solely on the basis of their statutory priorities and 
preferences, without regard to race or color.” While he warned, “In the absence of a change in 
political climate,” the HABC “must be prepared to accept an ever increasing measure of 
integration,” Feinblatt hoped that, “If our efforts are genuine and we constructively experiment 
with integration, there is every reason to believe that we will be insulated from adverse court 
action.”138  
 In the midst of this debate among Housing Authority commissioners, the Baltimore 
Public School Board was contending with many of the same issues. Although the School Board 
had voted in 1952 to allow black male students to enroll in a specialized engineering course at a 
white high school, by 1954, the board faced a lawsuit regarding high school offerings for black 
female students. Despite claims that white and black schools were generally equal, black schools 
were severely overcrowded. Booker T. Washington Junior High, for example, had 2,500 pupils 
in a building designated for only 1,200. Both that school and the Dunbar Senior-Junior High had 
returned to educating students using “double shifts” of school days lasting just four hours –– all 
while seats sat vacant in white schools.139  
School Superintendent John Fischer claimed there had never been “qualitative 
distinctions...in providing facilities for white and Negro pupils,” while simultaneously blaming 
the overcrowded, dilapidated condition of black schools on the neighborhoods where they were 
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situated.140 Fischer himself was an American boot-strap success story. He taught science in 
Baltimore’s public schools while earning his bachelor’s degree through night classes at Johns 
Hopkins, and later earned his master’s degree and doctorate while working as Deputy 
Superintendent. He believed that “individual initiative” was the key to success, telling a 
Baltimore Evening Sun reporter that “government should be as decentralized as possible with as 
high a degree of local autonomy as can be achieved.”141 Fischer likewise claimed to be led by the 
“principles of the Founding Fathers” –– what he determined to be an emphasis on classical 
liberalism, or what would today be generally termed libertarianism. In the discussion of school 
desegregation, Fischer would later write, “We believe it wrong to manipulate people to create a 
segregated situation. We believe it equally wrong to manipulate people to create an integrated 
situation.”142 Seemingly many of his white contemporaries in Baltimore’s housing leadership 
shared his beliefs. 
 After studying the question of housing desegregation, the appointed HABC staff 
committee issued a report of their own. First, they soundly rejected a “separate but equal” 
proposal to pair each white housing project with a black project such that “substantial equality 
could be achieved.” They called the proposal “futile,” expecting that a court case directly related 
to housing “might well come along within the next couple of years.”143 Moreover, it was the 
likelihood of a court case against the HABC that the committee, and the authority as a whole, 
most wished to avoid. They feared that if forced to integrate by court decision, “the pressure 
groups...will continue to breathe down our necks to make sure that we do not attempt to evade 
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the effect of the decision,” noting “this lack of freedom in carrying out an enforced integration 
policy could lead to trouble.”144 By forging and implementing their own policy ahead of any 
court orders, the commissioners hoped the HABC might be subject to less scrutiny and oversight 
of their progress.  
 In deciding the appropriate way to proceed in desegregating public housing, the 
authority’s committee split between those who wanted to wait until legally forced, and those who 
wished to take immediate steps toward desegregation. One member in favor of waiting until 
legally compelled worried that to do otherwise would be taken as the authority “using its powers 
as a participant in the crusade for integration,” and an attempt “to leap too far ahead of the 
normal line of growth” for black areas of the city. He claimed to fear such actions “would retard, 
rather than advance, eventual integration,” due to the backlash it would cause. Even still, the 
member conceded, “there is no logical reason for discrimination or segregation of the Negro 
from the community other than by individual or collective prejudice.”145  
Even with reservations such as these, the majority of the staff committee favored 
immediate desegregation. One spoke against accommodationism and gradualism, writing, “The 
entire history of race relations in this country is filled with instances where the traditional 
argument for either the ‘status quo,’ or gradualism as the next desirable alternative, develops its 
case on the existence of fears and prejudices in the community.” Furthermore, their report noted, 
taking action in advance of a lawsuit “would avoid the embarrassment” of defending continued 
segregation “when it appears that no real defense is possible.” In their discussion of the matter, 
HABC officials came back several times to the need to follow a path that would “win us the 
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maximum of friends and supporters.” Although they differed on their preferred methods of 
implementing desegregation, the commissioners expressed that they themselves generally 
favored an end of racial prejudice within the public housing system.146  
 Before the HABC came to a decision, the school board announced its new policy. The 
school had previously operated under a system of “open enrollment” rather than districting, 
meaning that students could apply for enrollment in any school assigned to their race, regardless 
of its proximity to their home. On June 10, 1954, the school board announced a small but 
important change: “All the standards and criteria which are now in force with respect to the 
admission of pupils to schools, grades, or curricula shall continue in force except that the race of 
the pupil shall not be a consideration.” In order to ensure that “no child shall be required to 
attend any particular school,” the board continued its rejection of districting, with the important 
exception that if a school was determined to be overcrowded, a district line could be drawn to 
close off open enrollment for that school by those who lived beyond the line.147 As historian 
Howell Baum described, “Officials construed students’ freedom of choice, or individual liberty, 
in negative terms. They had in mind freedom from external restraint, rather than freedom to get 
or achieve anything in particular.”148 This school desegregation plan was unanimously adopted 
by the school commissioners on June 25, 1954.149 
 The desegregation plan adopted by Housing Authority commissioners was strikingly 
similar to that of the school board, in that it kept all the same requirements with the sole change 
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of “eliminating the factor of race” in admission decisions.150 In a press release announcing their 
decision, HABC officials wrote:  
The attention of the Commission has been directed to an examination of 
its racial occupancy policies by reason of the significant events of the past few 
months, both locally and nationally, establishing a clear trend toward the 
abandonment of policies sanctioning segregation. The Commission recognizes 
that this trend affects the Authority’s own policies. 
Furthermore, an examination of such legal opinion as is available results 
in the conclusion that the existing policies would be extremely difficult to 
administer to satisfy legal requirements and still be workable, acceptable, and 
practical. 
Accordingly, the Authority is proceeding to revise its admission policies 
by eliminating the factor of race in the selection of eligible tenants, consistent 
with the present admission procedures. 
The staff is directed to develop the necessary administrative changes and 
arrangements towards this end.151 
 
It is telling that in this statement the authority failed to condemn the practice of 
segregation, instead distancing itself from the issue by pointing to local and national “trends.” 
Though a small difference, this is an important way in which the HABC shifted responsibility, 
and thus potential blame, for its actions. Simultaneously, the statement shifted focus to the 
authority’s inability to effectively meet the increasingly burdensome requirements of non-
discrimination within a segregated system, giving another discursive slip to its own agency. 
 While the intentions of the HABC commissioners were important, most housing authority 
employees were never privy to the conversations actually crafting the new policy. Their 
introduction to the change came from HABC Executive Director Oliver C. Winston, former 
FPHA Regional Director during the Herring Run debacle, who addressed an assembly of 
employees on June 30, 1954.152 He began by reading the official press release announcing the 
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new desegregation policy. Winston could have followed the commissioners’ lead and focused on 
the difficulties of the changing legal structures of segregation, but instead, much of his speech 
extolled the virtues of the decision to desegregate the projects. Like the press release, Winston 
pointed to the national trend toward “eliminating discrimination and segregation practices in all 
areas of human activity,” as well as the “unmistakable trend of legal opinion” that segregation 
was unconstitutional.153 Unlike the release, though, Winston placed the responsibility to uphold 
the desegregation decision onto agency employees. He told the group, “The policy is not just the 
Commission’s policy, it is in every sense of the word our policy. I want you to get in the habit of 
thinking about it that way.”154 This rhetorical emphasis is important, as it collapsed the distance 
between the HABC employees and commissioners, framing the policy as something the entire 
staff was embracing rather than a decree from above. Though the official press release sought to 
limit the assumed agency of the HABC, Winston emphasized to the employees that it was not 
just a national trend toward desegregation driving the change, but also a moral responsibility to 
end discrimination. 
 Winston also directly addressed those employees who would wish to maintain 
segregation in the housing projects. Unlike the residents of public housing, for whom the right to 
individual choice was of tantamount importance, agency employees were required to comply 
with the desegregation policy regardless of their personal feelings on the matter. Winston warned 
that the authority would not allow employees “to express contrary personal opinions...while 
engaged in the performance of their official duties.” Employees were not allowed to make 
statements such as, “I agree the decision is bad, but what can I do about it?” Winston explained, 
because such statements would decrease the new policy’s effectiveness. Finally, he reminded 
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those employees who felt “prejudices...so strong that he cannot perform his job” within these 
parameters that they would be subject to dismissal under the employee code of conduct. Here 
again, Winston placed responsibility for ending racial discrimination on the shoulders of each 
individual employee.155   
 Despite Winston’s strong language in his speech to the staff, behind closed doors, he 
made it clear that he felt the need to be careful in how the HABC presented the new policy to the 
public. Having learned from his time as FPHA Regional Director during the controversy 
surrounding Herring Run, Winston recognized the importance of presenting the decision as a 
collaborative effort, not a mandate handed down from an overzealous bureaucrat. In a meeting of 
HABC officials on November 5, he told the commissioners that any interpretation of the 
desegregation policy given to community partners “must be presented in a manner which could 
not be construed by any person as being a ‘crusade’ entered into by the Housing Authority.” He 
went on to say, “At no time should we give the appearance of ‘bowling something through on the 
community.’”156 Even though he had encouraged lower-level staff to take ownership of the 
desegregation policy and overtly threatened employees with dismissal for expressing 
disagreement, for dealing with community groups, Winston encouraged language that once again 
downplayed the HABC’s agency. By shifting culpability away from the housing authority, 
commissioners positioned themselves to play both sides––with any community groups who 
disapproved of the changes, the HABC could claim to be a similarly aggrieved party acted upon 
by broader societal change, while with more progressive groups who were in favor of 
desegregation, the HABC could claim to be leaders in housing desegregation.  
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 As shown, the new policy was presented differently to the private audience of the HABC 
commissioners and the public-facing group of employees. The policy was presented in a third 
way when discussed with the officials of other municipal housing authorities at the Human 
Rights Day Institute in St. Louis, Missouri in December 1955.157 At the Institute, HABC Deputy 
Director Ellis Ash gave a speech titled “The Baltimore Story,” a tale meant to inspire and 
encourage other housing authorities facing similar challenges as desegregation loomed large on 
the national stage. While it is necessary to read between the lines in Ash’s speech, there are 
moments where his message was explicitly clear––that desegregation was only going to go as far 
as the “individual choices” by housing residents forced it to go. 
 Likewise, Baltimore School Superintendent John Fischer recognized that the “freedom of 
choice” policy would not lead to a true end to school segregation. Following the Baltimore 
School Board’s decision, Fischer told teachers, “Will our school system be reorganized to 
integrate all schools? The answer to that question is ‘No.’...No effort will be made deliberately to 
transfer children of either race for the purpose of ‘mixing’ schools. We have had the last of 
placing children anywhere for racial reasons.”158 Fischer would return to this point again and 
again. In 1959, he said, “Negroes have been free to remain in their own schools or, if they chose, 
to transfer to a white school. The one thing we have resisted is to manipulate people. We are just 
opposed to pushing people around. The school system has never adopted any plan to achieve a 
good balance. We feel there is no merit in having a particular racial composition.”159 A few years 
later Fischer returned to this theme of integration as manipulation, calling school integration 
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“social engineering” and claiming that “even the most desirable end does not justify 
manipulating people to create a structure pleasing to some master planner.”160 As Baum 
explained, “Explicitly, [the school board] would not discriminate against black children; 
implicitly, neither would it act on their behalf.”161  
 As in Baltimore’s schools, the bulk of the responsibility for housing integration was thus 
placed upon the black residents of the projects––or, as Ash described it, “every applicant can 
now express a preference for any project.” In this way, integration was up to black housing 
applicants, not the HABC. This was a conscious choice made by the commissioners, and it was 
working exactly as planned, with several projects still 100 percent white-occupied. As Ash 
claimed in the aforementioned speech, “At this stage, a number of projects have had no 
applicants from members of the racial group formerly excluded from consideration.” The 
continued de facto segregation in the HABC project system was the responsibility, and thus the 
fault, of black residents, who, in Ash’s telling, simply did not want to integrate the O’Donnell 
Heights, Claremont Homes, and Brooklyn Homes projects. Ash emphasized this point clearly to 
the gathered participants at the institute, telling them proudly, “The Baltimore Authority has not 
applied its policy on the premise that integration must be achieved throughout the program, if 
that means that families are required to either live in particular projects or sacrifice their 
opportunity for housing.” Ultimately, the HABC was willing to remove the legal mandate that 
segregated housing projects, but would not take any meaningful steps toward their integration.162 
The promise by housing commissioners that “We are not going to require anyone to live 
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anywhere against their wishes,” cut both ways.163 It meant that black residents would not be 
forced into segregated housing, but also that white residents would not be compelled to live 
alongside black neighbors. It was the black applicants who were making the decision to move in 
next door to potentially unwelcoming whites, not the city officials who were placing them there.   
 Ash clearly knew that this system of voluntary housing project choice was not the way to 
achieve integration, ending his speech saying he did not wish to give the false impression, “that 
all projects operated by the Baltimore Authority are now integrated. Frankly, I don’t know when 
that will occur.”164 From their first conversation on desegregating the projects, HABC 
commissioners had shown that integration was not the end goal of the policy change. As their 
report stated in 1954, “If we wait for a court decision we will not only have no control over the 
types of families we select to begin the integration process, but probably not enough control over 
where we place them within a project either.”165 Ash’s speech puts those conversations in a 
clearer relief: it was not just a fear of government intervention in the speed of desegregation that 
made commissioners nervous, but also that government oversight of the process may force actual 
integration, which could have devastating political consequences. Others had recognized the 
limitations of the “choice” system, as when Winston told HABC employees that “there is a good 
probability that all our projects will not attract persons of different races than the present 
pattern.”166  HABC officials recognized the limitations of the individual choice system, yet 
embraced it despite –– and potentially because of –– those limits.  
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 Director Ash could not plead ignorance of this likely outcome. In July 1954, Director of 
Housing Management Harry B. Weiss warned Ash, “It should be recognized that segregation is 
not necessarily forced; it may be voluntary, since persons may prefer to live among others of 
similar cultural background. Conversely, integration is not necessarily voluntary, since the denial 
of free choice may be required to insure against a continuance or a resurgence of a segregated 
pattern.”167 Perversely, Ash called back to this same language in “The Baltimore Story,” telling 
the gathered officials that it was no surprise that Baltimore’s projects remained partially 
segregated since the city was “still a community with essentially segregated living, and 
institutional resources such as shopping, entertainment, and religious facilities [for black people] 
are not available in the neighborhoods adjacent to a number of the projects.”168 What Weiss had 
raised as a point of concern about a structural flaw in the policy, Ash used as a justification for 
the authority’s limited actions toward integration.  
With so little reporting on housing desegregation efforts by the Sun leading up to the 
HABC announcement, one can only imagine it must have come as a surprise to the majority of 
the Sun’s white readership. In contrast, for Baltimore Afro-American readers, it likely seemed a 
long time coming. Just a few months earlier, the Afro-American reported on the very California 
court case that spurred the HABC to action, Banks v. San Francisco. Savvy readers of the paper 
might have remembered the Afro-American reporting earlier that year that “The Superior Court 
ordered the housing authority [of San Francisco] to admit all qualified applicants to any and all 
available low-rent public housing units, subject only to the rules and regulations which applied to 
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all applicants and without regard to race or color.”169 Running almost twice the length of the Sun 
piece, the Afro-American’s report on the HABC’s decision quoted the press release in its 
entirety. In addition, it gave background on the projects currently under operation, the 
construction of two new projects in progress, and listed the members of the HABC board who 
made the decision. Where the Sun echoed the language of the HABC press release, the Afro-
American made small but important changes. Even the very headlines run by the two newspapers 
differed in how they viewed the change: while the Sun reported that “Segregation is Ruled Out,” 
the Afro-American more optimistically declared “Housing Integrated in Baltimore City.”170 
Unfortunately, as discussed, the Sun’s headline was closer to the mark in the end. For the Afro-
American, though, its coverage of the issue was not done with this piece. The following week, 
the paper reported on Oliver Winston’s address to all the HABC employees, the text of which 
was discussed earlier in this chapter. In addition to an editorial calling Winston’s address a 
“temperate, reasoned, statesmanlike document,” the paper dedicated most of a page to reprinting 
the address in its entirety.171  
 Before the HABC decided to desegregate its projects, the Sun remained either unaware of 
or uninterested in the housing segregation policies of other cities. This is in sharp contrast with 
the Afro-American. After the decision, however, the Sun ran a few articles about other cities, 
many of them related to the Brown v. Board decision and its aftermath. For instance, a 1956 
article about an Alabama voter initiative detailed plans in that state to maintain segregation in the 
face of the Supreme Court ruling.172 The Sun article opened, “Segregation-conscious Alabama 
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voters will decide tomorrow on two measures designed to prevent race-mixing in the schools and 
public recreational and housing facilities.” The article carefully walked the line of detailing how 
the proposed plan would enable Alabama officials to maintain segregation in schools and public 
facilities while taking the segregation laws off the books, yet not explicitly suggesting that 
Baltimore lawmakers do the same. Combining the extremely value-laden term “race-mixing” 
with the tacit endorsement of such a plan, the Sun was able to take the side of segregation 
without directly saying so.  
Other instances of the Sun’s failure to denounce clearly racist policies as anything of the 
sort include a 1957 Associated Press article detailing the ludicrous plan by a Georgia lawmaker 
to send black families to New England and the Midwest in hopes that forcing white residents in 
those regions to live next to black families would increase their racism and thus garner support 
for continuing segregation.173 It is not clear whether the original article by the AP was intended 
to be tongue-in-cheek, poking fun at such a ridiculous plan, or slyly supporting the proposal as 
the Sun did in the previously discussed article. Either way, the fact that the Sun editors chose to 
run the piece, combined with other racial sentiments expressed in the paper, suggests that the Sun 
did to some extent support those who were pushing back against integration.  
 Another AP article run by the Sun is a 1958 piece about the workings of the public 
housing desegregation plan undertaken by the New York City housing authority. This article 
decried the failure of desegregation in that city’s public housing, saying, “A policy to prevent 
discrimination against Negroes in city housing has resulted in whites moving out, thereby 
defeating its purpose of integration.” 174 It went on to describe a survey report by the Citizens 
Housing and Planning Council of New York, Inc., which suggested a policy of affirmative action 
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should be adopted over the current “color-blind” plan. The report also suggested the NYC 
authority “issue a firm and unequivocal statement as to its determination to develop and maintain 
integration,” a far cry from the HABC method of ending blatant discrimination but going no 
further. The Sun itself recognized that the HABC decision had not led to integration, as when 
Edward C. Burks reported, “Segregation regulations were dropped several years ago, but in 
practice there has been little intermingling of the races in the assigning of apartment space.”175 
Despite this acknowledgment, when the HABC was faced with potential interference by the 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development just a few years later, the Sun 
dramatically changed its tune, declaring, “As for our eighteen public housing projects, 
integration prevails in fifteen of them, there being only three which are all white – and these only 
because there have been no Negro applicants.”176  
 While the Sun otherwise avoided discussion of desegregation policies across the country 
with the aforementioned exceptions, the Afro-American continued its regular reporting of legal 
challenges, successes, and failures in public housing desegregation throughout the 1950s. In 
addition to single-article reporting on integration efforts in Chester, Pennsylvania; St. Louis; and 
Hartford, Connecticut, the Afro-American followed debates in several other cities through 
multiple years. The paper reported on the NAACP’s suit against the Detroit Housing 
Commission in 1950, and proudly announced when the judge in that case declared “separate 
housing facilities are inherently unequal” in 1954. In addition to reporting when the Newark 
Housing Authority abolished segregation in their housing projects in 1950, the paper followed 
the case in nearby Elizabeth, New Jersey, where black plaintiffs filed against the local housing 
authority in 1953 and won the suit the following year. Likewise, the Afro-American reported on 
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housing discrimination lawsuits in Toledo, Ohio in 1953. Perhaps the most surprising city 
missing from the Sun’s reporting and present in the Afro-American was Washington, D.C., where 
the decision to desegregate public housing and its implementation dragged on for years.177  
As a final example, even when the Sun and the Afro-American did report on the same 
lawsuit, the depth of coverage and direction of the editorializing differed greatly. An AP article 
on Savannah, Georgia selected by Sun editors to run in the paper in July 1958 began, “The 
principle of voluntary racial segregation was approved by a Federal appellate court today in a 
decision against integration in a Savannah public housing project.”178 According to the piece, the 
Fifth District United States Court of Appeals decided, “If Negroes and whites desire to maintain 
voluntary segregation for the common good, there is certainly no law to prevent such 
cooperation. Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment operates positively to command 
integration of the races but only negatively to forbid governmentally enforced segregation.” It is 
interesting that the court would term its decision in such a way, since if “Negroes and whites 
desire[d] to maintain voluntary segregation,” the lawsuit in question would never have existed. It 
is also valuable to recognize this distinction made yet again about “voluntary” segregation, the 
same excuse made by the HABC for the lack of substantive desegregation efforts in its own 
project housing.  
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 What the Sun article failed to mention was the background of the Savannah lawsuit. The 
suit was brought forward by Queen M. Cohen, a black woman who was denied housing in the 
Fred Wessels Homes, a white-designated project. Although the first time this project came to the 
attention of the Sun was this appellate court decision, the Afro-American had begun following 
the case five years earlier. In 1953, the Afro-American ran an article about a court challenge to 
plans to begin construction on the Fred Wessels Homes.179 It is only in the Afro-American that 
readers discover the Fred Wessels Homes were constructed “on the ‘Old Fort’ site, an area 
inhabited by colored families.” The Afro-American reported on the case again in 1954, when the 
U.S. Court of Appeals dismissed a suit brought against the Savannah Housing Authority on a 
filing technicality, saying “the ‘important constitutional issues’ raised were not ready for 
decision.”180 This background provides depth to the 1958 articles. In the Afro-American’s report, 
and missing in the Sun’s account, was the statement by the appellate court, that “there was ‘no 
indication’ that Mrs. Cohen actually wished to live in the project, since the case had been 
brought as ‘a test’ by the NAACP.”181 Setting aside all discussion of the case itself, the Sun did 
not mention that the plaintiff in the case was a former resident of the neighborhood where these 
projects were built, which was cleared to make way for white housing, and she was then denied 
entrance into the public housing development. For the Sun to state that she did not actually want 
to live there but was just a pawn of the NAACP is quite telling of the paper’s perspective on the 
subject of housing desegregation.  
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 Baltimore’s black elites praised the “free choice” policies of both the school board and 
the HABC. The NAACP claimed credit for the school board policy, stating, “The policy 
statements...embodied the requests made by the [Baltimore] Branch,” and branch president Lillie 
Jackson told the Afro-American, “The Baltimore Branch NAACP heartily commends the 
Baltimore City School Board for the magnificent decision.”182 In the days following the school 
desegregation announcement, the Afro-American declared, “In Maryland, we are face to face 
with integration.”183 Failing to draw a distinction between desegregation and integration, the 
Afro-American likewise celebrated the revised HABC policy as “one of integration.”184 In the 
elite black community, a colorblind liberalism focused on individual opportunity held sway. As 
Betty Murphy Phillips, daughter of the Afro-American’s owner explained, “there will be only a 
few colored pupils in many schools in our city. But that’s not important –– the important thing is 
that [individual black students] will now have an opportunity to avail themselves of all the public 
school facilities this city offers.”185 Phillips embraced the color-blindness of the policy. In 
another article, she expressed hope that “in the next 15 years...we get all our young people –– 
white and colored –– to stop thinking in terms of race.”186 
In both schools and public housing, those who championed integration hoped that the 
new policies adopted after Brown v. Board would open a path toward racial integration, and 
through that, an end to racial discrimination. In the school system, nearly the opposite was true. 
Though some individual black families bravely chose to send their children to formerly all-white 
schools, for a variety of reasons, the vast majority of black children remained in all-black 
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schools. For the 1954-55 school year, fewer than 5 percent of black students attended schools 
with white classmates.187 In the 1960s, due to a boom in Baltimore’s black population, more 
black children were attending all-black schools than had before Brown v. Board; by the end of 
the century, the racial composition of Baltimore public schools would shift from 60 percent 
white, to 89 percent black.188 This pattern of limited desegregation followed by re-segregation as 
a result of large-scale abandonment by white families would likewise play out in the public 
housing sector, as the following chapters detail.  
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4 CHAPTER THREE: DESEGREGATION IN PRACTICE 
  
In 1954, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC), following what it saw as a 
national trend challenging overt segregation, declared its public housing projects desegregated.189 
As in Baltimore’s public schools, the liberal policy of “freedom of choice” applied public 
housing projects, hinged on the power of individual decision making in the face of long-standing, 
systemic, codified segregation. This “color-blind” plan was easy to declare, absolving local 
authorities of responsibility for integration, but left open questions about implementation that 
housing officials struggled with for the rest of the 1950s and into the 1960s. More than a decade 
after officially ending segregation policies in its projects, Baltimore public housing remained 
racially segregated on a de facto basis, due in part to a combination of factors including the city’s 
history of residential segregation, overt racism, and unequal opportunity supporting white 
upward mobility; but primarily, Baltimore’s public housing remained segregated because of the 
lack of institutional support inherent in the classically liberal idea of “free choice.” 
Even after the HABC resolved to “eliminate the factor of race” in public housing 
admissions, questions remained about how exactly to implement the new policy.190 The 
department first looked to Fairfield Homes, a project constructed by the federal government in 
1943 as war housing for employees at the Bethlehem-Fairfield shipyards, located on an industrial 
peninsula alongside the Patapsco River.191 Complementing the all-white Fairfield Homes, was a 
separate temporary project built for black workers, called Banneker Homes. Although both 
                                                 
189 Oliver C. Winston, Speech entitled Desegregation Policy: An Address to All Employees of the Housing 
Authority of Baltimore City, June 30, 1954, Series 3, Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 5, Exhibit 137, ACLU. 
190 Winston, Desegregation Policy. 
191 P. Nicole King, “Preserving Places, Making Spaces in Baltimore: Seeing the Connections of Research, Teaching, 
and Service as Justice,” Journal of Urban History 40 no. 3, May 2014: 436. 
68 
projects were turned over to the HABC for low-income housing following the war, Banneker 
was torn down in the early 1950s, and in 1953, the HABC had begun the process of re-
designating Fairfield Homes for all-black residency.192 By then, the area surrounding Fairfield 
had deteriorated significantly, contaminated with industrial pollution and detritus. 
Simultaneously, the area suffered from what historian Nicole King refers to as “disinvestment” 
from city officials who, among other things, failed to modernize the site with the water and 
sewer lines constructed throughout the majority of the city following the war.193 No longer 
desirable, the site was to be given over to black residency; unlike the fights over Herring Run in 
the 1940s, the move garnered little resistance from white residents.  
 The large-scale changeover from white to black occupancy at Fairfield had already begun 
by the time of the HABC’s 1954 desegregation decision. Seeing this moment as an opportunity 
to test out integration in public housing, the HABC halted transfers of white residents out of 
Fairfield Homes. By that point, however, most of the residents had already left, and only 69 
white families remained in the project.194 Eight black families became the first to integrate 
Fairfield Homes on November 16, 1954, and by August of the following year, the project was 
once again near full capacity.195 Despite this “integration,” within a year, Fairfield was 90 
percent black––effectively the same racial turnover the HABC had planned before instituting 
their “free choice” desegregation policy.196 
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 The next phase of implementing the new housing policy came about in the summer of 
1955. On May 31, nine black families moved into Perkins Homes in Southeast Baltimore, near 
the ethnic enclave known as Little Italy. The next day, seven black families moved into Latrobe 
Homes, just a mile north. Despite having made the decision to move black families into formerly 
all-white projects as vacancies became available, officials held back applications for black 
residency until a group of sufficient size had amassed to enable a cohort.197 In both Latrobe and 
Perkins, like in Fairfield Homes, the scales of racial balance tipped quickly. By 1964 both 
projects were majority black, and by 1970, had further increased to 80-90 percent black 
residency.198 
 The first three integrated projects were the result of moving black residents into formerly 
all-white housing facilities, but the HABC also had several new public housing projects in the 
pipeline at the time of their desegregation decision. As HABC Director of Housing Management 
Harry Weiss explained, this provided an opportunity to open new housing on an integrated basis, 
drawing a distinction between desegregation and integration: “In the case of existing projects 
desegregation is the issue while with the new projects integration can begin at initial 
occupancy.”199 This distinction between desegregation and integration was unusual, as the terms 
were used interchangeably by most HABC officials at the time; moreover, Weiss highlighted a 
difference in process, not in outcome. Despite all new public housing projects after 1954 opening 
on an integrated basis, all of these saw the same trend of rapid turnover to all-black occupancy. 
Lafayette Homes, for example, opened in 1955 with only nine white families. By the following 
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year, that number had dropped to four, all of whom left within the decade.200 Another project, 
Flag House, opened on the edge of Little Italy in 1954 with 76 percent white occupancy. By 
1958, that had dropped to 60 percent––still a laudable enough number that the Sun reported, 
“Segregation regulations were dropped several years ago, but in practice there has been little 
intermingling of the races in the assigning of apartment space except for Flag House Courts.”  
Although its location on the border of Little Italy, a low-income ethnic white neighborhood, 
slowed the racial turnover, by 1970, even Flag House had become 95 percent black.201 In fact, all 
eight projects opened on a “desegregated basis” were overwhelmingly black-occupied by 
1970.202  
Despite their stated hopes for integration of the public housing project, officials soon 
realized the limits of their success. In a late 1959 memo, five years after desegregation was 
announced, Weiss wrote to Edgar Ewing regarding the “steadily rising percentage of Negro 
occupancy at all projects.” Furthermore, he noted, “The future projects that are presently planned 
are likely to be substantially Negro in occupancy, if not completely so.”203 This same trend of 
racial turnover had been experienced by housing officials in other cities, including Chicago. 
Despite the Chicago Housing Authority opening Wentworth Gardens as an integrated project in 
1947, the combination of long-term residential segregation and housing shortages in black 
neighborhoods led to an applicant pool that was entirely black. According to reports, when white 
people arrived to find a line of black applicants, the white people left without applying. As a 
staffer noted, “Unless a public relations job is done in advance of the actual selection of tenants, 
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the project will become uni-racial as a result of the overwhelming need among Negro 
families.”204 At another public housing project in Chicago, officials had hoped for 20 percent 
white occupancy upon opening to mirror the neighborhood before the redevelopment. Instead, 
like with Lafayette Homes and Flag House Courts, the few white tenants who initially moved 
into the project soon left.205 
HABC officials were well aware of the possibility of this “re-segregation.” Years earlier, 
Weiss had warned the housing program director that segregation was, “not necessarily forced; it 
may be voluntary, since persons may prefer to live among others of similar cultural background.” 
Likewise, he noted that integration was not necessarily voluntary either, because “the denial of 
free choice may be required to insure against a continuance or resurgence of a segregated 
pattern.”206 To the public housing officials in Baltimore, the matter of deepest concern was the 
appearance of free choice, rather than the outcome of continued segregation. This supposed 
“choice” was disconnected from any consideration of systemic racial or class barriers that could 
prevent individuals from making a choice, or any discussion of whether a choice was actually 
meaningful. By embracing this stance, officials were able to willfully avoid having to address 
segregation caused by decades of residential discrimination and racially based policy decisions. 
To force integration at the cost of free choice proved unacceptable to housing officials, not only 
because of the ideologically liberal focus on individual decision making disconnected from 
societal factors, but also because of the more practical benefit––the continued ability to avoid 
responsibility for correcting the situation.  
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As the previous chapter argued, Baltimore was one of the first cities to apply the 
individualist tenets of classical liberalism to desegregation of the school system, which prevented 
school board members from taking steps to positively address the system’s racial disparities, but 
this avoidance of responsibility was not unique to Baltimore. As Ansley Erickson explored in her 
recent book, Making the Unequal Metropolis: School Desegregation and its Limits, school 
desegregation in Nashville followed different patterns stemming from the same processes. She 
wrote of the Nashville school board, “Their stunted vision was as much material as cultural; their 
racism a system of power as much as a matter of individual feeling.” These “basic political and 
economic structures,” stemming from a racially-based and racially-biased system, hindered 
efforts to proactively further desegregation through busing in the late 1960s and 1970s.207  In a 
broader sense, American society fundamentally emphasized the supposed link between 
worthiness, effort, and success––in which case poverty was evidence not of systemic racial 
injustice, but personal failure.208   
Weiss’s 1954 letter to Ash had also warned that “selection solely on the basis of ‘need’ 
might well re-establish segregation.”209 Applicants displaced from their homes due to city urban 
renewal projects were placed at the top of the public housing waiting lists. As Weiss recognized, 
most of these urban renewal areas were black neighborhoods, which meant a high percentage of 
those placed in public housing would be black. This only served to exacerbate the long-standing 
shortages of housing available to black residents.  
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In many cities across the nation, neighborhood residents who were displaced by urban 
renewal or to make room for new housing projects were unable to return, even after the projects 
were desegregated. Housing historian Lawrence Vale estimated that in Boston, only between 2 
and 12 percent of those displaced from public housing sites were admitted to the subsequently 
constructed housing projects; figures from New York City are only slightly higher, at 18 
percent.210 In other cities like Chicago, neighborhood composition rules were used to justify low 
percentages of returning residents. In the Jane Addams Homes project in Chicago, data showing 
only 35 black families living on the site before clearance was used as justification for admitting 
only 30 black families back into the 1,027-unit project.211 As Vale explained, housing reformers 
“proposed to replace ‘housing conditions’ with better housing...not necessarily say that the 
people lifted bodily out of their present homes would be the same bodies selected to return to the 
improved district.”212 Housing shortages were further exacerbated when demolished land was not 
replaced by low-rent housing, but commercial or market-rate development.213  
The racial turnover in Baltimore public housing was not without local precedent. Until 
1917, housing in Baltimore was not racially segregated. Black families were spread throughout 
the city, generally living in two-story alley houses. At the turn of the century, the “best” black 
families began moving into the northwestern part of the city, along the westernmost border of the 
affluent white Eutaw Place neighborhood.214 The backlash to this black migration foreshadowed 
the debates over Herring Run described in earlier chapters, as well as Baltimore public housing 
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writ large. In the summer of 1910, black lawyer George W.F. McMechen moved into a house on 
McCulloh Street, becoming the first black family to cross the racial divide into Eutaw Place. In 
response, the Baltimore City Council passed an ordinance forbidding black families from 
moving onto any block that was more than 50 percent white-occupied.215 When the law was 
ruled unconstitutional by the 1917 U.S. Supreme Court Case Buchanan v. Warley, white 
neighborhoods instead turned to the use of restrictive covenants.216 Racist lending practices 
known as “redlining,” backed by the Homeowners Loan Corporation, further exacerbated the 
shortages caused by in-migration of African Americans during the Great Migration and World 
War II. A 1946 survey by the Baltimore Urban League found that black homeowners were 
paying an average of 170 percent above prewar levels and at least 75 percent above present 
market values.217 By the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled such covenants unconstitutional in 
the 1948 Shelly v. Kraemer decision, demand for decent black housing combined with white 
hysteria had reached critical mass. Blockbusting fervor swept the city, with panicked whites 
selling their homes in transitioning areas.218 In the decade from 1955 to 1965, the West 
Baltimore neighborhood of Edmonson Village went from nearly all-white to nearly all-black.219 
This trend presaged the racial turnover that occurred in Baltimore’s public housing. The 
numbers of white applications to HABC-administered housing dropped precipitously in the years 
after the desegregation policy was announced, from 2,563 in 1950 to 807 in 1966. While black 
families faced federal policies that limited their housing choices, white families were granted an 
abundance of options from mortgage loan assistance to GI Bill benefits that encouraged home 
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ownership and enabled white flight from diversifying neighborhoods to the suburbs. Baltimore 
historian Edward Orser referred to this pattern as the “proverbial pull and push of 
suburbanization: the attraction of new housing in a suburban setting, the push of groups from 
whom they sought social distance.”220 Programs meant to benefit upwardly mobile residents and 
prevent the need for subsidized public housing disproportionately benefited whites, often by 
design.221 Like at the Wentworth Gardens and Cabrini projects in Chicago, poor whites had 
choices not available to poor black residents, and often exercised those options to avoid 
desegregated public housing. In Baltimore’s public housing projects, desegregation did not lead 
to integration, but instead single-race occupancy by black residents. As George J. Marder said in 
a 1965 article in the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper, “What starts out as open housing to all 
races often ends up all-colored.”222   
The same patterns were replicated throughout the HABC project areas. During World 
War II, HABC had operated six black-only projects. Despite ostensible desegregation of the 
housing program, not a single one of these projects had become home to a white family by the 
1970s.223 On the opposite end of the spectrum, the white-only projects of Brooklyn Homes, 
Claremont Homes, and O’Donnell Heights remained exclusively white until well into the 1960s. 
Even thereafter, these projects remained 80-90 percent white, only marginally desegregated.224 
Of the 1,601 white families in the HABC housing system during 1970s, 1,393 of them lived in 
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these three projects. The vast majority of white public housing residents were thus concentrated 
in these mostly white projects. This was likely the result of two mutually reinforcing factors: the 
lack of integration in these projects meant white residents were less likely to flee and cause racial 
changeover, and those who did leave the projects for the suburbs or market-rate housing would 
be replaced by other white applicants who chose those projects because of its lack of integration. 
Despite a majority-black waiting list for HABC-administered housing, all new residents in these 
three projects were white until 1967.225 
 
Figure 4.1 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1960 226 
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That Brooklyn, Claremont, and O’Donnell remained overwhelmingly white despite 
desegregation was not a fluke, but by design. The HABC officially blamed these racial 
disparities on the black housing recipients, saying that “unless a family had its roots” in the 
surrounding neighborhoods, “they were not interested.”227 The fact that a history of residential 
segregation meant that no black applicants would have such “roots” in the white neighborhoods 
surrounding the projects was not considered. Instead, as the Sun dutifully declared in 1962, 
“integration prevails” in fifteen of the eighteen projects administered by HABC, “there being 
only three which are all white––and these only because there have been no Negro applicants.”228 
In a 1971 memo, HUD administrators described policies they called “freedom of choice” tenant 
selection plans. HUD acknowledged that under such plans, at least theoretically, “If a black 
applicant wanted to live in a white project,” he need simply apply and, should a unit be available, 
he would be eligible to rent it.229 Indeed, this was exactly as the HABC described and defended 
their program. In reality, freedom of choice plans did little to change racial occupancy patterns. 
While conforming to the letter of the law, these plans did not take affirmative actions to 
encourage integration, but merely put in place requirements to avoid codified discrimination. The 
onus of action was on individual residents to make changes. As the HUD memo described, 
freedom of choice plans were insufficient to “counteract social inhibitions which had become 
institutionalized to such an extent that people were afraid to exercise their freedoms.” Indeed, 
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local administrators often managed freedom of choice plans in ways that worked to “preclude 
both freedom and choice.”230  
In July 1966, HUD questioned HABC on the continued segregation in Brooklyn, 
Claremont, and O’Donnell housing projects.231 Rather than undertaking a policy to more broadly 
desegregate the projects, HABC responded by trying to attract enough black residents into the 
white projects to satisfy HUD scrutiny.232 In an HABC committee meeting, the housing officials 
created a plan to encourage black Baltimoreans to apply for standing vacancies in white projects. 
This time, instead of using racially coded language to justify their discrimination, the HABC 
used administratively coded language. Commissioners began by making plans to desegregate 
O’Donnell Heights, which at the time consistently maintained 30-40 standing vacancies––
approximately a 4 percent vacancy rate, more than double the maximum allowable under HUD 
regulations. The committee also noted that the vacancies were mostly in large-sized dwelling 
units. When planning the desegregation of O’Donnell, however, the committee determined that 
they should not transfer in “overcrowded families” from other projects in order to fill the 
vacancies. Families whose units were too small for their large number of household members 
and needed the kinds of larger units standing vacant in O’Donnell were specifically excluded 
from the desegregation effort. The justification given by the board was that white residents 
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would feel more receptive to incoming black residents drawn from the “general community” 
rather than from other projects.233  
HABC commissioners also suggested that the Housing Application Office be required to 
“notify all prospective tenants of available dwelling units, and their waiting time.” This policy, 
which actually already existed, allowed the housing authority to put the onus on potential black 
residents to seek out information on O’Donnell Heights rather than soliciting non-white tenants 
and actively working to desegregate the project. Once an applicant expressed interest, however, 
the office was required to immediately notify the director and provide the housing, in the interest 
of increasing the number of non-white families in the project. Even so, they decided that, for 
their own safety, new black residents would be moved into the white projects as cohorts of at 
least three families.234 The plans further implemented procedures to “encourage standard families 
to apply for public housing.” At this time, “standard families” referred to two-parent families and 
generally required that at least one parent be employed. Although this statement stayed within 
the required policy of openness to single-parent families and welfare recipients, encouraging 
“standard families” to apply increased these more “respectable” applicants to the pool so they 
could then be selected for the desegregation effort. 
For the initial cohort of black families in O’Donnell Heights, the HABC plan was even 
more specific, stating, “At first, only standard families including husband and wife, with or 
without children (preferably not more than two) will be referred.”235 Thus, although operating 
within an official policy allowing applications from any type of family, officials were clear that 
they planned to select a specific type of black family for residence in O’Donnell Heights. This is 
                                                 
233 Memorandum from R.L. Steiner to Saul M. Perdue, Interim Report - Recommended Procedures for Filling 




a unique glimpse into the respectability politics behind the veneer of HABC’s “freedom of 
choice”––while the housing authority constantly pointed to the freedom of applicants to apply 
wherever they wanted as evidence of non-discrimination, the authority clearly had no qualms 
about selecting those who most closely fit the middle-class white ideal. Moreover, as previously 
mentioned, HABC commissioners purposely chose to initially accept only small families, despite 
the abundance of large unit vacancies in O’Donnell––exactly the type of units desperately 
needed by larger families the agency often had trouble placing. Yet here, when they had large 
units sitting vacant, HABC not only decided to disallow overcrowded black families already 
within the public housing system to move in, but also to exclude large families on the waiting 
lists to be placed.236 
This choice to prioritize new applicants over those already in public housing is notable, 
considering that the proposed policy did allow that, if needed to enable three families to move in 
simultaneously, “existing public housing families” could be transferred.237 This distinction 
played into stereotypes about people who lived in public housing, a population that HABC had 
openly described as “more and more broken, old-age, and single-person families.”238 
Transferring larger, less traditionally structured families into bigger vacant units would have 
solved two problems at once, and yet officials bowed to societal pressures that considered new 
residents preferable to those who seemingly embodied the worst characteristics assumed of 
public housing residents. The HABC officials planned to move these new black residents in 
during the fall or winter months, explaining, “During this period there is less movement of 
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individuals outside their respective homes,” and that children were less likely spend time outside. 
Instead, “The interests and energies of the children would be directed more to the structured 
school programs.”239 Here, too, officials relied on stereotypes of “problem families” for policy 
making, playing into fears and assumptions that black youth were likely to cause problems in the 
new projects.240  
These new guidelines, though meant to support the existing “freedom of choice” plan, 
show that the original plan was flawed and led to “self-segregation” of housing applicants––or, 
in the parlance of the HABC policy, applicants “choosing” to remain segregated. That there were 
so many standing vacancies in O’Donnell Heights either means that black applicants on the long 
wait lists were not told that there were openings available in the white projects, or were being 
discouraged or rejected from applying to those openings. Though this is “freedom of choice” on 
one level, in that the black applicants had not actively pursued the vacancies in O’Donnell 
Heights, it necessarily leads to questions about how much information is necessary for such 
choices to be meaningful. Putting the onus of “choosing desegregation” on the black residents 
themselves absolved the HABC from responsibility for managing and facilitating desegregation 
and non-discrimination in its public housing projects. It thus became the failure of individuals for 
not choosing to live in integrated projects––precisely the liberalism inherent in the desegregation 
program from the start.  
Although the new policy plan was drafted in July 1966, by November, no concrete steps 
had been taken to desegregate O’Donnell, Claremont, or Brooklyn Homes. That month, Mayor 
McKeldin, Ewing, and Feinblatt went to Washington, D.C. for a meeting with HUD Secretary 
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Robert Weaver.241 In that meeting, Weaver warned the group that a change would be coming in 
HUD policy regarding “freedom of choice” plans. Weaver promised a public statement would be 
issued, but soundly refused to go into specifics or allow the HABC to review the statement 
before it was released to the public. He did indicate that the statement, “would not question the 
intention, the integrity or the commitment of Baltimore,” but fell short of promising not to 
criticize the HABC program or its implementation. Furthermore, Weaver warned that HUD 
would not be approving plans for the multi-million dollar Inner Harbor redevelopment, “until 
HUD is satisfied with...a full and complete explanation of our public housing picture,” 
particularly in relation to integrating the three remaining all-white projects.  
Spurred into action by the threat of funding cuts for their commercial urban renewal, 
HABC Director Steiner met with Baltimore Police Commissioner Donald D. Pomerleau. In his 
letter following up with Pomerleau, Steiner reiterated the stance that HABC was taking on 
desegregating the three white projects. Despite HUD requiring that HABC end segregation in 
Brooklyn, Claremont, and O’Donnell, Steiner explained, HABC “is making no special effort to 
house nonwhite families” in the three projects. However, he wrote, “In the process of filling 
vacant apartments, if a nonwhite family is on the eligible list of families to be housed, then it will 
be housed in the project of its choice, which may be O’Donnell Heights, Claremont, or Brooklyn 
Homes.”242 “Freedom of choice” thus protected HABC officials both from the responsibility of 
managing desegregation, and from possible blame when desegregation did happen. Since it was 
an individual applicant who would have to choose to move in and desegregate the white projects, 
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the HABC was able to shift responsibility, and thus potential political backlash, away from 
themselves for such action.  
The HABC continued forward with the plan it had laid out in July. On December 22, the 
housing office sent notification letters to the current residents of Brooklyn, Claremont, and 
O’Donnell for the express purpose of explaining the policy of “eligibility for residence” in public 
housing.243 The letters informed residents, “It has been the policy of this Agency since 1954 that 
race would not be a factor in determining where any eligible family might live in the public 
housing projects,” and yet “to date, no non-white family has asked” to move into the white 
projects. Echoing the language used in the letter to Chief Pomerleau, the letter continued, “In the 
process of filling such vacant dwellings, it is possible that some Negro families may request 
housing” in their project. In these letters, HABC directly blamed any black applicants who 
requested housing within the still-white projects for the desegregation that was set to occur. 
Though the letter concluded with the hope that residents understood federal requirements and 
would “do everything possible to preserve harmonious neighborly relations if a Negro family 
does move in at some time in the future,” it is foolish to believe that officials believed white 
residents of these projects, which had become the safe haven of white public housing residents, 
would allow the change without pushback. Moreover, having disavowed their own control over 
the situation and placed responsibility squarely on the shoulders of any black residents who 
would cross the racial barrier, HABC officials put a target on the backs of the new black 
residents. The danger of the situation would become clear when a copy of the letter to the 
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O’Donnell Heights residents was returned, emblazoned with a swastika and the words “WE ARE 
READY.”244  
 
Figure 4.2 "We Are Ready" Letter to O’Donnell Heights Residents, 1966 245 
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Despite the attempts by HABC officials to shift public perception of responsibility 
through framing desegregation as something being done by individual black applicants rather 
than the agency, protesters against the change made no such distinction. One flyer, titled 
“Negroes and O’Donnel [sic] Heights,” proclaimed elected officials to be “race-mixers,” while 
calling the urban renewal director Director Richard Steiner “a jew from the city.” It went on to 
say, “The people you have elected to office are rewarding you with their garbage. They are about 
to make O’donnel [sic] Heights a City Dump by sending you the City’s trash...the Negro.” It 
proclaimed that black residents would lead to “vandelism [sic], yokings, rapes, beatings, filfth 
[sic] and fear that the negro brings with him from the Black City.” The flyer referred to 
Baltimore as “McKeldin’s Town,” displaying animosity towards the Mayor for his support for 
the city’s black community, whose support had helped him win reelection in 1963. Invoking 
southern myths of rapacious violent blacks, the flyer asked readers to consider “when your kids 
will be afraid to walk your streets in peace, when your daughters will be molested, when you will 
not even be able to sit on your steps in peace,” to then “think of those that you have elected to 
office and wonder if THEY are putting up with this where they live. You can be your sweet life 
they are NOT.” That the flyer referred to ownership of “your steps” is curious, showing little 
distinction between homeownership and residency in public housing––at least, for white 
residents. The sentiment in the flyer emphasized not only class and racial difference, but physical 
distance: “Those who have decided that you and the blacks will live in harmony and love are the 
same ones that live far, far away from the negroes.” Finally, the same language of “invasion” 
prevalent in discussions of residential segregation during the Herring Run debates of the 1940s 
again featured prominently, with the flyer instructing readers, “You and your White neighbors 
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had better band together and be prepared for this invasion. Be prepared to defend yourself and 
your loved ones...with White Power, if necessary.” The flyer also included Director Steiner’s 
home address and telephone number.246  
Another flyer that was distributed by O’Donnell resident Faith Gosnell read in part, 
“People of O’Donnell Heights and surrounding areas––LISTEN!! Stand up for yourselves! 
Negroes in your neighborhoods mean CRIME! Murder, rape, assault, robbery upon you and your 
family. Fight for your rights NOW!!! Before it is too late.” Interviewed by the Baltimore Sun,  
Gosnell “denied she believed in racial superiority but said she believed there was an ‘inborn 
tendency’ for Negroes to be more violent than whites.”247 Since white public housing residents 
could not frame their resistance to desegregation in terms of lowered property values, Gosnell 
attempted to legitimate her protest through supposed concerns over crime, equating black people 
with violence, a stereotype common throughout the racial history of the United States, but 
especially prevalent in debates around urban renewal.  
Soon after the protests, Gosnell’s mother, Anna Broyles, was served notice of eviction 
from their unit in O’Donnell Heights. Broyles filed an official complaint that the eviction was in 
retaliation for Gosnell’s picketing, a charge that project management vehemently denied. In fact, 
Broyles had been served the first notice of eviction back in June due to four other residents living 
illegally in Broyles’ unit, including Faith Gosnell. Even so, Broyles went to the Maryland 
Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations complaining, “I feel I’m being intimidated 
because of my daughter’s picketing.”248 Broyles’ stunning display of hypocrisy was not limited 
to white tenants breaking the rules while complaining about black malfeasance, but also in her 
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assertion that management was “intimidating” her into silence while her daughter was actively 
and maliciously attempting to intimidate potential black residents to keep them from moving into 
O’Donnell Heights.  
In January 1967, while Gosnell and others were distributing flyers and picketing, no 
black people had yet applied for housing at O’Donnell Heights. That changed in the spring, as 
HABC unveiled a new program meant to encourage black applications to the three all-white 
projects. First, intake officials would actually tell black applicants to public housing that the 
three projects were available to them, with the caveat that the interviewer would “point out the 
family’s best opportunities for housing within a reasonable time.” Next, applicants would have a 
group meeting and tour of the “traditionally white neighborhoods” around Brooklyn, Claremont, 
and O’Donnell, and discuss the opportunities presented by moving to such areas. The meeting 
and tour would last three hours, a significant demand of their time.249 If applicants did not attend 
the group meetings, intake officials would attempt to meet with them individually, with the 
unwritten insinuation that those who resisted these meeting attempts would not be considered as 
having completed the application process. As the final step, applicants had to submit to a home 
visit by HABC officials to their current residences.250 In this fashion, HABC hoped to avoid 
being seen as mandating desegregation, while ensuring enough desegregation to satisfy HUD’s 
requirements. Officials could continue to present their actions as simply allowing black residents 
“freedom of choice,” rather than of having actively engineered their relocation into white 
projects.  
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Esther Frank Siegel was one of many who performed the visits to applicants’ homes. Her 
notes and report to HABC Housing Director Van Story Branch have an air of middle-class 
progressive paternalism, grading both the applicants and their homes. Of one Mrs. Jessie Bell, a 
black applicant to Claremont, Siegel wrote, “We visited her home in the country on November 
21 and it is one of a group of dilapidated single homes close to the water. Like Mrs. Bell herself, 
the house was meticulous.”251 Siegel took great care to describe both the misery of Bell’s 
situation, and the ways in which Bell managed to adhere to middle-class values despite her 
poverty. Siegel’s report seemed unaware that she objectified Bell, drawing parallels between the 
applicant’s meticulously kept but dilapidated house, and the meticulously kept but dilapidated 
person. Siegel’s other reports show additional benevolent racism. For example, in another report 
to HABC Director Branch, Siegel described three black families who attended a group meeting 
for potential applicants. She described Mrs. Joseph Fortune as, “being alert and mature.” Of Mr. 
and Mrs. Isaiah Banks she wrote, “They are young but they appear alert and able.” She reported 
that Mr. and Mrs. James Little “appeared alert and they were immaculate,” and said that their 
home visit “disclosed children and home as neat and tidy as the parents.”252 
In the final preparations for the first black tenants to move into O’Donnell Heights and 
Brooklyn Homes in the summer of 1967, HABC paid installation fees and twelve months of 
telephone services for the new tenants. Director Branch said to the Sun that the telephones were 
provided so the black residents could call for help if they encountered “organized opposition.” 
Earlier in the summer, Ku Klux Klan members had rallied outside the projects, activity that the 
Sun downplayed as “anti-Negro organizations picket[ing].” Even with the Klan actively present, 
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the newspaper reported that integration was a success, since the “majority” of white tenants 
“showed no particular reaction.” The Sun quoted HABC official David Filker saying that at first, 
officials “were afraid perhaps that was just apathy,” but that white families had proven to be 
“intelligently responsive to the change.” Despite the evidence of Klan resistance, in August, 
Director Branch declared the “period of crisis” was over.253 
Branch’s optimism proved premature, as Klan members returned to the Brooklyn Homes 
housing project in September 1967. For three nights in a row, Klansmen rallied outside the house 
of Shirley Rivers, a black mother who lived in Brooklyn Homes with her three preschool-aged 
children. On the third night of their demonstrations, 25 Klan members led a march down the 
block in front of a gathered crowd of 350 people, while ten members of the Congress of Racial 
Equality stood watch outside Rivers’ front door. Though police had been present for the first two 
nights, it was only on the third that they acted, arresting fourteen men, including a “self-
proclaimed exalted cyclops” and charging them with disorderly conduct.”254 Overt 
demonstrations against integration in the projects ended. 
Despite intimidation by the Klan, the HABC continued to make real efforts to encourage 
black applications to the all-white projects. In working to identify prospective black residents to 
move into Claremont, HABC reviewed applications, made home visits for interviews, and 
invited prospective residents to attend group meetings and tours. Once again, reports from these 
efforts discredit the agency’s repeated claims that black people simply were not interested in 
living in Claremont, O’Donnell, or Brooklyn Homes. Of Mrs. Geraldine Pate, the intake official 
wrote she was “very eager” to live in Claremont, but if she could not get a unit there, she would 
consider O’Donnell. Her original choices of the majority-black Latrobe, Perkins, and Douglass 
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had fallen to the bottom of the list. In fact, Claremont Homes was so popular with black 
applicants that a memo recommended foregoing the tours of Claremont until the “desired 
number” (20 to 25) of black residents had moved into Brooklyn.255 In so doing, HABC was 
acknowledging for the first time that giving black applicants true choice would lead to black 
people integrating the remaining all-white projects, and that withholding knowledge of that 
option would again passively push black residents into other project sites.  
Despite desegregation becoming the official policy in Baltimore public housing in 1954, 
more than a decade later, the city’s housing projects remained clearly divided along racial lines. 
Even so, in 1967, Branch proclaimed, “Even with the tension in all the other cities we took a 
bold step and succeeded.”256 That Branch, who was himself black, would declare such token 
desegregation to be a success is in part a result of the racial tensions that erupted in the 1967 
Detroit riots, but also a measure of how long other HABC officials had allowed de facto 
segregation to remain after officially “desegregating.”  
Though pushed to action by HUD in 1967 to begin to moving black families into the 
remaining majority-white projects, HABC continued to insist on maintaining its “freedom of 
choice” plan, absolving the housing authority of responsibility for dismantling the system of 
residential segregation inherent in the city and its public housing. HUD would seek to further 
affirmatively address the continued segregation present in Baltimore and other housing 
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5 CHAPTER FOUR: FIRST COME – FIRST SERVED 
  
The Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) operated its projects under an 
unrestricted “freedom of choice” plan from 1954 to 1966. In that year, following investigation by 
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) into three of the city’s 
housing projects that maintained 100 percent white occupancy, the HABC created a system of 
group interviews and began actively encouraging black applicants to the white projects—a 
process detailed in the previous chapter. Despite these changes, HUD soon released new 
requirements nation-wide in an attempt to fully desegregate the country’s housing projects 
through a centralized and regulated system of application tracking and mandated procedures for 
the assignment of housing units to public housing applicants. While the HABC was unsuccessful 
in its initial attempts to avoid the new requirements altogether, local officials used the language 
of choice to argue for, and eventually gain, HUD acceptance of a plan that subverted the new 
requirements to the point of irrelevance.  
HABC’s measures to finally integrate the all-white projects of Brooklyn, Claremont, and 
O’Donnell in 1966 proved too late to stave off additional federal involvement. By 1967, HUD 
recognized the need for an updated national policy regarding racial segregation rather than 
continuing to allow the patchwork of locally adopted “freedom of choice” plans, which had 
resulted in many projects remaining segregated. In a 1967 memo describing the issues with 
“freedom of choice” desegregation, HUD officials could have been speaking directly to the 
situation in Baltimore. The memo referenced projects wherein the buildings used predominantly 
by one race (generally black) had vacancies while applicants of another race (generally white) 
lingered on waiting lists, a clear example of institutional acceptance of continued segregation. 
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Although HUD noted, “Even without inducement of Local Authority staff, the plans tended to 
perpetuate patterns of racial segregation,” the Baltimore Afro-American newspaper published 
complaints that HABC officials were exacerbating the problem.257 As one article explained, the 
HABC administration of “free choice” included the option for applicants to wait indefinitely 
before accepting an available housing unit. In addition to enabling white applicants to wait until 
units in all-white buildings came available, the Afro-American claimed officials were likewise 
holding back black applications until units were available in all-black buildings, a practice that 
was not specifically prohibited by federal law. “Although never the announced policy,” the Afro-
American stated, “the practice in public housing... was to re-inforce segregated housing.”258 
Thus, while HABC claimed that continued segregation in housing was a result of individual 
choices by public housing residents, black and white, the system only truly offered such a choice 
to white residents. 
Also in 1967, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver wrote to the Special Counsel to the 
President to report on the department’s compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibited discrimination based on race in federally financed programs, including public 
housing. One problem HUD faced in complying with Title VI regulations was the regulations 
themselves—while they prohibited the type of discrimination inherent in segregated projects, 
“They do not direct affirmative action to integrate housing.” In the report, Weaver chose his 
words carefully; rather than discussing the number of desegregated projects, he referred to those 
that were “nonsegregated”—meaning at least one family was of a different race, but meaningful 
desegregation was not necessarily achieved within the project. While this categorization is no 
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longer used today, it served an important purpose for Weaver to be able to acknowledge that 
token measures to eliminate strict segregation did not rise to the level of desegregation. Even 
under this expansive definition of “nonsegregation,” Weaver reported, only 19 percent of 
federally-assisted low-income housing projects were nonsegregated in 1962, and only 30 percent 
by 1964.  
These low rates of nonsegregation grew directly from the classically liberal policies of 
free choice, which Baltimore and other local housing authorities had adopted. According to 
Weaver, however, “HUD has now determined that this [freedom of choice policy] is not 
feasible,” and was preparing to issue new instructions to local housing authorities by 1967. These 
new guidelines would require local authorities to maintain system-wide waiting lists of public 
housing applicants and assign tenants based on the order of application. They would also develop 
a safeguard against white applicants waiting indefinitely for vacancies in all-white projects by 
limiting the number of units an applicant could reject before being moved to the bottom of the 
waiting list.259 
Director Ash had bragged at the 1955 Human Rights Day Institute in St. Louis that “The 
Baltimore Authority has not applied its policy [of desegregation] on the premise that integration 
must be achieved throughout the program, if this means that families are required to either live in 
particular projects or sacrifice their opportunities for housing;” yet it was exactly this type of 
plan that HUD would now mandate.260 In July 1967, HUD released the new requirements for the 
administration of public housing, which the agency termed “First Come––First Served.” The new 
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plan intervened in two significant ways: first, local authorities would be required to maintain 
applications on a community-wide basis rather than separate waiting lists for individual projects; 
and second, applicants must be offered housing in the order they applied, and in the project with 
the most vacancies, rather than holding back some applications to wait for openings in certain 
projects. Understanding that applicants could have legitimate reasons that were not based on 
Title VI-prohibited discrimination to avoid a given project, HUD allowed local authorities to 
offer up to three project placements before an applicant would be moved to the bottom of the 
waiting list.261 
In addition to the new regulations, HUD distributed its “Basis for Revised Requirements” 
explaining the reasons for the new restrictions. In addition to noting that freedom of choice plans 
often “did not afford freedom of choice in fact,” the memo explained that placing the burden of 
desegregation on individuals did not acknowledge how long-standing patterns of segregated 
housing affected the ability of individuals to make such choices. Whether due to internal factors, 
fear of reprisal by the community, or inducement by the local authority, placing the onus on 
individual housing applicants without providing institutional support to overcome the systemic 
patterns and pressures of racial discrimination, “did not provide applicants with actual freedom 
of access to, or full availability of, housing in all projects and locations,” according to HUD. In 
this statement, the federal agency was acknowledging both that systemic discrimination limited 
the type of choice lauded by proponents of liberalism, and that it was the responsibility of the 
government to step in and rectify such a situation. The memo did stop short of claims that local 
authorities were purposefully maintaining segregation, specifically stating, “Even without 
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inducement of Local Authority staff, the [freedom of choice] plans tended to perpetuate patterns 
of racial segregation.” Indeed, HUD recognized that the long-standing segregated housing 
pattern, “was in itself a major obstacle to true freedom of choice.” This pivot in responsibility, 
from offering choices to offering meaningful choices, is an important one. For the first time, the 
agency acknowledged that “few applicants have the courage to make a choice by which they 
would be the first to change the pattern.” Instead of blaming black applicants for not applying to 
all-white projects, the agency placed responsibility on local authorities to change the pattern on 
an institutional level––a major shift from the rhetoric of liberalism and individual choice. 
In changing the policy, HUD allowed local authorities to request a waiver from 
compliance, provided the authority could prove that they had already achieved “substantial 
desegregation” and maintained low vacancy rates in all of their projects. While Weaver had 
earlier referred to “nonsegregation” as residency by one or more members of another race, the 
“substantial desegregation” needed for a waiver required “at least two-thirds of the housing 
projects...desegregated on more than a token basis.” Furthermore, the local authority had to show 
that following the new requirements would likely cause even more segregation and lower 
occupancy than the authority’s current plan.262 In the case of Baltimore, the Afro-American 
referred to the these tasks as “proving the unprovable,” but that did not stop the HABC from 
trying.263 
When HABC staff leadership received their copy of the new HUD regulations, they 
immediately wrote a response to Vincent Marino, Assistant Regional Administrator for HUD. 
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The Baltimore agency took umbrage at the creation of new regulations, complaining they were 
created with a “presumption” that local programs were not complying with Title VI, and a 
“supposition...that discrimination does in fact exist” in the tenant assignment policies. In 
contrast, HABC officials insisted their program had, “operated free of discrimination under its 
voluntarily adopted policy of desegregation since 1954.” HABC also rejected the notion that the 
freedom of choice plan had allowed tenants “the privilege to express a preference” for specific 
projects. While HUD was requiring substantial desegregation to be in compliance with Title VI, 
HABC was purposely conflating a lack of mandated discrimination with desegregation.264 Just 
months before, HABC had maintained three projects without a single non-white resident, yet 
they continued to claim this was due only to tenants having the “privilege” of determining where 
they wanted to live. 
The letter repeatedly reiterated the HABC’s emphasis that “choice” was the only factor 
causing the still-segregated projects. Although, as described in the last chapter, the HABC only 
undertook limited desegregation of the Claremont, Brooklyn, and O’Donnell projects after HUD 
threatened to tie up funding for the Charles Center commercial urban renewal project, the letter 
told a much different story, stating repeatedly that the agency took “extraordinary measures,” 
completely “voluntarily,” to find black residents to move into the all-white projects. The officials 
wrote that more than 2,000 applications were reviewed, but failed to mention the stringent 
requirements for family size, marital status, and income—over and beyond those agency-
mandated requirements for housing—to which those applicants were subjected. Officials also 
claimed they had to “motivate and encourage” applicants to accept residency in the three 
projects, despite evidence to the contrary; once project space was made explicitly available, 
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black applicants willingly expressed preference for assignment to the all-white projects. Under 
the new regulations, HABC would no longer be able to hand-pick the few black families living 
in the white projects; yet, in their retelling, he policy changes would be problematic, as officials 
would no longer be able to take their voluntary, extraordinary measures to encourage black 
applicants “to accept occupancy in those projects where they had not previously lived.”265   
The HABC letter also lamented that the new regulations would anger and scare off white 
applicants who were already shying away from the housing projects. At the time, only 319 of the 
2,714 active applications on file were from white families—just shy of 12 percent. This disparity 
is even more significant in the context of the overall decline in applications, shown below.266 
Table 1 Percentage White Applicants to HABC Public Housing, 1950-1967 267 
Year 






1950 5,882 2,563 43.57% 
1960 3,674 1,309 35.63% 
1967  
(7 months) 
2,714 319 11.75% 
 
While the ranks of black applicants on public housing waiting lists swelled as a result of 
urban renewal demolition, the numbers of white applicants simultaneously dropped due to 
distaste for desegregation and the pull of the federally-subsidized lily-white suburbs. Because the 
new HUD regulations mandated assigning housing to applicants based only on the order in 
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which they applied, HABC rightly noted that the new regulations would lead to approximately 
nine out of ten housing referrals being for black applicants. Even so, HABC’s characterization 
that the regulations would “mean that, by and large, only Negro applicants will be referred to any 
vacancy” distorts that truth.268  
The HABC also argued that compliance with waiver requirements in the new regulations 
would likely cause an increase in vacancy rates. In their letter to Marino, officials warned of the 
potential that “a large number of non-white applicants are unwilling...to move to the most 
recently integrated projects.” Similar to their exaggeration of the effort needed to “motivate and 
encourage” black applicants to Claremont, Brooklyn, and O’Donnell, this line of reasoning 
understated the willingness of black residents to move into all-white projects as long as they 
were provided institutional support from potential white hostility. The officials also warned that 
if the black applicants “should eventually agree to accept such vacancies” in the white projects, 
“it is highly possible that integration could disappear all together [sic] and a complete non-white 
occupancy result” as it had in Lafayette Homes and Flag House Courts. Officials were thus 
arguing that complying with the new regulations would either lead to an increase in vacancies or 
a decrease in the limited level of integration they had thus far achieved. In effect, the HABC’s 
request for a waiver was truly an attempt to maintain unofficially segregated projects for white 
residents in an effort to keep any white residents in the public housing system at all.269 
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Despite HABC’s immediate request for a waiver from the new regulations, its application 
languished for nearly a year before being denied. HABC officials were then left facing two 
choices: Plan A, in which an applicant’s refusal to move into the first available housing unit 
would place them at the bottom of the waiting list, or Plan B, in which applicants could reject 
three placements before moving to the bottom of the list. In a memo laying out the situation, Van 
Story Branch repeated many of the same claims from the original letter to HUD. First and 
foremost, HABC officials declared, “the Local Authority has been operating free of 
discrimination under its voluntarily adopted policy of desegregation.”270 Conflating the lack of 
overt discrimination with success in desegregation was key to understanding the HABC 
“freedom of choice” policy. This conflation actually had legal precedent—in the decision of 
Brown II, the Supreme Court’s 1955 follow-up ruling to the previous year’s Brown v. Board 
case, the court defined desegregation as the operation of a “racially nondiscriminatory school 
system.”271 As with the absence of a defined difference between desegregation and integration, 
no distinction yet existed between lack of discrimination and actual desegregation. Title VI of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act repeated this problem, prohibiting discrimination without directing 
affirmative effort to actively integrate, a problem that HUD itself lamented as limiting their 
effectiveness in ending patterns of housing segregation.272 
By removing the policy of mandated segregation, the HABC reached the bar of 
“nondiscrimination,” and was thus able to justify any remaining segregation as a result of 
individual choice. This line of thinking, made explicit as early as the 1955 Human Rights Day 
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speech, was also seen in school segregation cases including Briggs v. Elliott in 1955. On appeal 
following Brown v. Board, the District Court found that Brown, “has not decided that the states 
must mix person of different races...or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools 
they attend,” but that so long as schools were open to children of all races, “no violation of the 
Constitution is involved even though the children of different races voluntarily attend different 
schools.” The District Court decision in Briggs became an important piece of case law for school 
segregation challenges following Brown and Brown II, explicitly for its grounding in the idea of 
free choice:  
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes 
away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The 
Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids 
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of 
voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental powers to enforce 
segregation.273 
 
HABC officials indirectly referenced this determination in the response to their waiver 
application denial, which described their “existing non-discriminatory plan of tenant selection.” 
Even here, though, officials continued to belie their claims of nondiscrimination and truly 
voluntary segregation. In detailing the current application procedure, Branch wrote, “Applicants 
are given a choice where they wish to live although they are advised of the reality or unreality of 
their choices in terms of being housed within a reasonable time.” While Branch failed to go into 
specifics about what applicants were advised, this question of the “reality or unreality” of being 
placed quickly as justification for continued lack of black applicants to white projects was in 
direct contrast to the actual vacancy rates in the white projects, which were substantially higher 
than those for majority-black projects from 1966-1967.274  
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Latrobe 1.02% 0.84% 
McCulloh 0.17% 0.17% 
Perkins 1.16% 1.36% 
Douglass 1.04% 1.06% 
Gilmor 0.66% 0.82% 
O’Donnell 5.36% 2.69% 
Somerset 1.55% 0.67% 
Cherry Hill 2-11 1.01% 1.13% 
Cherry Hill 2-12 0.96% 1.07% 
Cherry Hill 2-17 0.74% 0.67% 
Fairfield 2.41% 2.31% 
Lafayette 2.00% 1.65% 
Flag House 1.59% 2.14% 
Brooklyn 4.73% 2.05% 
Westport 1.25% 1.37% 
Westport Ext. 1.04% 0.75% 
Lexington 1.06% 0.86% 
Murphy 0.38% 1.09% 
Claremont 0.68% 0.99% 
Average 1.67% 1.29% 
 
HABC officials insisted that “good occupancy patterns had been established,” referring to 
the low overall vacancy rates in the city’s public housing projects. All but one of the project sites 
had vacancies within the allowable HUD-mandated threshold of 5 percent during the 1967 
budget year; only O’Donnell exceeded the limit at 5.36 percent, though Brooklyn came close at 
4.73 percent. The vacancy rates at these two majority-white projects dropped by half the 
following year, to 2.69 percent and 2.05 percent, respectively. HABC officials claimed credit for 
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this change as proof that their freedom of choice policy worked, writing, “It would appear 
then...that in giving applicants a choice, we reduce our vacancy rate.” This statement ignored, 
however, that the drop was only made possible because of new efforts to actively attract black 
applicants to those projects where, by design or by circumstance, they had previously felt 
unwelcomed. Prior to the implementation of the group interview program, officials had insisted 
that specifically encouraging black applicants to pursue residency in the white projects would be 
inappropriate interference in the opportunity for free choice. Now, facing further federal 
intervention, those same officials claimed credit for implementing the group interviews, insisting 
the program was necessary to allow applicants a choice. Moreover, despite the significant 
decrease in vacancy rates in O’Donnell and Brooklyn by August 1968, these now “desegregated” 
projects were still overwhelmingly white.276  
 


















O’Donnell 10 1.1% 55 6.1% 
Brooklyn 8 1.6% 19 3.8% 
Claremont 0 0.0% 18 6.1% 
 
 The significant decrease in vacancies in the majority-white projects was especially 
important when viewed in light of the dwindling numbers of white applicants to public housing, 
both in Baltimore and across the country. The HABC maintained that the new requirements for 
“first come––first served” assignments would scare off even more white applicants, and thus 
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increase segregation through wholesale abandonment of the public housing system by white 
families. Officials argued that such a prospect would “defeat...the intent of the Civil Rights Act,” 
insisting that three essentially all-white projects were acceptable to avoid losing white residents 
across the public housing system overall. The HABC memo noted that despite “conscious efforts 
to stimulate applications from white families,” the numbers of white applicants continued to 
diminish.  







1950         5,882       2,563       3,319  
1955         7,705       1,846       5,859  
1960         3,674       1,309       2,352  
1965         4,706       1,055       3,651  
1966         4,930          807       4,123  
1968  
(9 months)         2,561          510       2,051  
 
Brooklyn and O’Donnell had maintained the highest vacancy rates within the HABC 
system even as white applications dwindled, meaning officials had either consciously held out 
vacancies to entice white applicants to remain in the public housing pool, or had accepted that 
fewer white applicants would necessarily mean higher vacancies in the white projects. Whatever 
the reason, the effect was that as soon as residency was opened to black applicants through the 
affirmative interview program, vacancy rates dropped.279  
In describing the interview process, officials continued to insist that while program staff 
would present applicants with information on all of the available projects, the decision “must rest 
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with the applicant.” HABC officials repeatedly fell back on this type of language to emphasize 
supposed tenant agency while also absolving themselves from responsibility for the resulting 
segregation patterns. Although the HABC insisted that applicants were advised of the wait times 
for their preferred projects, the significantly higher vacancy rates in O’Donnell and Brooklyn 
strongly suggest that black applicants, consciously or unconsciously, were steered away from 
applying for those projects. Until 1966, officials insisted that the white projects had been 
“mentioned” but were rejected by black applicants. Once encouraged and supported through the 
group interview process and protection of a cohort system of black residents moving in 
simultaneously, the vacancy rates in these projects quickly dropped. Surprisingly, most of the 
white residents remained. 280 
 Even with the lower vacancy rates, HABC officials needed to explain away the lingering 
segregation in their projects. First, they pointed to the location of O’Donnell, Brooklyn, and 
Claremont in “traditionally white neighborhoods” that were “away from the pulse and heartbeat 
of the CITY” [emphasis in original], echoing 1940s-era insistence that housing projected be 
located along the “traditional plan for the development of Baltimore city.”281 Officials insisted 
that “unless a family has its roots” in those traditionally white neighborhoods, “they were not 
interested.” Of course, as in many cities, that these areas had remained racially exclusive was not 
a matter of chance but of specific, sustained effort by policymakers, local officials, and white 
residents.282  
While the group interviews and cohort system had successfully served to bring some 
black families into the white projects, this outcome calls into question the housing authority’s 
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commitment to choice. It is possible that despite showing no previous interest in the white 
projects, black applicants became independently and simultaneously interested at the time the 
HABC began group interviews and took advantage of the procedures HABC had in place 
allowing free choice; perhaps all it took was group meetings and a brief tour to solicit black 
applicants to the white projects, regardless of not having their “roots” in the area. What seems 
more likely is that black applicants had been steered away from the white projects as discussed, 
or they had not been given the opportunity to make an informed choice. The latter explanation 
seems most likely. As the memo from Van Story Branch, the highest-ranking black official of 
the HABC, emphasized, “If housing is going to prove meaningful in the lives of people...they 
must be exposed to alternatives,” and “above all they must, with the proper tools, make their own 
decisions.” It is worth noting, however, that Branch was suggesting the HABC had always 
offered, and thus should be allowed to continue offering “free choice,” while admitting the ways 
that the HABC had failed, whether through malice or neglect, to give residents the “proper tools” 
to make informed and meaningful decisions. 
While officials had many complaints about and arguments against the first come-first 
served policy, their primary emphasis was still the necessity of choice. As Branch wrote in the 
HABC memo, choice was, in their view, “a necessary ingredient to self-respect.” “To threaten 
people who reject an already specified dwelling one, two or three times, and tell them they will 
‘be placed at the bottom of the list,’ is unrealistic. It can also be disastrous,” Branch wrote, both 
in its effects on applicants’ self-respect, and on the public housing program budgets. 283 Housing 
officials were continually fretting about the effects of policies on the willingness of white 
residents to participate in public housing at all. If those applicants with qualifying but relatively 
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higher incomes stopped applying to public housing, the program would no longer be financially 
viable. The financial solvency of public housing was a constant struggle, due in large part to the 
very design of public housing subsidies, which paid for construction of housing projects while 
operations were to be funded through tenant rents. As early as 1953, HABC officials voiced 
concerns about the increasing number of black “welfare families” in the housing projects, whose 
federally mandated rents were too low to defray the cost of operations and maintenance for a 
housing unit. Part of the gap in rental rates was racial, due to the myriad factors influencing the 
wage gap between black and white Baltimoreans––the median income of white applicants in 
1953 was $3,051, but only $2,160 for black applicants. Even before desegregation, the eligible 
white applicant pool was shrinking due to rising post-war prosperity for whites––in 1951, 41 
percent of white applicants to Baltimore’s public housing were income-eligible, but by 1953, the 
number had dropped to 27 percent. Although the HABC raised income limits in 1953 in an 
attempt to capture more white residents whose higher rents would help balance their financial 
position, the timing of the Brown decision rendered their efforts moot.284 
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Having failed to receive a waiver from the new regulations despite their claims of 
nondiscriminatory administration, the HABC conceded to accept the first come-first served plan 
“if ‘location(s)’ and ‘undue hardship or handicap’ can be broadly interpreted.” It was this broad 
interpretation that was the true undoing of HUD’s plan. In administering the plan, HUD stated 
that applicants should be offered a vacancy in the “location that contains the largest number of 
vacancies,” and could refuse referral to three locations before being moved to the bottom of the 
waiting list. The regulations defined location as “any low-rent housing site...except that when 
sites are adjacent or within a block of each other, such sites collectively shall be considered one 
location.” HABC officials insisted, however, that to individually maintain appropriate records for 
all of their project locations would be “unwieldy.”  
Instead, the authority asked to group together the individual projects into four “areas.” 
Applicants would then designate their preferred area, satisfying HABC’s desire to facilitate 
individual choice, and be offered a place in that area’s project with the highest number of 
vacancies. By modifying the plan thusly, HABC’s request stated, “We broaden the applicant’s 
opportunities for housing. He has already defined the area in which he will live, and he can still 
exercise choice.” The “area” plan would also loosen the requirement that applicants be given 
only three refusals before being moved to the bottom of the waitlist. HABC officials wrote, “The 
prediction is that [an applicant] will not find it necessary to reject three areas, whereas he might 
well reject three individual projects.”285 Applicants could then decline placement an unlimited 
number of times within their specified area without counting toward their three refusals; the 
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three-strikes rule only came into play if an applicant refused placement in three of the separate 
housing areas.286 
Although the four new “areas” were ostensibly determined by geographic boundaries, 
distances between projects far exceeded the one-block rule. Through the HABC’s loose 
definition of “nearby projects,” the majority-white O’Donnell Heights and Claremont Homes 
were grouped into the “East Location.” The third majority-white project Brooklyn Homes, too 
far to justify grouping with the others, became part of the “Southeast Location.” Thus, if white 
applicants specified a preference for the East Location, they would be guarantees a placement in 
a majority-white project. If an applicant’s employment necessitated they live in the southern 
portion of the city, they could specify a preference for the southeast location and use their 
unlimited refusals until given a placement in Brooklyn Homes.  
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Figure 5.1 Baltimore City Map Housing Project Locations (as submitted to HUD, 1968) 
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The first come-first served plan also allowed for hardship waivers that would prevent 
refusal of a project placement from counting toward an applicant’s three strikes. In the 
regulations, HUD gave examples of such hardships “not related to considerations of race, color, 
or national origin,” including “inaccessibility to source of employment, children’s day care, and 
the like.” In their revision of the plan, Baltimore officials greatly expanded these parameters. 
Accepted hardships included not just proximity to employment and access to special educational 
resources, but also “being close to family or friends to whom one can take the children for care,” 
“being close to a hospital, clinic or doctor, or church,” and “being close to the familiar for 
emotional stability.” Any of these could be effectively used to refuse housing outside of one’s 
current, segregated neighborhood without the repercussion of losing one’s place on the waiting 
list. While acknowledging that hardship claims could not be based on race, the HABC gave no 
specifics on how they would ensure that the claim was not a racialized one.288 Despite these 
problems, HUD accepted the revised plan on January 17, 1969.289  
Reporting about the new plan differed greatly from HUD’s initial announcement of 
changes in 1967 to the approval of HABC’s plan in 1969. When the Afro-American first 
announced HUD’s new requirements, the paper described it as “nearly, but not quite, put[ting] 
public housing on a ‘first come, first served’ basis.” At that time, the Afro-American was not shy 
about pointing out how the “freedom of choice” plan reinforced housing segregation.290 Just a 
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few months later, the paper reported on Atlanta’s attempts to refuse the change, quoting Atlanta 
Housing Authority member Frank Etheridge who declared, “Let’s test them (federal officials). 
We ought to spar with them awhile. We have a good chance of knocking them out.”291 By 
December 1968, the tenor of the Afro-American’s reporting had changed significantly. Unlike 
the editorializing in the earlier articles, which clearly pointed to the hypocrisy of “choice,” the 
headline of one article unironically proclaimed, “Wider choice okayed for public homes.” The 
article itself hewed closely to the words of Housing Authority Chairman Feinblatt, and his claims 
that the federal government’s required plans would have “arbitrarily” assigned residents to 
housing projects.292 Still, when compared with the Baltimore Sun’s reporting on the new policy, 
the Afro-American was hardly exuberant. While both newspapers quoted Feinblatt’s claims, the 
Sun went further in espousing his views, heralding the new policy as “a plan to give 
applicants...more choice of a place to live than federal officials had wanted for them.”293  
Even as the HABC and HUD debated the specifics of Baltimore’s plan, the fundamental 
basis of federal housing law changed with the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair 
Housing Act. The first piece of federal legislation to address racial discrimination in housing, the 
Fair Housing Act specifically prohibited private and public housing markets at all levels from 
practices that created and continued residential segregation. Unlike the previous non-
discrimination rules put in place by the Executive Order 11063 and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
the Fair Housing Act directed federal agencies and grantees to act “affirmatively” to further fair 
housing policies, rather than simply requiring non-discrimination. Unfortunately, as a result of 
the many fights and horsetrading in Congress over the law, many of the enforcement provisions 
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were stripped away, which meant that while HUD could investigate complaints of housing 
discrimination, it had no power to enforce remediation of offenses. For those cases that HUD did 
refer to the Justice Department for prosecution, the Attorney General was only authorized to act 
following evidence of “a pattern or practice” of discrimination or issues of “general public 
importance.”294   
Even after all the debates and wrangling needed to force the HABC into a first come-first 
served policy, just two years later, HUD again announced proposed changes in tenant selection 
requirements to better align with the Fair Housing Act. While most of the 2,000 public housing 
authorities under HUD’s jurisdiction had adopted some version of the first come-first served 
plan, for most of them, the new measures had “not led to desegregation or to a decline in 
discrimination.” To the contrary, HUD wrote in a 1971 report, “Empirical observations show that 
racial segregation, and hence discrimination, are still the norm.”295 Laurance D. Pearl, Director 
Program Compliance in the HUD Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, would later go 
on to describe the first come-first served policy as “vacancy conscious” rather than racially 
conscious, meant to “get a better use of the inventory” by encouraging the overabundance of 
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black applicants to accept units in majority-white projects. Though the policy was generally in 
line with the 1968 Fair Housing Act, its emphasis was not on eliminating racial disparity, but on 
“HUD’s administrative responsibility to see that public housing units were used in an effective 
and efficient way.”296  
While the lack of impact can be blamed in part on the contents of the policy, HUD 
officials discovered soon after the adoption of “first come-first served” that many authorities had 
not actually complied with the requirements. Despite threats of programmatic funding cuts and 
fear of legal action leading to cities like Baltimore accepting the tenant selection system, other 
cities had not. Some, like Gadsden, Alabama, had never adopted an approved plan. Others, 
including Lake Charles, Louisiana, had adopted a plan in compliance with HUD regulations but 
failed to implement it. Still others, such as San Antonio, Texas, had adopted and implemented a 
first come-first served plan, only to then rescind the plan and reinstate “freedom of choice” in 
defiance of federal regulation.297 In all of these cases, refusal by the Department of Justice to 
prosecute noncompliance left HUD with little recourse. 
Those cities whose authorities did adopt, implement, and comply with the first come-first 
served plan faced stumbling blocks within the plan itself. In the 1971 report, HUD laid out many 
of these unforeseen issues, despite agencies including HABC using them as the basis for waiver 
requests. Among the foremost was the “rigidity” of the three strikes policy. HUD felt it 
necessary to limit the number of times an applicant could refuse a housing assignment, but 
officials soon discovered the policy had the effect of “discouraging” white applicants. While 
Baltimore had subverted the plan requirements through their 1969 waiver, the original 
regulations limited applicants to the projects with the highest number of vacancies. As the HUD 
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report explained, if these vacancies were all in majority-black projects and white applicants who 
refused placement dropped to the bottom of the waitlist, this would further exacerbate the racial 
imbalance already caused by the preference for applicants displaced by urban renewal, a group 
that was overwhelmingly black. Combined with the dwindling numbers of white applicants to 
public housing projects as white flight to the suburbs intensified, these admission standards could 
have the effect of ensuring “that the waiting list, and, hence, the future of public housing in the 
city” was all-minority. Like in Baltimore, many other cities continued to find mechanisms that 
would in effect set aside some housing projects for white occupancy in order “to ensure that 
whites would not flee from public housing” altogether.298  
The three-strike requirement affected minority applicants as well. If all three of the 
projects with the greatest number of vacancies were in undesirable locations, those black families 
who were able would likely either refuse and drop to the bottom of the waiting list, or find other 
accommodations outside of public housing. This would result in a waiting list “composed 
exclusively of minority group families who are multiproblemed.”299 In addition, vacancy rates in 
more desirable projects would rise as authorities were forced to refer repeated applicants to 
undesirable locations with higher vacancy rates until the point that the vacancies equalized. This 
could well lead to an increase in vacancies system-wide and have disastrous effects on the 
amount of operating income collected from tenant rents.300  
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HUD announced proposed revisions to the first come-first served policy in 1971 as a 
result of these continued issues. In the new policy, all “rigid procedural requirements” for tenant 
selection were removed, and the method of administration for Title VI compliance was left “to 
the local authority, and to it alone.” Rather than strict rules and procedures to assure 
desegregation, HUD would create performance standards to measure success in achieving 
“nondiscrimination,” a much lower bar. These performance standards were to be based “largely 
on occupancy ranges and timetable” reflective of “the racial characteristics of project occupancy, 
the user group population, and the general population of the locality,” a move that would account 
for white flight out of public housing. The announcement stated that the policy would have 
“many advantages,” including minimizing HUD’s oversight, which would now be “limited to 
examining and approving the ranges and timetables,” reviewing progress reports, and providing 
guidance where needed. Local authorities could enjoy “the utmost flexibility to tailor their 
procedures” to their local circumstances, which would “involve them in a positive manner in the 
selection of both means and ends,” and “give them a greater sense of control” over their local 
programs.301  
HUD’s announcement concluded that “for the first time, there would be stated goals for 
anti-discrimination, and a way to evaluate success in meeting those goals”—an emphasis on the 
end results rather than the process. Despite having spent years struggling to convince and 
admonish local housing authorities into abiding by the rules of Title VI, the federal government 
now predicated its new policy upon the idea that the authorities would willingly create and 
implement necessary procedures to end discrimination in their housing projects. The local 
housing authorities of San Antonio and Lake Charles, both of which had been called out by name 
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in HUD’s memo for refusing to comply with first come-first served policy, were held up as 
examples of locations where officials “found that the new policy was strongly welcomed as a 
realistic approach to the problem of segregated occupancy,” despite not yet having any indication 
that the increase in flexibility had any positive effects on lessening segregation in either city. 
Even still, this flexibility and focus on measuring results rather than procedural compliance, 
HUD officials wrote, would “benefit both HUD and the Authorities, as well as the residents of 
the housing.” Tellingly, though, the memo noted, “We do not believe that HUD can delay much 
longer” in implementing a new policy due to a “spate of litigation” related to tenant selection and 
segregation in public housing. These included Gautreaux in Chicago, Blackshear in Austin, and 
Taylor v. City of Millington in Tennessee.302 Just as HABC officials had fretted in 1954 about the 
possibility of a lawsuit leading to a judicially-mandated desegregation policy, in 1971, HUD 
feared that a delay in changing the tenant selection requirements would lead to “a new policy set 
by the judiciary over which we have no control.”303  
This emphasis on being “results-oriented” was more than an attempt to shift 
responsibility away from HUD and onto local housing authorities; it marked a major shift in 
federal policy. On June 11, 1971, President Richard Nixon released a statement outlining his 
administration’s approach to fair housing, in which he called for policy that was “results-oriented 
so its progress toward the overall goal” could be evaluated. In this statement, Nixon likewise 
emphasized that the problems facing public housing administrations were “uniquely local in 
nature,” and thus the federal government should be limited in its interference with those policies. 
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While Nixon insisted, “Denial of equal housing opportunity to a person because of race is wrong, 
and will not be tolerated,” he simultaneously reasserted HUD’s original emphasis on choice and 
expressed support for the “voluntary efforts” that had already taken place toward “correcting the 
effects of past discrimination.” Finally, the president restated his administration’s goal of “a free 
and open society,” by which he meant one of “open choices.” He wrote:  
In speaking of “desegregation” or “integration,” we often lose sight of 
what these mean within the context of a free, open, pluralistic society. We cannot 
be free, and at the same time required to fit our lives into prescribed places on a 
racial grid—whether segregated or integrated, and whether by some mathematical 
formula or by automatic assignment…. An open society does not have to be 
homogeneous, or even full integrated. 
 
More than a decade and a half since after Baltimore School Superintendent John Fisher 
wrote he believed it “wrong to manipulate people to create an integrated situation” and HABC 
Housing Director Harry Weiss warned integration may require non-voluntary compliance in 
order to be effective, HUD’s emphasis on substantive desegregation rather than passive 
nondiscrimination was over.304 While the proposed 1971 policy was never put into place and first 
come-first served approach remained the law into the 1990s, HUD relaxed its oversight of the 
implementation and administration of these policies.305 
The ability of residents to choose had, in the words of Van Story Branch, “always been 
permissive.”306 During the era of “freedom of choice” policies, this permissiveness was 
absolute––segregation lasted because white public housing residents were allowed to express 
preference for all-white projects without any resistance on the part of the HABC. Even after the 
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change to the “first come-first served” tenant selection policy, this permissiveness remained—
housing officials purposely subverted the implementation of federal policy in ways that allowed 
applicants to surreptitiously express racialized preferences for public housing placements.  
In 1989, twenty years after the Baltimore housing authority received approval for their 
four-area plan, HUD Secretary Jack Kemp issued directions to all regional housing 
commissioners that discontinued the practice of locational preferences for public housing 
applicants. No matter whether “solicited, allowed, granted based on availability, or 
ignored…expressed in terms of east side or west side, north quadrant or south quadrant,” public 
housing authorities had 90 days to discontinue the use of location preferences in relation to the 
first come-first served plan.307 In addition to Secretary Kemp’s reasoning that “projects which 
are segregated or dominated by one race are often the result of or perpetuate such preferences,” 
Director Pearl later explained that allowing separate waiting lists for individual or groups of 
projects “would end up with something looking sort of like freedom of choice, which was that 
not very much would happen.”308 In Baltimore, this was precisely the case: Claremont, 
Brooklyn, and O’Donnell projects remained 70-82 percent white in 1985.309 Despite HUD’s 
attempted intervention, “first come-first served” did as little to encourage integration as 
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6 CHAPTER FIVE: FIRST COME – FIRST SERVED 
  
Along with attempts to desegregate public housing through tenant selection and 
placement, in the 1960s the Department of Housing and Urban Development saw the necessity 
of deconcentrating public housing from poor minority neighborhoods in central areas of cities. 
At the same time, HUD began experimenting with neoliberal forms of public housing 
construction and operation that would eventually give rise to the voucher-based system still in 
place today. In Baltimore, officials were forced to grapple with these questions of site selection 
alongside struggles over how to move majority-black public housing around a city that was 
rapidly losing white, middle-class families. While many of the city’s civil servants expressed a 
desire and willingness to relocate public housing in some of the few remaining white areas of the 
city, they were often stymied by the lack of necessary approvals by elected officials—whose 
voters, they knew, were not willing to see public housing expand outside the boundaries of 
already black areas.  
As this chapter discusses, despite some attempts to deconcentrate public housing through 
scattered site, turnkey, and leased housing programs, the HABC rarely followed the new site 
selection requirements, and HUD rarely enforced their own rules. While regulations stipulated 
new public housing development should take place outside areas of minority concentration, 
between 1960-1970, 18 of the 21 project sites proposed by the HABC were in black 
neighborhoods, which would later be used against the housing authority as “evidence of de jure 
segregation” in court challenges to continued public housing segregation in the 1990s.310 
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In 1945, when the Federal Public Housing Authority (FPHA) began the Low Rent 
Housing Program, officials wrote that due to the “large number of variables” and location-
specific factors in housing site selection, “It is not possible to lay down definite rules to govern 
this procedure.” Believing that “the full responsibility for site selection must be assumed 
locally,” rather than by federal requirements, the agency offered advice and suggestions. They 
recommended that local authorities consider the effects that site selection would have on the 
future of a public housing development and on the city plan. On the latter, their directions were 
more explicit, stating, “The housing program must be properly fitted into the city pattern, both 
existing and as projected into the future.”311 It was thus in these very guidelines themselves that 
early housing projects should be located along the racially segregated patterns already in place in 
cities like Baltimore. 
Along with the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
the 1965 Housing Act brought with it a change in official policies surrounding public housing 
site selection. Rather than requirements to maintain existing racial patterns, HUD instructed 
public housing authorities to take pains to avoid further concentration of minorities and poverty 
through public housing programs. In 1967, following confusion on the latest HUD site selection 
requirements, HUD Secretary Robert Weaver issued a memo to clarify the “proper 
interpretation” of the policy. He explained that the purpose of the guidelines was to provide 
housing opportunity and choice both within and outside areas of current minority concentration, 
and as such, “any programs of public housing which provide sites only in areas of nonwhite 
concentration are, on the face of it, unacceptable.” Recognizing that previous public housing 
built for black and minority use had been built only in areas already inhabited by those groups, 
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HUD mandated that new public housing developments were to be located outside of “racial 
minority group ghetto areas.”312 In addition to providing better opportunities for black residents 
outside of these areas, HUD hoped that rethinking site selection would also help to stave off 
some of the increasing re-segregation of formerly all-white housing projects transitioning into 
all-black occupancy.313 Alongside these new site selection regulations, the 1960s and 1970s saw 
HUD and local housing authorities experimenting with new systems of public housing 
acquisition and administration, namely scattered site projects, the turnkey program, and leased 
housing. 
Although the city did experiment with new forms of public housing, the majority of 
development in the 1960s followed the same patterns––large-scale projects located in low-
income black neighborhoods. One of these developments that explicitly recreated the same 
segregated patterns was the proposed expansion of McCulloh Homes. Located in a West 
Baltimore public housing cluster that included the two high-rise projects of Murphy Homes and 
Lexington Terrace, McCulloh Homes was one of the original eight segregated housing projects 
in the city. When it opened in 1941, it joined the ranks of Poe Homes, Douglass, Gilmor, and 
Somerset as housing for black low-income Baltimoreans.314 In the initial 1934 site report, the 
State Committee on Housing in Baltimore called the area where McCulloh would be situated, 
“emphatically a colored area.” Furthermore, the report stated, “The site has no other value except 
for Negro residence, and never will have.” A report by the Associated Architects of Baltimore 
(AAB) from the period called the area surrounding McCulloh, “the most advanced case of 
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‘blight’ in the City.” The AAB report posited that if McCulloh could be redeveloped enough to 
attract the “upper third” of the black housing market, it would “make possible the restoration to 
white use” of the neighboring areas, “a much needed change for Baltimore.” These reclaimed 
areas would then serve as a buffer to separate the black housing projects from the “well liked 
white residence area to the North” and “buttress” property values for the wealthier white 
neighborhood of Bolton Hill.315 The value of renewing McCulloh was further noted by city 
inspector Homer Phillips, who claimed the neighborhood would “offer a splendid barrier against 
the encroachment of colored.”316  
Although the language of the 1930s reports is striking in its frank espousal of racist 
viewpoints, many of the same underlying characterizations reemerged during discussions in the 
1960s about expanding public housing in the neighborhood. In much the same way as 1930s 
housing officials viewed McCulloh as a protective barrier to spare white home values in Bolton 
Hill, 1960s housing officials saw expansion on the McCulloh site as a way to avoid affecting 
property values in the few remaining white areas of the city. In writing their recommendations to 
HUD, HABC officials described the neighborhood surrounding McCulloh as encompassing 
various “fair to poor” housing sites, “a few small junk yards,” and a planned highway project that 
would fragment and deteriorate the neighborhood. Because all dwellings within the boundaries 
of the expansion site were deemed “substandard,” the proposal declared the area “an undesirable 
place to live.” Furthermore, HABC noted, the site was located nearby five existing housing 
projects encompassing 2,754 units, all of which “currently house Negro families.”317 The HABC 
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was aware of the potential that HUD would reject the plans on the basis that they would increase 
the concentration of public housing in the area.318 In an unusual and risky move, the HABC 
touted the move as a benefit that could prove “a valuable asset in the relocation process” for the 
many families being displaced by the city’s urban renewal projects. Even more brazen was the 
outright lie that black residents in the area were concentrated by choice. HABC officials claimed, 
“The housing market situation for Negro families is quite favorable,” and “Many areas [are] now 
open to Negro occupancy outside of the rundown sections of the city.” In sum, the HABC 
proposed adding 516 additional public housing units to the neighborhood, designated the 
McCulloh Homes Extension.319  
Unconvinced by the HABC’s claims, the NAACP filed a formal complaint about the 
McCulloh Extension project and the pending dislocation of neighborhood residents in November 
1966.320 Baltimore NAACP officials alleged that homeowners in the surrounding neighborhood 
of Upton were being told that the “fair market value” of their homes was lower than the 
municipal tax assessments, which were, by state statute, supposed to be set at 65 percent of fair 
market value. This systemic undervaluing of property meant that either the city had been 
inflating the tax assessments to collect additional property tax revenues, or were now under-
valuing the properties to avoid paying displaced residents for the full value of their properties.321  
In addition to receiving “fair” compensation for their homes, residents displaced by urban 
renewal were to receive assistance in finding new dwellings, financial support for relocation, and 
for those who were income-eligible, status at the top of waitlists for public housing. While 
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displacement was an issue for all residents, the elderly homeowners of Upton were especially 
vulnerable. For these residents who owned their homes outright, returning to a rental situation 
was not only insulting, but put their financial futures in jeopardy, forcing them to pay monthly or 
weekly rent in perpetuity rather than owing yearly property taxes. The offer of placement into 
public housing was also unappealing to those who had owned their homes and saw that 
ownership, no matter how meager the property, as a marker of self-sufficiency. As such, the 
NAACP demanded that displaced homeowners be compensated at a rate that would allow them 
to repurchase homes in new neighborhoods.322 Moreover, the complaints alleged, HABC 
relocation counselors only referred displaced residents to the “Negro listings” in local 
newspapers that were unaffordable and in substandard conditions.323  
The HABC responded denying any wrongdoing. While the NAACP claimed that 
displaced residents were not receiving adequate relocation assistance, the HABC insisted that the 
homeowners had “clearly expressed...unwillingness to even consider public housing,” and thus 
their complaints were invalid. The agency flatly denied that properties were being undervalued 
for relocation funds, claiming instead that market values in the area had been declining “fairly 
rapidly” without tax assessments being adjusted, all but admitting that homeowners in the 
neighborhood had been unfairly taxed while passing blame to the municipal tax assessor’s office. 
Housing officials did concede that for the neighborhoods’ longtime homeowners, especially 
those who had maintained their properties while the area deteriorated around them, relocation to 
a similarly blighted neighborhood was unsatisfactory. Rather than propose any real solutions, 
however, the HABC suggested that the federal government be responsible for providing the 
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difference between the current “fair market value” of the homes and the cost to purchase a 
similar home in a non-blighted area.324 Despite the NAACP’s complaints, HUD sided with the 
Baltimore housing authority and ruled that the local office was “endeavoring to carry out its 
relocation responsibilities... in a satisfactory and competent manner,” and approved the housing 
development plans to move forward. The McCulloh Homes Extension opened to public housing 
residents in 1971.325 
Simultaneous with the NAACP’s complaints on behalf of displaced Upton residents, 
another group called Activists for Fair Housing was forming. The group was founded in 1966 by 
six former members of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), including well-known local 
activist Walter P. Carter.326 That year, the group issued a report accusing the Baltimore housing 
authority of reinforcing residential segregation in the city by only offering relocation for 
residents displaced by urban renewal to areas “usually occupied by the Negro population.”327 
Although the Fair Housing Act of 1968 had not yet been passed, the Activists for Fair Housing 
argued that this was a violation of Brown v. Board, as segregated housing was “ipso facto 
unequal and inferior.” Baltimore’s urban renewal and housing authority executive director 
Richard Steiner defended the HABC, arguing that officials were working toward “improving 
housing conditions” and “removing blight from residential neighborhoods,” and that they had 
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“the best record and the most progressive outlook wherever race relations are concerned.”328 His 
argument hinged on the constant refrain of “freedom of choice,” stating that the agency believed 
in a “positive framework of free choice.”329 The activists’ complaints also implicated HUD, 
leading the HABC and HUD to arrange a meeting in Washington, D.C. in November 1966. At 
that meeting, HUD Secretary Weaver made clear that he was not interested in addressing the 
specific points made by the Activists for Fair Housing, but that HUD and the HABC needed to 
work together to set out plans that would “break down the patterns of the past.”330  
The activists were not satisfied with the answers they received from HUD and the 
HABC, and continued to write letters outlining their grievances. In January 1967, the group 
wrote to HUD Secretary Weaver that they would not be satisfied with empty assurances that 
HABC was “doing all it can,” and called into question whether the department was complying 
with Executive Order 11063 requiring equal opportunity in housing.331 The Activists for Fair 
Housing asked HUD to intervene in the city, questioning whether, “in light of previous city 
council decisions,” any locations “outside of the ghetto” would be approved for public 
housing.332 Although the HUD regional office in Philadelphia did launch an internal review of 
the HABC’s policies, officials refused to release the study’s findings. Even so, HUD spokesman 
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Jack Brian told the Baltimore Sun that the federal authority was “in the process of ‘juicing up’ its 
anti-discrimination efforts.”333 
Baltimore’s elected officials cast themselves as the maligned victims of unfair complaints 
about racial discrimination. Soon after the protests by the NAACP and Activists for Fair 
Housing, HUD was likewise facing claims by the National Committee Against Discrimination in 
Housing that their urban renewal and public housing programs were building “racial ghettos.” 
Baltimore Mayor Theodore McKeldin wrote to HUD Secretary Weaver offering his sympathies 
and commending Weaver’s statements refuting the claims. McKeldin wrote that he was himself 
“faced with somewhat the same situation” in Baltimore, with “inaccurate and unfair” accusations 
“opposing improvements in housing and living conditions within areas of predominantly Negro 
occupancy.” McKeldin expressed outrage that these groups were “castigat[ing] our continuing 
and simultaneous efforts to improve...the slum and blight-ridden” neighborhoods that were 
“occupied in the main by disadvantaged Negro families.” He also claimed that city officials were 
making “every effort” to integrate public housing, unlike the NAACP and other groups who 
were causing “injustice” and doing great “disservice...to the people they most want to help.” In 
fact, McKeldin insisted, the “prognosis for success” in integrating public housing was good, and 
he claimed to have “obtained the voluntary integration of a number of private housing 
developments” through his own personal efforts. 334  
McKeldin then created a strawman of the finest order. “Would these civil rights leaders,” 
he lamented, “abandon all of these people indefinitely?” On the other hand, he himself refused 
“to suddenly abandon neighborhoods,” as doing so would be “foolish, impractical, and short-
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sighted.” McKeldin was convinced he had the moral high ground. “Lest others forget,” he told 
Weaver, “the first goal of national housing policy is a good home in a good environment for 
every American family. Other objectives are important too, but this one is—and should remain—
foremost.” McKeldin’s line of reasoning failed to address the actual complaints made against the 
HABC and HUD. Advocacy groups were not agitating to end urban renewal entirely, but to stop 
corralling the displaced residents of color in the same ghettoized areas that gave rise to the 
current issues of concentrated poverty. Clearly McKeldin did not see, or did not wish to 
acknowledge, the concerns that state-sponsored retrenchment of segregated residential patterns 
was in itself a violation of his “foremost” goal.335 
Despite resistance from elected officials to deconcentrating public housing from poor 
minority neighborhoods, it seemed that many civil servants within the Baltimore housing 
authority did understand and support the goals of HUD’s site selection policies. Simultaneously, 
officials were faced with rapidly shrinking white neighborhoods as thousands of white city 
residents moved to the surrounding counties.336 Executive Director Steiner declared proudly to 
the HUD regional office in February 1967 that seven of the nine sites submitted for city council 
approval were located “quite a distance” from “conventional areas of non-white concentration.” 
What he failed to mention was that while these neighborhoods were not historically black, many 
of them were undergoing rapid transitions toward majority black occupancy. Still, Steiner 
pointed to these site selections as “concrete evidence” that the HABC was “not only willing, 
but...making a conscientious effort” to establish subsidized housing outside of the inner city. 
Steiner expressed understanding that segregated housing “aggravates slums and conditions of 
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blight and deterioration,” calling it demoralizing and discouraging, and adding, “No city can 
expect equal responsibility, without advocating equal opportunity.”337 
Displacement of residents in the name of “progress” through urban renewal was a 
constant problem for rapidly changing cities across the United States during this era, not just 
Baltimore.338 Residential displacement was a driving force in the rapid racial turnover of public 
housing projects, in large part because federal regulations mandated that those supplanted by 
urban renewal projects who were income-eligible for public housing be placed at the top of 
housing waitlists.339  
Urban renewal projects disproportionately displaced residents of color; between 1951 and 
1960, the HABC reported that 3,722 non-white households had been forced from their homes, 
compared to only 252 white households during the same period.340 While the vast majority of 
urban renewal displacement was caused by “neighborhood development projects,” the 
construction of new public housing projects themselves displaced thousands of low-income 
residents.341 
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Figure 6.1 Causes of Resident Displacement, 1951-1971342 
 
Moreover, of the 10,000 families during those two decades who qualified for relocation 
assistance due to displacement, 86 percent were black. According to a 1971 report by the 
Department of Housing and Community Development, “The more affluent white residents are 
leaving for surrounding counties... before neighborhood deterioration reaches the point” where 
an area would be declared an urban renewal project, and thus eligible for relocation assistance.343  
White residents of even modest means had enough options available to them on the open 
housing market and through FHA and veterans’ home-financing programs that they were able to 
leave areas that began to deteriorate; it was often only at that point that black residents were even 
able to move into the declining neighborhoods. Conversely, even more affluent black residents 
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were often stuck in place as their neighborhoods began to fall apart around them.344 While white 
Baltimore residents were fleeing the city in favor of surrounding Baltimore County, black 
residents were leaving the county for the city. The County government did not have to resort to 
overt racism; due to the combination of predatory zoning practices, denial of sewer services, and 
other neglectful methods, the black population of Baltimore County fell from 18,026 residents in 
1950 to only 16,580 in 1964, even as the overall population of the county more than doubled.345  
Table 5 Baltimore County Population, 1950-1964 346 











One effort to deconcentrate poverty, support meaningful residential integration, and 
reduce stigma surrounding public housing came with the creation of the scattered site housing 
program. Officials saw developing smaller lower density projects “scattered” throughout 
neighborhoods, rather than high-rise “towers in the park”-style public housing, as creating new 
opportunities to build public housing in non-minority neighborhoods without the massive public 
outcry they faced with Herring Run in the 1940s.347 Still, the shift to scattered-site housing 
brought with it renewed questions about where to construct public housing projects, specifically 
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whether to put them on vacant or “clearance” land where blighted housing and slums had been 
torn down for urban renewal.  
While the city outwardly embraced the scattered-site housing program, many public 
housing officials disagreed with the vision of placing these projects in new neighborhoods. For 
Assistant Director of Planning Ellick Maslan, the choice was simple: continue adding new 
housing projects on the “fringes” of existing projects, as that was “where it was already 
accepted.” Though not explicitly referring to the 1940s conflict over Herring Run, Maslan’s 
comments reflected the city’s desire to avoid another protracted fight over the placement of 
public housing. Despite being neutral on the surface, Maslan’s comments also had racial and 
class undertones. Some housing officials raised concerns that adding more public housing would 
constitute a “continuing policy of ringing the center of the city with permanent economic 
ghettos.” It was politically more feasible, however, to continue concentrating public housing in 
low-income, minority neighborhoods where residents had less political power than to attempt to 
infiltrate the few white middle-class neighborhoods remaining in the city.348 Maslan’s suggestion 
also ran directly counter to HUD requirements to avoid areas of poverty or minority 
concentration. Despite HUD guidelines implemented in the 1960s, many of the public housing 
projects developed in 1960s Baltimore—Emerson Julian and Spencer Gardens, Rosemont, and 
McCulloh Homes Extension among them—were placed in census tracts of near-total minority 
populations and areas of “extreme poverty.”349 
In February 1970, a “package” of three projects in the northwest neighborhoods of 
Rosemont, Dukeland, and Hilton came before the HABC Staff Commission for discussion. 
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Despite purchasing parts of the land and hiring an architect in 1965, the HABC had allowed the 
housing sites to sit undeveloped for five years amid concerns that the projects “would be difficult 
to maintain” due to the unsuitability and “unattractiveness” of the “three odd pieces of land,” 
which included bad terrain and railroad tracks.350  
When plans resurfaced several years later, residents objected to the projects, reflecting 
class stratification within Baltimore’s black community in the ways that middle-class black 
residents expressed “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) objections to the development of public 
housing within their neighborhoods. The Rosemont neighborhood embodied the aspirations of 
the city’s middle-class black community. Characterized as a “stable, middle class Negro 
community” in a 1968 Baltimore Sun article, Rosemont was 98 percent black and had a 72 
percent homeownership rate—significantly higher than the city as a whole.351 In the mid-1960s, 
the neighborhood successfully fought off design plans for the Baltimore East-West Expressway, 
which would have run through the neighborhood, effectively destroying the community.352 In 
1969, the HABC Commissioners decided to reopen plans for public housing in Rosemont, 
stating, “The neighborhood is ready for these projects.” The neighborhood vehemently 
disagreed.353  
When word of the renewed plans reached the Rosemont Neighborhood Improvement 
Association (RNIA), the group wrote to Commissioner of Housing Robert Embry that the 
increase in private developments in the intervening years since Rosemont’s first approval as a 
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public housing site meant the neighborhood’s service facilities were already at capacity. They 
expressed concern that the project would overburden the already inadequate sanitation services, 
police, and public safety, and exacerbate transportation problems in the neighborhood. While 
facility upgrades had already been discussed for the neighborhood, RNIA representatives feared 
the planned project density was too high and would “more than overcrowd” the planned 
infrastructural improvements.354 Having experienced greater than a 15 percent population 
increase in the previous decade, the group lamented, “We now find ourselves with inadequate 
everything.”355 Moreover, the 98 percent black Rosemont residents saw the decision to develop 
public housing in their neighborhood as “the fostering of ‘de facto’ segregation” and the 
“establishment of a ghetto.”356 No projects had been proposed in the city’s few remaining white 
middle-class neighborhoods, yet Rosemont was denigrated in the press for its refusal to accept 
the plans. In 1969, the Baltimore Sun published an editorial complaining, “Nearly everyone 
concedes the urgent need for new housing to accommodate low-income families, but when the 
city tries to act, the howl is always: ‘But don’t built it here!’”357  
Receiving no response, the RNIA wrote again to Embry in July 1970. This time, RNIA 
President Joseph Wiles pointed out that the association had been warning of these problems for 
years. The year before, then-President Rose Gallop had written a letter to the editor of the 
Baltimore Sun declaring, “If that housing site is put there, you will be adding another slum to 
Baltimore City.”358 In his letter, Wiles reiterated concerns about minority concentration. The 
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creation of the Rosemont housing project, Wiles asserted, “would be in strict violation of Federal 
statutes” for site selection policy. He pointed out that despite being “ghettoized,” the Rosemont 
neighborhood was currently “stable,” and offered a number of suggestions “as means of 
preventing further moral and physical neighborhood deterioration,” and to “prevent a ghetto 
from becoming a slum.” These included new school facilities, a Mayor’s Station, administrative 
facilities for the Baltimore Public School System, park and recreation facilities, a community 
center, and reconstructed and realigned roads—all of which would require a number of housing 
units to be deleted from the project plans, of course.359 Despite having successfully fended off 
the East-West Expressway, the RNIA was unable to replicate their success in relation to public 
housing. Construction on the Rosemont housing project was completed in 1975.360 
Rosemont was not the only location in the scattered-site “package” to face neighborhood 
opposition. Similarly, the Hilton neighborhood was 81 percent black; unlike Rosemont, however, 
the bordering neighborhood of Saint Joseph’s was predominantly white.361 While the RNIA had 
used all the avenues available to them to object—writing letters to the editor, complaining to the 
HABC, and even bringing a proposed ordinance change to the city council—it was this 
proximity to a white neighborhood that enabled Hilton to successfully stop plans for public 
housing within their community, especially when State Senator Carl Friedler got involved. 
Carl Friedler had served as Assistant City Solicitor from 1960-1963, and was elected to 
the Maryland Senate in 1966. At the time of the Hilton proposal, Friedler was preparing to run 
for the Democratic nomination in a U.S. congressional race, and fighting the “encroachment” of 
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public housing into one of his constituent white neighborhoods was a banner opportunity.362 
Unlike the RNIA’s letters to Housing Commissioner Embry, Friedler bypassed the Baltimore 
civil servants and wrote directly to HUD Assistant Secretary Don Hummel. In a somewhat coded 
appeal, Friedler said that despite the local school board’s plans to build a new school in the 
neighborhood, it only “might be adequate for existing needs,” a position that does not hold up to 
the barest scrutiny [emphasis in original]. Rather than noting the opportunity to revise the plans 
before construction to take into account the additional need from children living in the proposed 
project, Friedler insisted that the additional students would “overload, if not make obsolescent” 
the new school before it was even built. Friedler insisted that HUD should essentially work 
backwards, only allowing as many public housing units as the school could already 
accommodate. Perhaps anticipating that the response to his objections would be to revise the 
school plans to account for an increase in enrollment, Friedler then dropped the coded language. 
The Hilton project, he wrote, would “unquestionably saturate the neighborhood with additional 
unwanted people,” and be “a sick slum surrounded by new mortar.” In an echo of RNIA’s Rose 
Gallop, he wrote, “I cannot understand why your agency is so determined to build a new 
slum.”363  
Because Friedler bypassed the local authority, HABC Commissioner Embry only found 
out about the letter once it was forwarded by HUD Assistant Director Hummel with a request for 
explanation. Embry responded that Friedler’s claims were “inaccurate and incomplete.” Despite 
Friedler’s assertions that Hilton was a “high density” project, the scattered-site project was only 
to include 84 units, with a planned density of 16 families per acre in an area zoned for 40. 
                                                 
362 Carl Friedler Obituary, Washington Post, July 12, 1990. 
363 Letter from Carl Friedler, State Senator to Don Hummel, HUD Assistant Secretary, January 10, 1969, Series 3, 
Plaintiff Exhibits, Box 7, Exhibit 198, ACLU. 
137 
Furthermore, the Department of Housing and Community Development had given 35 percent of 
the project area to the school board for construction of new school facilities, and were 
coordinating with the school board “to ensure that adequate school facilities are available.”364 
Not receiving the response he wanted from HUD, Friedler next turned to the Baltimore 
City Council. Despite Friedler’s objections having no basis in fact, the pressure from him and the 
Saint Joseph’s Improvement Association led City Council President William Schaefer to 
introduce a motion to rescind approval for the Hilton project site. Following the motion’s 
introduction, Embry wrote to Schaefer reminding him that, following approval by the city 
council and mayor in 1965, the HABC had expended significant funds to purchase the site, 
conduct a preliminary site preparation, and hire an architect. He also reminded the council that 
they ought to be “fully aware” of the need for additional public housing and the “dearth of 
suitable sites” available. As such, rescinding approval for the Hilton project, “would constitute a 
serious retrogression in the Administration’s efforts to assure all Baltimore families a decent 
home and a suitable living environment.” Furthermore, Embry voiced concern that the move 
would “seriously complicate” the HABC’s relationship with the federal government, as federal 
funds had already been spent and contracts made.365 Nevertheless, the City Council officially 
rescinded permission to build on the Hilton site, killing the project.366 
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Although the Hilton project was dead, Baltimore was still in desperate need of affordable 
housing units, so the HABC asked for and received permission from HUD to add units to a 
planned scattered-site project in the Upton neighborhood, where the Murphy Homes public 
housing project already dominated the landscape.367 Murphy Homes, a massive block of public 
housing located in the same West Baltimore cluster that included McCulloh Homes, 
encompassed 758 units in high rises.368 When plans for Murphy Homes had first begun in the 
1950s, the HABC proposed that the mix of high- and low-rise housing also include yards and 
larger-sized units for families with more children. Instead, HUD insisted on higher density for 
the site, increasing the number of units within the project from 643 to the 758 that were 
eventually built.369 According to the Baltimore Sun, agency officials expected the four high-rises 
and 19 low-rise buildings surrounding them would eventually “blend into” the surrounding area 
as it was reconstructed through urban renewal.370 
This plan did prove, in one sense, prophetic. By the time that the additional housing units 
from the Hilton plan were transferred to Upton, more than 25,000 people had been displaced 
from Baltimore neighborhoods due to highway construction and urban renewal demolition. This 
left the remaining low-income housing residents over-represented in the neighborhood—a 1979 
study found that more than half of the residents in Upton earned below 80 percent of the city’s 
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mean family income.371 Despite the already heavy concentration of public housing residents, 99 
percent of whom were black, HUD also approved the addition of the Emerson-Julian Gardens 
and Spencer Gardens housing projects to the neighborhood.372 This was a direct contradiction of 
HUD’s own site selection policies. Just four year earlier, HUD had rejected Upton as a site for 
any additional public housing on the basis of the area’s extreme minority concentration and the 
density of public housing already in the area; but with the mayor and city council blocking public 
housing in non-minority areas, Steiner and his staff had few other options left.373 While the 
general sentiment of HABC staff may have changed since Maslan’s 1960 suggestion to keep 
building on the fringes of existing public housing, the political situation had not.  
The late 1960s was also a time of innovation in public housing administration, made 
possible through the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act. Although the large-scale 
change in public housing policy toward neoliberal, private-sector development is outside the 
scope of this dissertation, two noteworthy early interventions took place in the Baltimore public 
housing scene. In 1966, HUD Secretary Weaver introduced the Turnkey Housing program. 
Under this program, private developers would construct housing on their own, privately-owned 
land using private bank financing. Then, when the development was completed, the private 
developer would sell it to the local housing authority to be used for public housing. The local 
authority and HUD did not front any funding or take any of the risk associated with the project, 
but the local authority would approve preliminary plans and sign a Letter of Intent and Contract 
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of Sale. The Turnkey program was envisioned as a cost-reduction mechanism—estimated to save 
10-15 percent of development costs per project—as well as a way to get public housing sites 
built more quickly than local housing authorities could manage, reducing average construction 
time from the three to four years necessary for traditional public housing, to under a year for 
turnkey public housing.374  
In July 1967, HABC commissioners met to consider several turnkey sites. Under the 
turnkey program, private developers would remodel and rehabilitate a housing development to 
then sell to the housing authority for use as public housing, with the expectation that the private 
developer could do the work at a lower cost and on a shorter timeline than the public agency 
could build new projects. One site, Belle Vista in northeast Baltimore, was considered especially 
advantageous by the housing authority as it would provide 77 four-bedroom units, sixteen units 
with three bedrooms, and ten with two bedrooms, for a total for 103 new dwelling units available 
to the city public housing program. The proposal included the costs of converting smaller units 
into the larger three- and four-bedroom rentals, along with additional upgrades to stairwells, 
kitchens, and playground equipment. In total, the cost per unit of $14,809 was significantly 
below the estimated cost of new public housing construction. HABC Assistant Director L.S. 
O’Gwynn recommended that, “Giving due weight to the desirability of the Belle Vista site,” as 
well as the relatively short timeline needed for completion of the rehabilitation, commissioners 
should move forward with the project.375 
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In consideration along with Belle Vista was another turnkey site, Shirley-Oswego. 
Although HUD preferred turnkey projects be acquired in “all white” neighborhoods, regulations 
allowed for projects in non-white areas if “paired with one in an all white neighborhood.” At 
first, HABC officials tried to claim that the Shirley-Oswego area was “racially mixed,” but this 
claim did not hold up to scrutiny by HUD, as the neighborhood was in the midst of racial 
transition from white to black.376 With the delay in approval, HABC Chairman Eugene Feinblatt 
penned a scathing letter to HUD Assistant Secretary Don Hummel decrying what he saw as a 
“seeming lack of urgency” and “bureaucratic inflexibility and administrative regulation which 
sometimes defy belief.” Feinblatt declared the agency’s determination against Shirley-Oswego as 
“totally indefensible under the circumstances” of the dire need for additional public housing in 
the city. With these added delays, Feinblatt explained, it was becoming increasingly difficult for 
the Baltimore housing authority to claim “that turnkey is a method for getting public housing 
built quickly.”377  
In reply, Hummel wrote that his office was “fully cognizant of the great need for 
housing” in Baltimore and would do “everything we can to expedite your housing program.”378 
Although Belle Vista was in a “racially mixed neighborhood,” not an all-white one, HUD 
relaxed their requirements and approved of the pairing of the two areas to satisfy site regulations. 
HUD’s regional office wrote in September 1967 that, “taken as an entity” with Belle Vista, the 
Shirley-Oswego site was approved for a 35-unit turnkey project.379 Belle Vista had been 
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determined as an ideal site for a larger, 103-unit project to house many of the larger families in 
need, but despite Shirley-Oswego’s approval being contingent on the pairing with Belle Vista, 
the latter site was never actually acquired for housing development. After having bent their 
regulations to approve Shirley-Oswego, HUD failed to follow through on the very project that 
would have advanced, even if slightly, a deconcentration of public housing.380  
Another major innovation in public housing came in 1965, when the Housing and Urban 
Development Act created the first publicly-administered housing program to use private housing 
units.381 The Section 23 program, also known as Leased Housing, authorized local housing 
authorities to lease units from private owners and sublet the units to public housing-eligible 
tenants at affordable rents, with the housing authority using federal funds to cover the cost 
difference. Units leased through the program were required meet minimum condition standards, 
and were intended to “be dispersed as widely as practicable throughout the community.” HUD 
also mandated that the neighborhood surrounding the leased housing “be free of characteristics 
seriously detrimental to family life,” which included the note that “substandard dwellings... 
should not predominate” without an active plan for neighborhood improvement.382 
Section 23 Leased Housing programs had to be approved by the local public housing 
authority. In Baltimore, this required the approval of Mayor Theodore McKeldin and the City 
Council. While Section 23 guidelines recommended dispersal of leased housing units throughout 
the city, the mayor and council only approved Baltimore’s program for designated “urban 
renewal areas,” the boundaries of which were generally drawn along racial lines and, by design, 
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only encompassed those areas already in need of great repair.383 This decision drew ire from 
legal scholars, who referred to the actions later as clearly “evidencing...de jure segregation” and 
“having the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing segregation in public housing in 
Baltimore.”384 
Although the Fair Housing Act had not yet been passed, HUD still prohibited public 
housing authorities from building new subsidized housing units in areas of minority 
concentration. When the mayor and city council limited leased housing to urban renewal areas, 
HUD Secretary Robert Weaver and Assistant Secretary Don Hummel both expressed concern 
that doing so would limit the program to only black areas of the city and thus not meet HUD site 
selection requirements. In response, Baltimore executive director Steiner attempted a sleight of 
hand, claiming that because the urban renewal areas in Baltimore totaled roughly 2,750 acres, 
leased housing would not be limited to all-black neighborhoods. While Steiner was attempting to 
claim that this large acreage would include some white areas, it ignored the way that urban 
renewal area boundaries outlined economically depressed, predominantly black neighborhoods. 
Despite expressing trepidation, Weaver and Hummel accepted Steiner and the HABC’s 
assurance that the agencies understood and would abide by HUD rules. Secretary Weaver noted 
that despite his reservations, it was due to the “need for additional housing for large low-income 
families” that he allowed the Baltimore leased housing program to go through.385 
Section 23 was seen, in part, as a way to provide public housing authorities with the 
larger unit sizes needed for large families, as well as a way for housing authorities to obtain new 
public housing units more quickly than new conventional public housing construction could be 
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completed.386 Baltimore had a particular need for larger unit sizes; the problem of overcrowded 
families had plagued Baltimore’s housing program from the start and created a backlog of 
waiting applicants who needed more than three bedrooms for their families. While many of these 
families would have undoubtedly accepted fewer bedrooms than federal guidelines mandated in 
order to obtain subsidized housing, the HABC was constrained by HUD limits on how many 
people could occupy a unit. In its response to an NAACP complaint in the 1960s, the HABC 
noted the extreme shortage of housing available for larger families, and declared their hope that, 
“If leased housing could be utilized as a public housing resource, then such large families could 
be accommodated by the leasing of entire houses.”387 Yet, as can be seen in the chart of proposed 
unit distribution and the actual leased housing units, one- and two-bedroom units predominated 
in the program after all:  







1 50 57 
2 35 34 
3 40 34 
4 50 13 
5 45 17 
6 30 10 
Total: 250 145 
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HUD Secretary Weaver approved Baltimore’s program due to the need for larger unit sizes, yet it 
was precisely these larger units that would be cut when quotas were reduced.389 
 Despite HUD’s concerns, the agency approved Baltimore’s leased housing program. 
Assistant Secretary Hummel warned in a letter to Baltimore officials that while he accepted their 
assurances that the limitation of leased housing to urban renewal areas would not violate the 
Civil Rights Act, he expected them to report “frequently” and be “constantly alert” to conditions 
that might “perpetuate Negro concentration.”390 As with approval of the “four locations” plan 
under Baltimore’s first come-first served tenant selection policy in the traditional public housing 
projects, HUD officials lacked meaningful regulatory enforcement powers and thus acquiesced 
to local alterations in implementation, which undercut the policy.  
Hummel’s fears soon came to pass. Fewer than three months later, he wrote again to 
Baltimore officials that they were in violation of HUD regulations and his own specific 
instructions because of where the leased housing units were located. Of the 75 units leased in 
June 1968, all were in areas with highly concentrated black populations—80-99 percent.  
Baltimore’s new acting executive director of urban renewal attempted to show compliance by 
pointing to situations where the leased housing units were situated in a majority-white 
“individual structure or apartment building,” within an otherwise majority-black neighborhood. 
Hummel summarily dismissed this as unacceptable. In attempting to skirt HUD regulations 
against minority concentration, the leased housing program was replacing white occupants of 
these buildings with black public housing residents. This then increased the concentration of 
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black residents in the neighborhood—exactly the effect that the HUD site selection requirements 
were meant to prevent.391  
Although the Baltimore City Council did eventually vote to increase the eligible Section 
23 program area, it was too late to save the program. The restriction of leased housing to urban 
renewal areas, paired with the requirement that any housing leased through the program must 
meet minimum housing standards, meant that the city was unable to fill its HUD-authorized 
quotas.392 Even after those quotas were reduced from 250 to 145 units of leased housing, HUD 
pressed HABC administrators to proceed “as rapidly as possible” with the program. This 
pressure led officials to accept properties into the program at a “lower standard” than what was 
originally proposed, a decision that HABC Van Story Branch would refer to a few years later as 
“unwise,” and which directly led to the resulting failure of the city’s leased housing program. By 
1970, housing officials openly discussed the declining quality of the housing provided, the high 
turnover of renters, and the limited program funding.393 The program limped along for a few 
more years, but by 1976, only one lease of the revised 145 unit quota remained.394 Branch 
explained the failure of the program as the result of several external circumstances limiting the 
effectiveness of the program. First, the mayor and city council’s restriction of the leased housing 
program area to only those places already designated as urban renewal areas led to difficulty 
obtaining “standard and satisfactory dwelling units” for use as leased housing.395 Second, city 
contracts with landlords did not have a mechanism to increase rents as tax and utility rates 
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increased, causing some to pull out of the program or refuse necessary repairs. Finally, because 
of the problems with quality of both the physical dwellings and their locations, those who 
applied to leased housing did so “with great reluctance or in desperation,” and were not “the 
more desirable low-income families” the housing authority sought to attract and retain. “More 
desirable” families were those with middle-class cultural markers, traditional family structure, 
and low-paying but steady employment. Instead, the leased housing residents “required constant 
monitoring by the meager management staff” to make sure they were not disturbing the 
neighborhoods or damaging the leased property through malice or neglect. Although the leased 
housing program was an attempt to provide a desperately needed expansion of the public housing 
program, Branch wrote, “At its best, I would say that the program was mediocre.”396 
The 1960s saw new innovations in public housing through the scattered site, turnkey, and 
leased housing programs. While the new site selection requirements handed down by HUD failed 
to effectively deconcentrate new public housing in major cities, they did help pave the way for 
the requirements that housing authorities “affirmatively further fair housing” in the 1968 
Housing Act. In Baltimore, the housing authority generally failed in their aim to develop public 
housing outside of the same low-income black neighborhoods where projects had traditionally 
been located; even into the 1970s, low-income projects sat in clusters, while projects for elderly 
residents were scattered throughout the city.  
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Figure 6.2 Locations of Baltimore Public Housing Projects, 1970 397 
 
Taken together, the effect of white flight to the suburbs of Baltimore County, site 
selection decisions by the HABC and Baltimore elected officials, the majority black population 
topping the public housing wait lists, and continued housing discrimination throughout the 
region meant the city’s public housing projects remained essentially segregated into the 1970s. 
More than a decade after HUD ordered HABC to support and encourage black residents move 
into the three all-white projects of Claremont, O’Donnell, and Brooklyn, all three remained 
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strikingly segregated. While the vast majority of the other housing projects maintained 95-100 
percent black occupancy, these three were 71 percent, 77 percent, and 84 percent white. In fact, 
in 1977, these the projects alone accounted for 78 percent of all the white people remaining on 
Baltimore’s public housing rolls.398    




White Black Other 
% Non-
White 
Latrobe 701  11  690  0  98.4% 
McCulloh 433  0  433  0  100.0% 
McCulloh 
Extension 
516  1  515  0  99.8% 
Poe Homes 298  0  298  0  100.0% 
Douglass 
Homes 
388  0  388  0  100.0% 
Perkins 685  63  619  3  90.8% 
Gilmor 586  0  586  0  100.0% 
O'Donnell 900  689  201  8  23.2% 
Somerset Court 420  0  420  0  100.0% 
Cherry Hill 600  0  600  0  100.0% 
Cherry Hill 
Extension 1 
637  0  637  0  100.0% 
Cherry Hill 
Extension 2 
358  0  358  0  100.0% 
Claremont 292  207  84  0  28.8% 
Lafayette Courts 813  1  812  0  99.9% 
Flag House 
Courts 
483  13  469  1  97.3% 
Lexington 
Terrace 
674  0  674  0  100.0% 
Murphy Homes 756  0  756  0  100.0% 
Westport 
Homes 
198  0  198  0  100.0% 
Westport 
Extension 
232  0  231  1  100.0% 
Fairfield 300  0  300  0  100.0% 
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Brooklyn 499  419  73  7  16.0% 
Mt. Winans 140  0  140  0  100.0% 
Oswego Mall 35  0  35  0  100.0% 
Somerset Court 
Extension 
60  0  60  0  100.0% 
Rosemont 105  0  105  0  100.0% 
DuBeland 30  0  30  0  100.0% 
Hollander Ridge 985  238  737  10  75.8% 
Used Housing 
Program 
86  0  86  0  100.0% 
Vacant Home 
Program 
1,260  37  1,219  4  97.1% 
 
As the city’s racial demographics continued to shift to ever-larger black majorities, the inability 
of the HABC to fix the problem of segregated projects would make its way to the federal court 
system in the 1990s as the ACLU of Maryland sued HUD and the HABC on behalf of the city’s 
public housing residents. The patterns set through decades of city planning and public housing 





7 EPILOGUE: MEANINGFUL CHOICE? 
 
The problems of segregation in Baltimore’s public housing persisted throughout the 
remainder of the twentieth century, despite the turn to Section 8 and other Housing Choice 
voucher programs, culminating in what NAACP Legal Defense Fund President Theodore Shaw 
called “the most important housing desegregation lawsuit in a generation.”400 In the nearly 
twenty-year court case of Carmen Thompson et. al. v United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development et. al. (also known as Thompson v. HUD), the Federal District Court 
grappled with questions of choice, meaningful opportunity, and policy solutions for decades of 
residential segregation. The case culminated with the creation of a new housing voucher mobility 
program for the five-county Baltimore region to address the inability of the City of Baltimore to 
solve the public housing problems within its borders. 
In 1995, the City of Baltimore received funds under HUD’s HOPE VI plan to finance 
demolition of the city’s public housing high-rises. As plans for the demolition became public, the 
ACLU of Maryland filed suit against the Housing Authority of Baltimore City, the mayor and 
city council, HUD, and the current HUD Secretary.401 The lawsuit included six named current 
residents of HABC public housing, but achieved class action status on behalf of “all African 
Americans who have resided or will reside in Baltimore City family public housing units at any 
time from January 31, 1995 until January 1, 2027.”402 The suit alleged that both Baltimore and 
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federal officials were responsible for perpetuating residential segregation through public housing 
site selection practices well after segregation had been ruled unconstitutional in Brown v. Board 
and the city had officially desegregated its public housing projects. Plaintiffs pointed to many of 
the practices described throughout this dissertation, including the dubious nature of “freedom of 
choice” as a program to provide meaningful choices, the subversion of the “first come-first 
served” plan, and the refusal of Baltimore authorities to abide by (and HUD officials to enforce) 
site selection policies, as evidence of the responsibility HABC and HUD had for the city’s 
continued segregation. The need for an immediate response was urgent, plaintiffs alleged, as the 
HABC and HUD were embarking on “a major program to demolish and replace up to 3,000 
housing units,” with “virtually all the sites under development for replacement housing” located 
in low-income, minority areas with existing concentrations of public housing. “If not halted by 
this Court,” plaintiffs warned, “the defendants will rebuild segregation for generations of public 
housing families to come” and “squander a rare opportunity to right a wrong of historic 
dimension.”403 The following year, the involved parties signed a partial consent decree requiring 
that the 3,000 units of public housing be replaced with 1,000 new public housing units in mixed-
income neighborhoods on the sites of the demolished housing, and 2,000 units made available 
through housing vouchers and subsidies.404 
Following the partial consent decree, the lawsuit continued on for nearly a decade, 
culminating in a month-long trial in late 2004. Finally, in January 2005, Judge Marvin J. Garbis 
issued a decision on the liability of the HABC and HUD in perpetuating public housing 
segregation in the city. First and foremost, Garbis emphasized, “Baltimore City should not be 
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viewed as an island reservation for use as a container for all of the poor.” Due to the rapid 
demographic changes within the city that left it home to a disproportionately low-income, black 
population, it had become “impossible to effect a meaningful degree of desegregation of public 
housing by redistributing the public housing...within the City limits.”405 Quoting from the 1987 
court case NAACP v. Secretary of HUD, Garbis wrote that the Fair Housing Act “requires 
Defendants to do something ‘more than simply refrain from discriminating.’”406 
While Garbis found that HUD’s “failure adequately to take a regional approach to the 
desegregation of public housing in the region...violated the Fair Housing Act and requires 
consideration of appropriate remedial action by the Court,” he failed to issue a similar ruling on 
the responsibility of the HABC. Instead, subscribing to the liberal rhetoric of choice espoused by 
the HABC since the 1950s, Garbis described the “prompt desegregative action” by Baltimore 
officials as acting “rapidly, responsibly, and effectively” after the 1954 Brown v. Board ruling.407 
In his decision, Judge Garbis placed the responsibility on HUD for having “failed to take 
adequate action to disestablish the vestiges of the discrimination they participated in imposing,” 
and stated they “may have worsened the racially discriminatory situation” by focusing only on 
“rearranging Baltimore’s public housing residents within the Baltimore City limits.”408 As the 
city’s housing agency had no authority to force the surrounding counties to participate in public 
housing construction or voucher programs, Garbis’ ruling hinged on the ability of HUD to 
intervene in the region—and their failure to do so.409 
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With his decision, Judge Garbis implemented interim updates to the partial consent 
decree. HUD was to provide funding for 168 subsidized homeownership units, 1,342 tenant-
based vouchers, 646 project-based vouchers, and 2,600 “Moving to Work” vouchers.410 While 
the Section 8 voucher programs limited to Baltimore City had often resulted in unused vouchers 
due to an inability of program participants to find eligible housing, this separate category of 
“Thompson vouchers” came with the explicit ability to use them region-wide without permission 
to transfer between county housing authorities.411 The vouchers were targeted for use in 
“Communities of Opportunity”—census tracts with a lower than 10 percent poverty rate, less 
than 30 percent minority population, and fewer than 5 percent of housing units in public housing 
or HUD-subsidized housing complexes.412 
In addition to the financial subsidy HUD provided through the Thompson vouchers, 
recipients were given extensive mobility counseling, financial literacy classes, and credit repair 
services. As voucher recipients needed to compete in the private housing market, program 
counselors also worked with landlords to “counter negative biases” about program participants 
and explain the ongoing support given to tenants. Recipients were also given employment 
assistance through job training, and transportation assistance including low-cost financing to 
purchase used vehicles and financial subsidies to attend driving school. Finally, participants were 
offered post-move counseling to help the transition to their new community and “second-move” 
                                                 
While the court allowed context related to the history of public housing decisions made since the 1930s, the statute 
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counseling in case of future relocation to help “minimize disruptive and unwanted moves out of 
opportunity neighborhoods due to market barriers.”413 
With the demolition of high-rise housing in the city, the vast majority of the subsidized 
housing provided by the HABC came in the form of Section-8 tenant-based vouchers. While 
many policy officials viewed vouchers as a way to deconcentrate public housing while providing 
a mechanism for recipients to express choice, plaintiffs to the suit called in experts to argue the 
use of Section 8 vouchers was just as unlikely to provide meaningful choice as the other 
desegregation programs. Gerald Webster, a professor of geography at the University of Alabama, 
testified that while “black voucher holders largely use their vouchers in Baltimore City in census 
tracts that are largely African American and poor,” white voucher holders “largely use their 
vouchers in the five surrounding counties” outside of the city, “in tracts that are less 
proportionately African American and less comparatively poor.”414  
While Webster spoke of the program’s results, former Acting Assistant HUD Secretary 
for Policy Development and Research, Xavier de Sousa Briggs, testified that the stated objective 
of the Section 8 program to desegregate subsidized housing and promote access to desirable, 
quality locations was the “stepchild on the list” of program goals. “The voucher program is run 
primarily to minimize costs and to meet basic shelter needs,” he contended. Moreover, due to the 
“few incentives and resources” provided by HUD to promote desegregation and increase 
opportunity, the lack of penalties for local agencies who failed to do so, and “several perverse 
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incentives,” “not only does [the program] not advance the cause of desegregation, but in some 
ways the program is run in ways that exacerbate it.”415  
Jill Khadduri, former Director of the Division of Policy Development at HUD pointed to 
the need for regional administration of housing vouchers to enable recipients to move outside of 
the city limits with minimal impediments. All of these problems could be effectively addressed 
through Thompson vouchers. The program quickly showed successes; in the program’s first six 
years, 1,522 families moved to low-poverty, integrated neighborhoods, nearly 90 percent of 
which were in the suburban counties.416 Eighty-five percent of participants reported improved 
quality of life, feeling “safer, more peaceful, and less stressed,” while experiencing health 
improvements and gaining access to better schools.417 
Federal defendants objected to the provisions of the 2005 interim remedy. In a response 
filed after the trial, defendants referred to continuing residential segregation as “the reality of 
racial housing preference patterns,” and proclaimed that the goal of racial integration “will be 
elusive” due to the “interplay of the choices that members of different racial groups make about 
where to live.” Defendants once again hearkened back to liberal views of choice, claiming that 
Section 8 vouchers provided “remarkable” opportunity to exercise free choice, building off the 
“ingrained American value of freedom to choose where to live”—a choice, they claimed, “would 
be denied by plaintiffs’ proposed remedy.” In this classical liberal view, the requirements that 
Thompson vouchers be used in Communities of Opportunity were in fact restrictions on freedom 
of choice, an expression of “sheer paternalism” on the part of attorneys and lawmakers.418  
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Due in part to continued disagreements over proposed remedies for the fault found in 
2005, it was not until 2012 that the plaintiffs and HUD were able to come to a final settlement 
agreement. By that time, Shaun Donovan had been appointed HUD Secretary and changed the 
department’s course. Unlike the defendant briefing in 2005, Donovan understood the limitations 
of traditional voucher programs and continued concentration of poverty and lack of mobility of 
vouchers across housing authority jurisdictions. Moreover, Donovan said in a 2012 speech:  
When you don’t have mobility, you don’t have access to opportunity. 
That’s because when you choose a home, you choose so much more than a home. 
You also choose access to jobs, to schools for your children, to public safety. You 
choose a community––and the choices available in that community. 
  
Donovan thus embraced Thompson as “not only justice for families who were wronged—
but also a testing ground for mobilities policies and lessons” for communities nation-wide.419 In 
the final settlement agreement, HUD agreed to maintain the Thompson voucher program; create 
a Regional Administrator for the vouchers; create an online listing of subsidized housing 
opportunities in the region; fund a study on the patterns of public housing and vouchers in the 
region to identify impediments to accessing housing units outside of Baltimore City and examine 
the “locational patterns” of quality-of-life opportunity in the region; and undertake civil rights 
reviews of any “significant decisions” made by public housing authorities in the Baltimore 
region including agency plans, demolition applications, and site proposals for new or 
rehabilitated subsidized housing.420 
In addition to statements of support by Thompson voucher recipients, Greater Baltimore 
Urban League President J. Howard Henderson, Citizens Planning and Housing Association 
Executive Director Mel Freeman, U.S. Congressman Elijah Cummings, and former HABC 
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Commissioner Robert Embry issued a declaration praising the settlement plan. Embry stated that 
he “wholeheartedly support[ed] the settlement in this case,” as he felt “Baltimore can move 
forward only by taking a regional approach to housing opportunity.”421 As former HUD 
Secretary George Romney had stated during the Gautreaux hearings more than 30 years prior, 
“The impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the central city extends beyond 
the city boundaries to include the surrounding community. The city and suburbs together make 
up what I call the ‘real city.’ To solve the problems of the ‘real city,’ only metropolitan-wide 
solutions will do.”422  
Despite the initial successes of the Thompson voucher project, the dire need for 
affordable housing in Baltimore has proven beyond the scope of the program’s ability to remedy. 
In March 2017, the Baltimore Regional Housing Partnership, which administers the vouchers, 
decided to stop accepting new applications after the waitlist grew to more than 12,000 applicants, 
despite the program only having 1,000 remaining to distribute. The Housing Authority of 
Baltimore City had closed its waitlist for the traditional Housing Choice Vouchers two years 
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earlier, when 75,000 people signed up for a lottery to join the 25,000-name waitlist, from which 
1,000 to 1,500 vouchers are distributed each year.423  
As the affordable housing crisis expands, the neoliberal, market-based solution will 
become even more inadequate for addressing these problems. Even if housing vouchers were 
funded at a level that would have an effect on the growing backlog of applicants, they are 
predicated upon the idea that they enable “free choice” in a “free market.” Unless and until the 
federal government mandates source of income protections for voucher recipients, forbidding 
landlords from discriminating against tenants whose rents are subsidized through housing 
vouchers, the assumption that recipients are making free choices unconstrained by the structural 
inequality and systemic prejudices of those who own and manage property is false to its core. 
That our society refuses to accept this reality––because it is too uncomfortable, or too 
complicated, or just goes against our foundational ideology of the freedoms we have available to 
us––will continue to prevent meaningful change.  
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The story of public housing is not solely one of tragedy and loss, blight and apathy. At its 
beginning, many housing reformers thought they were doing the right thing—eliminating the 
slums where they themselves could not imagine living, and replacing them with more modest 
versions of middle-class homes for the deserving poor in need of temporary uplift. As the history 
of public housing repeatedly shows, however, intent does not always translate to impact. From 
its legally segregated beginnings to its effectively segregated ends, policy decisions made in 
Baltimore’s public housing projects have repeatedly failed to address—and have in many ways, 
exacerbated—the city’s issues of urban poverty and wide-scale disinvestment. 
As this dissertation has shown, a policy emphasis on individual “freedom of choice” does 
nothing to address the problems and results of systemic racism. Whether in the HABC’s “free 
choice” desegregation policy of 1954 or the “first come-first served” policy of 1966, the liberal 
emphasis on individual decision-making ignored the ways that communities, environments, and 
political systems all affected the availability of options, the ability to choose between them, and 
the potentially devastating consequences of structural limitations. Given long enough, this 
emphasis shifted the responsibility for segregation from systemic inequality to individual 
“preferences.” Expecting black tenants to move into all-white projects with no institutional 
support not only fundamentally misunderstood the depths of systemic racism, but dangerously 
underestimated the bounds of white racism. As the protests and backlash against the HABC-
supported integration efforts that did occur in the 1960s shows, black tenants moving into white 
projects would risk not merely dislike from their new neighbors, but Klan violence and death 
threats. To ask black residents to face this alone was morally indefensible.  
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Officials had understandable reasons for their desire to maintain some all-white projects 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The way that public housing was funded, relying on tenant rents to pay 
for maintenance and operation costs made it necessary for the housing authority to capture as 
much rent as possible. The economics of race, then and now, meant that poor whites as a group 
were still better off economically than poor blacks. Still, playing in to white racism—whether by 
holding aside space in all-white projects or acquiescing to white complaints about the impact of 
black neighbors on their property values—should never be the solution. As the history of 
Baltimore public housing shows, pandering to white racism is at best a temporary fix. By the late 
1970s, the out-migration of white residents fleeing to the suburbs and in-migration of black 
residents being pushed out of the suburbs resulted in a majority-black, majority-poor city.  
The interplay between Baltimore City and Baltimore County, though not the focus of this 
dissertation, reminds us that while local politics are important to local policy, so too are regional 
and federal politics. The federal government had numerous opportunities to intervene in the 
region, including when Baltimore County withdrew an application for a water/sewer master 
planning grant upon finding out the grant would require a low-income housing program.424 The 
Supreme Court ruling in Milliken v. Bradley determined in 1974 that “Without inter-district 
violation and inter-district effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an inter-district 
remedy.” Even so, the repeated refusal of Baltimore County to cooperate with the HABC’s 
requests to build and operate low-income housing projects outside of the city boundaries 
constituted just such an inter-district effect.425 As Judge Garbis rightly noted in his Thompson v. 
HUD decision, Baltimore City housing officials had no authority to force Baltimore County to 
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let in public housing; but that does not mean that Baltimore City officials are absolved of 
responsibility. From the moment that the city began constructing public housing, officials made 
conscious decisions to place the projects in low-income black neighborhoods. These choices left 
the segregation and poverty of such neighborhoods even more deeply entrenched, and spurred 
further disinvestment in nearby areas. Rather than alleviate slums, Baltimore’s public housing 
projects exacerbated them. Decisions made by local and federal officials created this situation, 
and it is the responsibility of local and federal officials to address the reverberating problems that 
remain even today.  
 
Limitations of the Project 
This project relies on close readings of written archival documents, a method that does 
carry with it significant limitations as to the conclusions that can be drawn. Throughout my 
dissertation, I have attempted to focus on policy decisions and the motives that can be easily read 
through the records. Those motives I have ascribed to historical actors came only after careful 
consideration of the documents available, the conversations recorded in their pages, and the 
patterns evident over time. Even so, I do not wish to make any claims of being able to reach into 
the minds of policymakers to cast aspersions on their characters. While some in these pages were 
willing to make their racism clear, for others, we can only see the racist effects their actions (or 
lack of actions) have caused. We should also stop short of ascribing pure motives of altruism for 
those who did attempt to change the systems of poverty and public housing in Baltimore. 
Even with these limitations, the memos and meeting minutes, letters and newspaper 
editorials have a story to tell. By focusing on the rhetorical hinge of “choice” and the myriad 
ways such a concept was used through decades of subsidized housing policy, we can put these 
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documents into conversation with one another. Still, were I able to pour many more years and 
thousands more dollars of research funding into this dissertation, I would track down those 
housing officials who still remain and ask them about their thoughts and motivations. I would 
also speak to public housing residents, past and present, and ask the question of how much 
agency they feel they have in making decisions about where to live. Alas, both of those resources 
are in short supply.  
If I somehow had the ability to start this project again, knowing what I know now, it 
would have also taken a much different direction. I began this project as a public historian, 
envisioning an investigation into place-making and community-building in public housing. 
Along the way, I became a historian of policy and city planning, discovering the depths of policy 
decisions and the ways that city planners and developers have shaped our lives without most of 
us even noticing. I end it having completed a transition out of academia, becoming a practitioner 
of city planning and policy myself. Where I had previously written about the conflicts between 
civil servants and elected officials, I have now experienced first-hand the very real challenges 
that civil servants face in making community-centered policy in a capitalist society where the 
decisions of elected officials are far too often predicated upon the calculus of gathering future 
votes. Finally, though the decision to cut my timeframe off just before the wide-scale change to 
Section 8 vouchers was a purposeful one at the time I made it, as I now venture into the 
affordable housing policy world, I am faced with a future working in public policy for exactly 
that voucher system. While I do not regret any of the choices I made along the way, my 
movement from the theoretical realm to that of practice would have resulted in a wholly different 
project.   
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The policy ideal of “individual choice” is one we still grapple with today. From health 
insurance to schools, the rhetoric of choice becomes a shield beyond which it is difficult to 
pierce. As opponents to the Thompson v. HUD remedy argued, what right do housing officials 
have to insist that voucher recipients move to “Communities of Opportunity” to receive 
assistance? These are the same arguments we hear when people ask what right does the federal 
government have to insist that all citizens purchase health insurance, or that said insurance 
policies cover contraception? While there are policy nuances that need to be considered and 
discussed, the emphasis on individual choice precludes our ability to have these nuanced 
conversations. As our society becomes ever more deeply entrenched in staggering inequality, we 
must find ways to confront systemic problems without falling back on the excuses of individual 
decision making and responsibility. American liberalism has proven largely unable to deal with 
structural inequality because our resistance to asking the right questions means we cannot begin 
to contemplate the right answers. We have a lot to learn from these twentieth-century attempts to 
reckon with inequality, however well-intentioned or misguided or inadequate they might have 
been. The world our kids are going to grow up in is ever-more warped by our inability to 
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